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This dissertation focuses on community organizing and uses it as a mechanism to 
compare the political environments in Baltimore and Washington over the last three 
decades. By conducting comparison case studies, I identify the contextual 
circumstances that affect the ability of grassroots organizations to achieve desired 
ends. The fact that both cities have functioning Industrial Areas Foundatio  (IAF) 
affiliates – Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD) and the 
Washington Interfaith Network (WIN) – provides the opportunity to investigate the 
conditions that give rise to community organizing. Examining the interac ions 
between BUILD/WIN and mayoral administrations over time sheds light on the 
varying temporal contexts while also explicating the different managerial styles of 
central political actors. By conducting these case studies, I highlight the optimal 
political conditions for the inclusion of grassroots organizations repres nting the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In December 2008, nearly 1,000 members of Baltimoreans United in 
Leadership Development (BUILD) gathered at a local church to demand that funding 
for youth programming be a priority for the city, especially in d fficult economic 
times. BUILD wanted Mayor Sheila Dixon to commit a percentage of the economic 
stimulus package from the incoming Obama administration on recreation centers and 
afterschool programs. Alternatively, the group said it would be satisfied if Dixon 
spent some of the city’s Rainy Day Fund (i.e., budget reserve) on youth violence-
prevention programs. “When times are hard, we’re forced to make choices about what 
we value,” said the Rev. Andrew Foster Connors, pastor of Brown Memorial Park 
Avenue Presbyterian Church – one of the few predominately white member churches 
of BUILD. As he spoke, audience members opened umbrellas to symbolize that it 
was beyond raining, and now storming in the city. 
The position from mayor’s office was that the city could not make 
commitments regarding the expenditure of federal stimulus money which would 
likely include categorical requirements. An additional argument was th t tapping into 
the Rainy Day Fund would jeopardize the city’s bond rating, hurting future budgets. 
Several city council members attended BUILD’s event and supported the stimulus 
package demand, but some were reluctant to use the Rainy Day Fund. Like other cash 
strapped localities, the city faced an estimated $65 million shortfall for the 2010 fiscal 




times require leaders to prioritize – and children should be at the op of the list, 
particularly given the recent string of youth homicides in the city.  
One week later, BUILD attended the city’s Board of Estimates (BOE) meeting 
to make their voices heard. Though not a member of the Board, Councilwoman Mary 
Pat Clarke – one of the council members supportive of BUILD’s efforts – attempted 
to get the organization on the agenda. The meeting was to begin at 9:00 am, but was 
delayed for 30 minutes because the Mayor and Council President were upst at not 
being notified beforehand (in compliance with BOE standards requiring written 
notification of protests). As one present at the meeting, I can attest to the level of 
tension existing in the chamber; television cameras and reporters were also present to 
capture the exchange. Things came to a head when representatives of BUILD
addressed the Board. The exchange went as follows: 
BUILD: “Will you meet with us?” [BUILD delivers letter] 
Mayor Dixon: “I will give it to my scheduler. That is the process” 
Bishop Miles and Rev. Foster-Connors: “Is process more important than our 
children?” 
Pastor Kean: “We’re standing on principal, not process.” 
After this exchange, BUILD members left and convened outside the chamber. 
Bishop Miles: “We are constantly disrespected…told to talk to scheduling 
secretary…that would never happen to stadium developers! They are choosing t be 
politicians, not public servants.” 
Councilwoman Clarke: “I’m embarrassed…sometimes it’s better to be sinned against 




Lead Organizer English: “The same day the city announced $300 million for a 
stadium, possibly with public financing. We’re not against the stadium, we’re for the 
children.”  
This sort of exchange is typical of IAF affiliates; in particular, the modus 
operandi of BUILD and WIN is to make high profile demands at crucial times. This 
often means putting pressure on elected officials to dedicate resourc  to 
neighborhood revitalization to counterbalance funds allocated for downtown 
development. In this case, funding for youth programs was also made in light of the 
city considering funding options for replacing a decades-old arena. Through such 
efforts, these organizations seek to organize communities to challenge the status quo 
of local governments supporting economic development while neglecting the needs of 
struggling neighborhoods and their marginalized populations.  
While urban communities continue to suffer disproportionately from 
economic, social and political inequalities, mainstream political s ience literature 
very rarely addresses the issue of concentrated poverty, as well as potential solutions 
for the resulting gap in democracy. Despite Dahl’s assertion that disparities in 
political resources are non-cumulative, U.S. cities reflect patterns of inequality that 
are patently cumulative. Arguably, it is at the local level that the myth of pluralism is 
most clearly deconstructed. It is my contention that through community organizing 
activities, ordinary citizens – who more than likely would have been excluded from 
local policy making – are able to play a significant role in the political realm.  
I assert that community organizing provides a landscape through which to 




how. In other words, organizing is a vehicle to understanding which constitue cies 
what receive benefits, when this occurs and the process by which it happens. Thus, 
the study of organizing offers insight into the political process, focusing specifically 
on competing interests and citizen engagement in local governance. In the field of 
organizing, it is not easy to construct a cut and dried formula for succe s, as 
relationships not only matter, but are of the utmost importance. These relationships 
depend on social, economic, and political contexts, in addition to the leadrship style 
and governing philosophy of specific mayors. Hence, organizational successes are 
related to mayoral typologies, but not necessarily dependent upon them. Though 
some mayors may be more amenable to collaboration than others, the varying types 
of mayoral regimes do not completely account for the variance in outcomes.  
While leadership style matters, I contend that political culture, local 
institutions, and historical relationships are key factors to understanding the nexus 
between governing regimes and grassroots organizations.  No two cities are exactly 
the same (histories, economies, demographics, etc.), and each mayoral regime is the 
product of specific circumstances. While this study also focuses on imilarities 
between localities and political actors, it does not gloss over significant differences. 
In this regard, the Advisory Neighborhood Commissioner (ANC) system – a form of 
structured participation – is a distinguishing feature of Washington’s governing 
structure that must be considered, however this work will only touch uponit as my 
research has revealed that commissioners tend to work independently of organizers.                                      
Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) affiliates are broad-based, multi-issue 




evolve, issues emerge – and these conditions and issues have a unique local flavor. 
Appropriately, organizing strategies must also be adapted to local cnditions, as well 
as the attributes of existing mayoral administrations. Additionally, collaboration 
between grassroots organizations and mayoral regimes is based on calculations of 
mutual self-interest – with particular consideration given to previous relations 
(successes, disagreements) and future needs (votes, favored projects). 
This type of study is important because it chronicles what is happening at the 
local level and what this means for the democratic process. As politics centers on who 
gets what, when and how, this is an effort to understand the forces at work in urban 
America; it also seeks to determine the most successful methods for community 
engagement in local governance. One major contribution is that it seeks to uncover 
what works at the ground level. In the process, it bridges the gap between political 
science literature and local governance – moving past static models and abstractions 
to make the discipline relevant to specific issues, communities and practitioners. 
By necessity and design, this dissertation borrows from several traditions 
within political science; consequently it may not fit squarely into any one area but 
moves across subfields. While concentrating on the urban setting, it seriously 
considers political economy, relies on normative theory, and ultimately ddresses 
gaps in participation and outcomes in American politics. Additionally it looks at 
administration and policy at the local level and how the interests of marginalized 
communities are most effectively pursued. The goal of this dissertation is to paint a 
picture of community organizing, using Baltimore and Washington as the canvas. As 




this study necessarily includes multiple facets. The chapters in the dissertation build 
upon one another and explore how organizing affiliates function in specific contexts.  
Chapter 2 discusses the existing literature on community organizing and 
makes a case for why the project adds to extant knowledge on this topic. It also 
introduces the research project and highlights the points that it addresses. One major 
point is that organizing is needed to represent the interests of marginalized 
communities. Chapter 3 explores the social, economic and political histories of 
Baltimore and Washington, with a focus on the conditions that gave rise to 
organizing. Using historical records and interviews with organizers and ministers in 
each city, I illustrate how local conditions contribute to when and how organizing 
takes root.  
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the elements of mayoral leadership. Chapter 4 
presents a theory of urban governance and the relationship between typ s of mayors 
and community organizers. It lays out the expectations of neighborhood inclusio  in 
urban regimes, given the generation, race, and electoral coalition of mayors. The 
chapter also includes a typology of mayors based on a number of characteristics. 
Chapter 5 presents profiles of the mayors, focusing on how mayoral administrations 
either facilitate or frustrate the efforts of grassroots organizations.  By looking at 
individual regimes and their relationships with organizers, this chapter tests 
expectations based on mayoral characteristics.  
Chapter 6 examines the structure of organizing affiliates. It provides an in-
depth description of Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD) and 




themselves and their missions. It also focuses on the composition of the organizations 
and describes how they function based on the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) 
model. Again, I argue that organizational structure (racial and economic composition) 
and strategies are all context dependent. All of the information in this chapter was 
gleaned from IAF training sessions, interviews with organizers, BUILD/WIN 
meetings and local actions.    
Chapter 7 explores the most recent victories achieved by each organization. It 
assesses the influence of community organizing activities on municipal spending and 
tangible results, particularly in the realm of housing. The chapter also looks at the 
effectiveness of community/government collaborations and the obstacles o achieving 
desired ends.  The findings from these case studies are particularly inte esting given 
their consistency with the previously introduced mayoral typologies. The cases also 
powerfully illustrate the role that context plays in the responsive ess of local 
governments relative to available resources. In my view, social, economic, and 
political contexts contribute to success; as such, organizing outcomes are dependent 
on local economic resources as well as political will. 
Finally, chapter 8 looks to future of community engagement and collaboration 
with local government. The purpose of this chapter is to critique the effectiveness of 
community organizing (by IAF affiliates BUILD and WIN) and lay out some policy 
oriented prescriptions for urban America.  If we have learned anything, it is that 
although context matters, there are some general propositions which hold true. 
Mainly, local governments are prone to support downtown development and the key 










During the 2008 Presidential race, community organizing unexpectedly 
became a point of contention between the Democrats and Republicans. While 
organizing, as practiced by IAF affiliates is non-partisan, such grassroots efforts are 
respected in the so-called left, but are regularly shunned by the right.  The most recent 
Republican National Convention provides ample evidence: 
-Former Governor George Pataki said: “[Barack Obama] was a community 
organizer. What in God’s name is a community organizer? I don’t even know if that’s 
a job.” 
-Former Mayor Rudy Giuliani said: “On the other hand, you have a resume from a 
gifted man with an Ivy League education. He worked as a community organizer. 
What? [Laughter]…I said, OK, OK, maybe this is the first problem on the resume.” 
-Governor Sarah Palin said: “I guess a small-town mayor is sort of like a community 
organizer, except that you have actual responsibilities.” 
Although the comments were intended to shed doubt on the relevance of the 
Democratic nominee’s experience, they highlight the disconnection between the 
grassroots and the officials that govern.  It also speaks to the chasm between the 
urban and suburban, the black and white – in other words, the haves and the have-
nots. In the end, one thing is apparent – that a great majority of Americans have a 




limited substantive knowledge. This is despite the reality that most citizens have 
either directly or indirectly benefitted from sustained community driven efforts. The 
Civil Rights Movement is probably the greatest historical model of successful 
organizing. I argue that in the post-Civil Rights era, the work of IAF affiliates is the 
best modern example of successful community organizing. 
In light of the limited understanding of community organizing, it is necessary 
to outline some of the major tenets. The process of building a mobilzable community 
is called community organizing. It involves building an enduring network of people, 
who identify with common ideals and who can act on the basis of those ideals (Snow 
et al. 1986). Community organizing can, in fact, refer to the entire process of 
“organizing relationships, identifying issues, mobilizing around those is ues, and 
building an enduring organization” (Stall and Stoecker 1998: 730). An organizing 
approach changes politics and empowers citizens by de-professionalizing politics and 
relocating it in the face to face horizontal interactions among people. “Organizing 
begins with the culture, history, and past work of change in any setting. It has, as its 
first premise, a respect for the intelligence and talents of ordinary, uncredentialed 
citizens. It taps diverse self-interests, understanding self-interest in terms of the 
passions, life histories, relationships, and core values that motivate people” (Boyte 
2004: 35). Organizing is necessarily attentive to power relationships, from positional 
leadership to informal networks of leaders who sustain the cultures and relationships 
in any particular setting. 
  




A seminal work in the area of organizing is Piven and Cloward’s Poor 
People’s Movements. According to Piven and Cloward (1979: xi), “popular 
insurgency does not proceed by someone else’s rules or hopes; it ha  its own logic 
and direction. It flows from historically specific circumstances: it is a reaction against 
those circumstances, and it is also limited by those circumstances.” People experience 
deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of large 
and abstract processes, and it is the concrete experience that molds their discontent 
into specific grievances against specific targets (Piven and Cloward 1979). Thus, the 
workings of social movements can be understood best in the context of a theory that 
sees them in all their particularity, and as consequences of the narratives through 
which people construct, interpret, and appropriate daily experience (Kling 2003). 
Piven and Cloward (1979) reiterated the theme that while protest politics and 
electoral politics were different – one emphasized conflict, the o r consensus and 
coalitions – they were also interdependent.  Therefore, the proposed strategy was not 
to pursue protest politics independent of electoral politics, but to play them off each 
other. Electoral politics often created unsatisfactory results that over time could lead 
to the development of protest politics, and protest politics could help marginalized 
groups gain a greater voice in the electoral process (Shram 2003). As far as the Civil 
Rights Movement, Piven and Cloward (1979) concede that existing institutions 
provided the vehicles to forge solidarity, to define common goals, and to mobilize 
collective action. However, even as they recognized the presence of these 
organizational bases – what Morris (1984) later called “movement centers” – they 




“The concept ‘movement center’ suggests that an alternative view best describes the 
workings of the civil rights movement: movement centers provided the organizational 
framework out of which the modern civil rights movement emerged and it was 
organization-building that produced these centers” (Morris 1984: 74). 
However, the mobilizing tradition, which focused on large, relatively short-
term public events, is what is best known. In popular memory, it is often taken as 
synonymous with the Civil Rights Movement. “Yet it was the organizing tradition 
that led to the transformation of everyday life and interracial power relations in the 
South… By patient, sustained work in communities, organizing approaches created 
foundations across the South on which the whole movement built…Such leadership 
had developed over decades. The movement created the context in which their public 
talents and political vision deepened and became widely visible” (Boyte 2004: 35). 
Southern black rural culture long included a tradition of community organizing that 
politicized the black community through political participation and the cultivation of 
indigenous leadership. That leadership emphasized helping people develop 
themselves for long-range progress and continuity rather than merely r lying on a 
single event to effect change (Payne 1996). Such a rich organizational infrastructure 
provided the material resources, spiritual/cultural messages and communication 
networks necessary for communal solidarity; these elements in tandem are largely 
responsible for success of the boycotts and protests of the movement.  
Hence, there were in fact two strands of the Civil Rights Movement – the 
mobilizing approach that led to demonstrations like the March on Washington and the 




origins of the movement not exclusively in the Black church, or in external events, 
but in a long- standing, indigenous organizing tradition. This paints a clear picture of 
the older Blacks in the South who had their own, older organizing tradition and who 
provided crucial support for young civil rights activists in the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  “What energized and sustained SNCC was not the 
relationship between young students and older leaders and organizations, such as 
Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), or 
the NAACP. Instead, it was personal ties and personal biographies on the local level. 
The movement in Mississippi was not the result of an infusion of outside activists but 
rather it was “about a young organizing tradition building upon an older one” (Payne 
1996: 179). 
Alinsky and the Industrial Areas Foundation 
Building upon the tradition of organizing through religious-based institutions, 
Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) affiliates operate as interconnected networks of 
congregations. IAF affiliates are dues-based, adhering to the belief that power comes 
in two forms: organized people and organized money. Under this rubric, an effective 
broad-based collective is defined as many organized institutions with some organized 
money in the form of dues. This is a reasonable measure because it follows that when 
a broad-based collective has a well-organized base of people and some money, it has 
a more solid platform from which to deal with politicians and business interests. Al o, 
as membership dues support the organizing efforts of the affiliates, th y are less 
susceptible to control from external funding entities. However, institutional 




organizations must be able to take on multiple issues because their member 
organizations have multiple interests. 
Nevertheless, the positives of this membership structure outweigh the 
negatives as existing institutions such as church congregations incorporate networks 
of citizens who share some level of initial trust and cooperative ties. “Religious 
congregations have staying power, so they can engage people in long-term processes 
of community building and democratic participation” (Warren 2001: 21). In addition, 
religion can offer a moral vision for political action. If we are particularly concerned 
with addressing the problems of low-income communities of color, commitments to 
social justice must inform understandings of community; a vision of social justice can 
inspire members of oppressed groups to action (Warren 2001). 
“Alinsky pointed to pragmatic power concerns: poor communities had to start 
by unifying what “pockets of power” existed. Other approaches, he argued, simply 
did not generate as much power. In fact, this institutionally grounded organizing has, 
over a period of several decades, proven more effective in mobilizing poor 
communities than have competing models of citizen mobilization” (Boyte 2004: 49) 
Alinsky’s model divided cities into two systems, the neighborhood and the larger, 
adversarial power structure outside. “Poor, minority, and working class ommunities, 
in his analysis, were victimized by the affluent, powerful, downtow-connected 
interests who bestowed social services and economic largess on the already privileged 
areas of the city. Within neighborhoods, the goal was to create an org ization of 




This is consistent with Ferman’s assertion that “decisions made behind closed 
doors reflect the interests of those on the inside; neighborhoods often rise or fall as a 
result of those decisions” (Ferman 1996: 12). Ferman’s treatment of urban arenas 
draws attention to institutional structures, patterns of resource distribution, and 
underlying political cultures; the goal is to identify the opportunities for political 
mobilization and the form that such mobilization will take (1996). Such an analysis 
identifies some of the conditions favorable to neighborhood incorporation, the a ure 
of that incorporation, and its significance for progressive government. Thus, 
integrating neighborhoods into urban political analysis adds a normative dimension 
currently lacking in the economic development or marketplace conception of the city; 
such an analysis tackles questions of participation, citizenship, and quality of life 
(Ferman 1996). 
Understandably, political engagement in depressed communities requires 
organization. Someone has to build strong enough relationships between people so 
they can support each other through long and challenging struggles. The IAF n twork 
continues to forge a thoughtful, constantly evaluated political practice out of the 
tension between ‘the world as it is’ and ‘the world as it should be’. “It not only 
teaches specific political information and skills; it adds a strong public relationship-
building dimension that helps re-center politics among citizens” (Boyte 2004: 53). To 
this end, communities often have to be “reorganized” to support political action 
(Alinsky 1971). Therefore, for successful progressive politics to take root, it must 
come via local mobilization. The IAF shows that people can be brought into politics 




concern them (Osterman 2002). “The strongest case for organizing locally is that it is 
only at this level that politics can be taught. And it is at this level that people are best 
mobilized. No matter how important the national agenda, the power to achieve it can 
be generated only through local action” (Osterman 2002: 190). 
 The Alinsky (IAF) model is based in a conception of separate public and 
private spheres, with “community organizing” being the public sphere battles 
between the haves and have-nots. The main role of the private sphere is to support the 
organizer’s public sphere work. While problems begin in the private sphere, it is 
important to move the community to understand how those problems are connected to 
larger issues outside the community. Thus problems could not be solved solely within 
the community but by the community being represented better in the public sphere 
(Reitzes and Reitzes 1987b). Therefore, as power and politics both occur in the public 
sphere, poor communities are able to gain power through public sphere action – 
picking a single elite target, isolating it from other elites, personalizing it, and 
polarizing it. 
In the Alinsky model, the organizer is not just there to win a few issues but to 
build an enduring formal organization that can continue to claim power and resources 
for the community – to represent the community in a competitive public sphere 
pluralist polity (Stall and Stoecker 1998). Hence, this type of community building is 
an ongoing approach to economic, social, and cultural vitality, as opposed t  a 
specific program or formula. Successful community building includes “a ustained 
series of strategic accomplishments that have a discernible impact on people, 




goal of IAF affiliates is to build sustained power. This is not the same as episodic 
demonstrations, but is rooted in the forming and re-forming of relationsh ps over 
time, predicated upon mutual self-interest. 
Thus, from a perspective that emphasizes the importance of the public sphere, 
organizing people requires appealing to the self-interest of groups and individuals. 
Organizers recognize that one has to work with people where they are and appeal to 
them in terms of what they understand their immediate interests to be. In order to be 
effective, organizers must operate in terms of the consciousness and political 
understanding of the people they attempt to organize (Kling 2003). The belief is that 
people become involved because they think there is something in it for themselves 
(Alinsky 1969; 1971). Since Alinsky saw society as a compromise between 
competing self-interested individuals in the public sphere, conflict was inevitable, and 
a pluralist polity was the means by which compromise was reached. Because poor 
people are at an initial disadvantage in that polity, the organizer’s job is to prepare 
citizens to engage in the level of public conflict necessary for them to be included in 
the compromise process (Reitzes and Reitzes 1987b). 
Concepts: Participation, Power and Social Capital 
Ultimately, the purpose of building strong organizations and reinforcing 
relationships is for distressed communities to seize the power necssary to exert some 
control over their destinies. Real democracy requires effective onnections between 
well organized communities and the political system. This requires m diating 
institutions that are capable of intervening successfully in politics and government 




Community building through organizing provides the structure within which demands 
can be presented by those who have first-hand knowledge of the local problems from 
which their communities suffer disproportionately. Ongoing organizing efforts 
support the relationships and mechanisms of collaboration through which change can 
be accomplished in a way that all parties involved meet their insttutional needs – i.e. 
mutual self interest. 
Community organizing (which I consider a form of community building) is 
intimately related to social capital, which can be thought of as a bundle of resources 
that – when activated – reinforces the capacity to act. This capacity is the interaction 
of the organizational resources and social capital existing within a given community 
that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve or maintain the well-
being of that community. Accordingly, community building is rapidly gaining 
recognition as a vital force for revitalizing democracy at the ground level as it seeks 
to reverse the decline of social capital in urban communities. Social capital resources 
exist in the structure of relations between and among actors (Coleman 1988). 
Essentially, social capital refers to the connections among individuals and the norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arises from them (Putnam 2000). Social capital 
signals that something of value has been produced for individuals who are involved in 
relationships with others (Putnam 2000). 
As an antidote to a dearth of urban social capital, community developmnt 
(another form of community building) can be defined as combining material 
development with the development of people. Real development necessarily involves 




building within the community critical thinking and planning abilities, a  well as 
concrete skills so that community members can replicate developmnt projects and 
processes in the future. The end result should leave a community not just with more 
immediate “products” (e.g., housing), but also with an increased capacity to address 
future issues and ability to replicate their achievements in othersituations (Kennedy 
1996). Successful community development can be manifested through tangible 
products of development, but rests primarily on power and control being increasingly 
vested in community members.  
“Although it is attractive and sensible to see the IAF as a piece of a solution to 
the growing deficit in social capital, there is a significant difference of spirit between 
the IAF and the social capital story. At its base the IAF wants to alter what it views as 
an imbalance in power, and it assumes and accepts that as part of its efforts, it will 
engage in political conflict” (Osterman 2002: 179). One challenge constantly 
confronting community organizers is developing leaders’ ability to accurately 
interpret their complex political environments. “Political environment here includes 
all those institutions, politically connected individuals, and issues that an organization 
might hope to influence. Interpreting that environment includes deciding what 
alliances to forge, which issues to pursue, what political or business leaders to target, 
and what information to gather” (Wood 1999: 314).  
Thus, community organizations must constantly interpret an ever-changing 
and ambiguous political environment; gaining skills such as of leading meetings, 
analyzing political opportunities, and developing political relationships requires 




observes, “if local government and municipal institutions are no longer ad qu te 
arenas for republic citizenship, we must seek public spaces as may be found amidst 
the institutions of civil society – in schools and workplaces, churches and 
synagogues, trade unions, and social movements.” It is only via these institutions that 
people can practice the kind of real politics that strong democracy entails. However, 
deliberation and agency are only part of the IAF story. “The IAF also has a view 
about distribution, not simply that the problem lies in a general failure of 
participation, but that the systematic exclusion of the “bottom third” is the real villain. 
In addition, the IAF is concerned with power and self-interest, albeit a self-interest 
modified by deliberation and community” (Osterman 2002: 182). 
If social capital is to be built – if attitudes of dependency are to be replaced 
with those of self-reliance – neighborhood residents must largely do it for themselves. 
This is consistent with the IAF’s Iron Rule: never do for others what they can do for 
themselves. In other words “community participation” is not enough; the community 
must play the central role in devising and implementing strategies for its own 
improvement. This does not mean that outside facilitators cannot provide guidance or 
that they cannot accept outside help or accomplish goals by partnering with outside 
agencies, but neighborhood residents must “own” the improvement process. 
As power is central to the work of community organizers, it is also vital to this 
dissertation. According to Elkin (1985), power in the sense of the capacity to promote 
or protect interests is therefore not just the ability to influence the outcome of a 
particular decision, but rather the capacity to shape and take advant ge of a set of 




each city has its own history, stakeholders, and arenas, it is crucial to have an 
understanding of what specific arrangements are at work in Baltimore and 
Washington. Arenas are “spheres of activity” that are distinguished by particular 
institutional frameworks and underlying political cultures that lend a structure to 
these activities. “Local political systems are made up of numerous arenas – electoral, 
civic, and business; which institutions within the city are prominent and how they 
operate depends largely on which arena is the primary home of activity” (Ferman 
1996: 5). Stone (1980) contends that, “Power is not only interpersonal; it is also 
intergroup (including relationships between classes and strata)… Power is not only a 
matter of intention; it is also a matter of context, of the nature of or “logic” of the 
situation… Power relationships are not only direct; they may also be indir ct” (979-
80).  
This supports the point made by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) that contending 
groups exercise power not only to influence the outcomes of specific issues but also 
to shape the context of decision making and thereby influence how, and eve  
whether, an issue develops. “Systemic power can be defined as that dimension of 
power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system (the situational 
element) confer advantages and disadvantages on groups (the intergroup lement) in 
ways predisposing public officials to favor some interests at the expense of others 
(the indirect element)” (Stone 1980: 980). Furthermore, urban political coalitions can 
be put together in multiple ways, and different kinds of coalitions are formed for 
different purposes. Although electoral coalitions may appear to be pluralistic, once 




involving upper-strata interests in planning and formulating policy proposals (Stone 
1980).  Similarly, there are indications that mayors elected with strong lower-strata 
support nevertheless feel constrained to form policy alliances with business interests 
(Stokes 1973). 
Because officials are predisposed to favor some interests and oppose others,
this system lowers the opportunity costs for some groups while raising them for 
others, thereby having an important impact on the community’s overall s t of power 
relationships. This observation reflects the necessity to have avenues for the resource 
poor to be included in governing and the policy realm. To this end, although scholars 
such as Berry et al (1993) have studied advisory councils, no one has studied their 
success over time and how they intersect with grassroots organizing efforts. The 
question that has yet to be answered is whether institutionalized advisory councils 
have the intended effect of substantive neighborhood inclusion. This dissertat on 
looks to answer this question as well determine what impact their success or failure 
has had upon community organizing over time. Are such structured mechanisms mere 
gestures of participatory democracy with no real impact or are they actually useful 
tools that simply do not have the capacity to represent the most urgent community 
needs and therefore necessitate community organizing efforts? Regardless, it will add 
to the knowledge of the political science discipline to conduct serious analysis in this 
area. 
The concept of power is often misunderstood and too limited. There are two 
types of power – power over (dominant) vs. power to (relational); the power with 




concept of power is rooted in forming, sustaining, and strengthening relationships; it 
is the nuanced treatment of relationships that is captured in the term “social capital.” I 
believe that latent community power may become active when underserved 
neighborhoods are organized with the intention of influencing the political process to 
achieve community-determined ends. Community organizing represents the pus  for 
inclusion of marginalized communities in addressing everyday issues; the focus is on 
self-determination within the existing policy realm. Accordingly, organizing efforts 
must be non-exclusionary (in terms of race and class) in order to be effective; such an 
inclusive orientation extends past a parochial and thereby limited perspective. 
Organizing in the Post-Civil Rights Era  
This dissertation looks at community organizing as a method for cultivating 
community capacity to influence local policy, including the distribution of resources 
and services. To some it might seem that there are no new lessons to be learned in the 
field of community organizing. From this perspective, everything of importance has 
already been said and the sad reality is that organizing has no substantial positive 
outcome. It is quite easy, and unfair for that matter, to assert that community 
organizing has no impact because one can see that all of the problems that beset large 
urban centers like Baltimore and Washington have not been solved. However, I argue 
that conditions in marginalized communities would be even worse in the absence of 
organizing activities. A major facet of my argument is that a number of benefits 
would never have come about without grassroots activity. In other words, changes in 





There are some lessons to be learned from the past, including victories and 
defeats, as well as new ones as we move forward in time. Community organizing 
does have its limitations, specifically when it comes to addressing larger systemic 
issues. The fact wholesale change did not occur as a result of the movements of the 
turbulent 1960s and 70s is not cause to abandon the concept of organizing, but to 
view it through a new and more practical lens. Some community activists in past 
generations tended to use more conflict-oriented strategies which conveyed the 
impression that they wanted to make inner-city neighborhoods self-contained nd 
largely independent from an encompassing adversarial system (Kingsley et. al 1997). 
But an important difference with current community organizers is that they recognize 
that such methods are self-defeating and impractical.  
Instead, organizers look for opportunities to partner with outside institutions 
in ways that will serve their own interests and strengthen their own internal 
institutions. In this way organizers attempt to use conflict as atool of a pursuing a 
progressive agenda rather than letting it become an end in itself. Th  IAF has a 
slogan, “no permanent allies, no permanent enemies,” that reflects a realistic view of 
the world but that also shields it against a shallow reading of self interest (Osterman 
2002). To this end, the only thing that is somewhat permanent are the issues affecting 
communities on a daily basis. This flexibility demonstrates the consistent pragmatism 
practiced by IAF affiliates given an unpredictable political limate and the need to 
create alliances. “The IAF is always willing to take half  loaf. Its ability to 




with. It avoids “letting the best solution get in the way of a good s lution” (Osterman 
2002: 176).  
Rather than throwing up hands in despair, it is more important tha ever to 
speak to the issues that plague marginalized communities and find concrete solutions 
to concrete problems, as opposed to abstract theories totally divorced from reality and 
public policy. Organizing is based on an attachment to the particul r; it aims to 
further the demands of a set of local people, and to foster their ability to govern 
themselves, challenge authority, and develop their civic capacities. Distressed 
neighborhoods suffer from systematic disadvantages resulting from macro-issues, 
which require both internal cohesion and collaboration with outside entities to attack 
(Sabl 2002). I contend that it is primarily through organizing that distressed 
communities are able to form a stable base from which to negotiate for beneficial 
policy outcomes. Indeed, the outlook is not hopeless, but organizing is not a panacea 
for all of the collective economic and social woes facing cities. The counterargument 
to the effectiveness of organizing is, in fact, an indictment of the prevailing political 
and economic system in the United States. Organizing works to counteract he 
deleterious consequences of urban inequality, however, the battle is against 
entrenched power. 
Nonetheless, community organizing represents the most pragmatic, and 
arguably the most potent vehicle for depressed urban communities to be integrated 
into the political process. Splintered groups have so far proven unable to translate 
their grievances with the government into a political platform for negotiations – 




some fascination with and belief in the transformative power of community 
organizing. Unfortunately, this has somewhat waned over time as few scholars 
currently venture into urban political economy and the efforts of citizens to get their 
fair share of the American Dream. Rather than lamenting the problem of inequality 
and pontificating about options that have no feasible chance of implementation, he 
study of community organizing provides the opportunity to assess the success of 
something tangible and to make suggestions regarding effective strat gies to secure 
desired outcomes. Organizers stress that achieving equitable policy outcomes requires 
addressing inequalities in social power. This activity may not turn the entire tide of 
American corporatism and the concentration of wealth, but organizing does create 
tangible differences in the lives of everyday people. 
Moreover, whereas the standard measure of a social movement’s “succes ” is 
the extent to which it achieves a predetermined set of demands or policy goals, the 
measure of an organizing movement’s success is the extent to which it engages 
people to pursue their own goals (Sabl 2002). Although results are extm ly 
important, organizing is worthwhile because it breaks down barriers between social 
groups and challenges the top-down paradigm – regardless of whether it succeeds in 
changing government or corporate policy. For democracy to thrive, political 
institutions must be constantly renewed through democratic action on behalf of those 
excluded from the polity. As low- and middle-income urban residents fi d it 
increasingly difficult to have their voices heard in the public aren , their ability to do 
so, comes from organizing large numbers of people together. In other words, they 




contributions, in which they are vastly outspent by more affluent resident  (Verba et 
al. 1995). Among the most effective groups challenging the status quo in the United 
States are those engaged in “community organizing” (Boyte 1989; Greider 1992; 
Warren 2001). These “church-based community organizing” efforts thus make up far 
and away the most widespread social movement advocating social justice among poor 
and working-class Americans today (Wood 1999). 
Research Agenda in Baltimore and Washington 
It is important to recognize that urban communities are not static, but dynamic 
and constantly changing. The urban landscape has changed over the last two decades 
as cities have reemerged as desirable places to the whites and middle-class blacks that 
left. Subsequently, more attention is focused on urban areas and the probl ms that 
have been neglected for generations. Although the demographics of cities may be 
changing through gentrification, power relations and the disparities of res urces have 
remained somewhat constant. If power dynamics have not changed apprci bly, it is 
important to understand why not. It is a different time period with different actors, so 
it is quite possible for the combination to produce somewhat different outcomes. And 
if power dynamics are truly static, it speaks to underlying systemic inequalities that 
must also be addressed. 
In order to flesh out the importance of both grassroots organizing and codified 
mechanisms of community engagement and their respective impacts on the policy 
process, it is fitting to analyze cities with different strucures of neighborhood 
inclusion. Baltimore and Washington are cities that are geographically close and 




political/policy making process. Since 1973 – the beginning of Home Rule in 
Washington – each of the District’s eight wards has had Advisory Neighborhood 
Commissioners who act as conduits between the neighborhoods in the variouswards 
and the elected council members. Conversely, in Baltimore there is no structured 
system – there are elected city council representatives and a number of neighborhood 
associations, but no formal connection between these groups and the city government. 
It seems plausible that this disconnection between communities and the local 
governing structure necessitates organizing activities. Additionally, the fact that both 
cities have functioning Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) affiliates – Baltimoreans 
United In Leadership Development (BUILD) and Washington Interfaith Network 
(WIN) – also provides the opportunity to investigate the conditions that give rise to 
community organizing by taking a look at their origins. 
As long as those in depressed urban communities face the multi-faceted 
problems of limited employment opportunities, strained educational environments, 
dilapidated housing, and inadequate support services, community organizing remains 
the most accessible and productive outlet. The term “community organizing” s often 
tossed about by those with only a passing knowledge or familiarity. Those who have 
seriously studied community organizing have had to become intimately ssociated 
with such organizations in order to gain both trust and access. It i such a qualitative 
approach that allows me, as a researcher, to uncover previously ignored elements and 
make more nuanced assertions regarding grassroots efforts in local politics. True 
organizing is a marathon and not a sprint. It takes time to build relationships of trust, 




local government. In this regard, successful organizing is based on forging and 
maintaining relationships (the building of social and political capital). Community 
organizing, like politics, is not so much an exact science as it is an art that must be 
practiced in order to be perfected. Nonetheless, there are some specific elements that 
could be deemed necessary and/or sufficient for grassroots activity to take hold. 
Not to say that organizing cannot be analyzed in a coherent, structured 
manner, but true understanding only comes with a temporal, contextual orientation. 
The purpose of this study is to uncover the specific circumstances that contribute to 
successful community organizing. Proper analysis requires knowledge of key 
players/stakeholders and their motivations (self-interest), which is not static, but 
changes over time. As such, historical developments, along with the economic and 
political landscape specific to a city, is something that must be considered when 
making assessments of governing structures and citizen inclusion. Additionally the 
relative strength of the mayor (Baltimore vs. Washington) is a factor that may be 
correlated with the administration’s willingness to collaborate with community 
groups. Both cities have relatively strong mayors, however, in Baltimore the mayor 
has greater ability to act unilaterally, while in DC the mayor must coordinate with the 
council to a greater extent.  
There are three primary sectors that interact at the local level: public 
(electoral), private (business) and civic (grassroots organizations); each of these 
facets has a particular self-interest, which at some times ay be in accordance or 
conflict with that of the other two. The self-interest germane to organizers in 




quality of life issues. The self-interest most crucial to business is an economic 
environment that increases profit margin and growth. The self-interest most critical to 
an elected official is electoral viability and support. I argue that each of these interests 
can be counterbalanced, but that the grassroots sector will only be included to the 
extent which organizers push the case. Elected officials and business entities often 
collaborate for the purposes of economic development, but coordination between 
governing administrations and grassroots organizations is often less than automatic. 
Research Questions/Hypotheses: 
What role does the philosophical orientation/leadership style of the mayor h ve upon 
the longevity and success of community organizing initiatives? 
It is my contention that leadership does matter, and that the degree to which 
community organizers are integrated into the governing structure dep n s quite 
heavily on the orientation of the mayoral administration. Although other efforts have 
discussed mayoral administrations as more of an afterthought, I embarked on this 
research with the question of executive leadership at the forefront. Mayoral 
philosophies may fit into a general typology (top down/oppositional vs. 
inclusionary/collaborative). This distinction, which is by no means discrete 
(either/or), may provide a shorthand mechanism for categorizing and critiquing 
mayoral administrations and governing regimes.  
What impact does the political structure – presence or lack of structured community 
participation – have upon the existence of grassroots organizations? Does 
neighborhood representation make organizing seem less necessary because of 




I also believe that a city’s governing structure matters in the development of 
community organizing affiliates. In the vacuum of meaningful neighborhood 
integration in local government, organizing sprouts as an antidote to this exclusion. 
However, I also find that government structured avenues for neighborhood 
participation can prove to be insufficient, from which emerges the call for grassroots 
organizing efforts. I hypothesize that community organizing and advisory councils 
are individually necessary, but could be more optimal when in tandem. Each has its 
own merits, however, if combined, inclusive government structures and bottom up 
strategies would provide for a more complete and responsive system. 
Why did organizing (IAF affiliate) take root in Baltimore thirty years ago, while this 
only occurred in Washington during the course of the last twelve years? 
Previous works have not asked the questions of why organizing takes place in 
some cities as opposed to others, why it occurs at different times n different places, 
and what contextual elements portend success or failure. Also, while ther  has been 
discussion of governing regimes, there has been little thought given to the types of 
government that allow organizing to be more effective, or make it seemingly 
unnecessary. I anticipated finding that in Baltimore the long history of organizing has 
served as a link between neighborhoods and government in the absence of a 
structured mechanism. I also expected to find that as a city such as Washington 
gentrifies, it becomes all too apparent that successive generatio s of black leadership 
and structured neighborhood representation are insufficient when it comes t  meeting 




How effective are the organizing strategies employed by IAF affiliates? Are they 
catalysts for significant policy change, or only responsible for limited improvements 
at the fringes? 
It appears that in Baltimore and Washington, the respective IAF affiliates 
(BUILD and WIN) have managed to emerge as significant players in the policy arena, 
particularly when it comes to affordable housing. It appears that the strength of the 
mayor in relation to the city council and the types of projects for which the 
administration needs broad support has an impact on the degree to which the agendas 
of broad-based grassroots organizations are addressed. This is evidenc d by deal-
making regarding municipal projects; in Baltimore this meant securing affordable 
housing in exchange for the convention center hotel, and in Washington this meant 
securing affordable housing in exchange for the baseball stadium. 
Theoretical Contributions 
I propose a theory of Non-Exclusionary Organizing which holds that 
organizing efforts that include a broad base of constituents/supporters are more likely 
to sustain challenges from majority-dominated institutions. Universal programs have 
much greater political strength than do programs targeted solely at low-income or 
minority populations. Further, integrated organizations arouse less suspicion and are 
able to make the case that benefits do not exclusively go to blacks/minorities, but to 
all of those that may need assistance. As a consequence, they are more able to sustain 
challenges from an urban regime. Organizers recognize that it is neither practical nor 
feasible to be strictly confrontational. Consequently, we see the emerg nce of this 




wholesale systematic change. This is not so much a failing as a realization that the 
revolution so bandied about in the 1960s and 70s never came to fruition; so short f 
that, largely black, marginalized communities must truly move from protest to 
organized politics. Since Alinksy’s death, the surviving organization (IAF) has 
adopted a strategy that seeks compromise, but is also willing to engag  in public 
conflict (Lancourt 1979). 
There are others that have recently studied community engagement in urban 
politics, however, my approach merges the community development/building work in 
the field of urban planning with the social action/movements literature found in 
sociology and the writing on participation in political science. This approach 
combines a focus on housing and services with social capital and political efficacy. 
To understand what community organizing looks like, one must gain access in order 
to gain a more in-depth vantage point. As Richard Fenno popularized “soaking and 
poking” at the Congressional level, I have sought to do this at the local level. To this 
end, it was instructive to attend the IAF national training to get a better idea of how 
the IAF sees itself and how it trains organizers on the central elements of power and 
relationships. Consequently a major portion of my research agenda includes open-
ended interviews with past and present organizers for BUILD and WIN. 
Additionally, I look at organizing from the perspective of holding loca  
administrations accountable to citizens/voters. Orr notes that “social capital, even 
robust intergroup social capital combined with financial resources, is not enough 
without the votes, representation, political incorporation, and political leadership 




mechanism behind the conversion of social capital into policy with which I am 
specifically interested. While Orr has looked at Baltimore and BUILD, his previous 
work has focused largely on the school system, while my work concentrat s more on 
housing. I am also seeking to uncover the specific differences between mayoral 
administrations in regard to the inclusion of marginalized 
communities/neighborhoods. Although organizing strategies are of major imp tance, 
the ability to achieve desired ends is also related to the governing styles of mayoral 
administrations. 
Also, while Ferman analyzes the efforts of community based organizations to 
challenge the downtown growth orientation of local governments, her treatment of 
arenas does not sufficiently address structured forms of participation. Her criticism of 
regime theory is that it holds a static view of the balance of power between business 
elites and political elites, despite evidence of variances in such power dynamics. As 
Ferman notes, while Elkin has emphasized the centrality of institutional arrangements 
in his typology of urban regimes, he noted that the “consequences” of institutional 
variation over time had not been investigated (Ferman 1996: 7). I seek to uncover 
these consequences in Baltimore and Washington. This dissertation does ot look at 
community organizing in isolation, nor does it look at governing regimes in isolation, 
the major contribution is that it stresses the relationship between th  two. 
Governments tend to be top down, organizers stress the bottom up; in order for the 
system to be effective these two orientations must balance one another. There are 




addressing macro issues, and communities are responsible for making sure that their 
specific issues are recognized by the government.  








“Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate nd 
unequal…Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive 
environment totally unknown to most white Americans. What white Americans have 
never fully understood but what the Negro can never forget--is that whitesoci ty is 
deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions 
maintain it, and white society condones it”  
The quote above is from the Report of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, better known as the Kerner Commission, which was convened after 
the 1967 riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Newark, NJ, to uncover the causs nd 
potential solutions to the unrest. Although the study came to the clear conclusion that 
social, economic, and political inequality based on race was the motivating factor in 
these urban disturbances, neither the national or local governments were willing or 
able to address the long-standing systemic issues facing blacks in America’s cities. If 
Martin Luther King had a dream of equality and human dignity for all people, history 
reveals that it most certainly was deferred; and to quote Langsto  Hughes, “what 
happens to a dream deferred...does it shrivel up and die, or does it explode?” 
Entrenched poverty and lack of political voice was a powder keg waiting to explode, 
which it finally did in the late 1960s. Because this situation was not fully understood 




Local politics differs from national politics in important ways, particularly as 
group interest and conflict over power and material resources is quite apparent at this 
level (Kaufmann 2005). But whereas others look at group conflict via public opinion 
and voting patterns, my aim is to look at the expression of group interest via 
community organizing and policy outcomes. It is correct that the allocation of 
resources can be extraordinarily contentious and elicit heightened conflict among 
racial groups. However, it is my contention that the study of organizing s able to 
uncover a less understood dimension – not necessarily the conflict among 
communities, but the tension between underserved communities and local 
governments. Although local governments are tasked with serving neighborhoods, 
there are competing economic interests that often lead mayors to make decisions that 
may seem beneficial for overall economic development, but in reality are detrimental 
to the most vulnerable city populations. I propose that without pressure from local 
organizers, it is more than probable that the interests most salient to marginalized 
communities would not be addressed, or would be mere afterthoughts. 
This chapter begins with the racial and political histories of Baltimore and 
Washington in the late 1960s and focuses on the conditions that give rise to 
organizing.  The purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for community organizing 
efforts in Baltimore and Washington and detail the origins of Baltimoreans United in 
Leadership Development (BUILD) and the Washington Interfaith Network (WIN). 
My major thesis is that the historical context of the city determines when and how 
organizing will emerge. The larger purpose of this study is to not only u derstand 




importantly what they tell us about the political structure and policy outcomes in 
Baltimore and Washington, as it relates to neglected segments of the population and 
the issues that are of importance to them. Although there may be commonalities, no 
two cities are the same and an overzealous attempt to make generalizations will gloss 
over significant nuances. A major consideration in the choice of Baltimore and 
Washington is that these cities provide substantive variation across a number of 
important factors; the objective is to provide significant variation in political context 
as well as other systemic factors that influence neighborhood / community 
mobilization directly and indirectly. 
Baltimore and Washington have similarities such as majority black 
populations, concentrated poverty and pockets of wealth, and some degree of 
descriptive representation/empowerment, but differ in a variety of ways. On one 
hand, Baltimore is a major American city, but has been studied far less frequently by 
political scientists and urban scholars than cities such as Boston, Chicago, Detroit, 
Los Angeles, and New York. On the other hand, Washington, DC is often viewed as 
an atypical American city, specifically because it is the Nation’s Capital. But aside 
from being the seat of the federal government, the city surrounding this enclave is 
quite typical of many urban centers. Nonetheless, there are important institutional 
differences between the two cities as Baltimore is the large, black city in the state of 
Maryland, while Washington is the black city controlled by Congress, though lacking 
a vote within its halls. Another potentially important point of variation is the 
respective structures of their local governments, as Washington has the Advisory 




while Baltimore has no such system. However, one element that links he two cities is 
that they both have affiliates of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), the oldest and 
largest community organizing network in the United States – BUILD and WIN.  
Although both cities have a strong mayor system of local government, the 
mayor of Baltimore wields a bit more power than does the mayor of Washington. In 
Baltimore’s government structure, most of the power lies in the mayor (especially 
when it comes to the budget), whereas the council has limited power. In D.C., there is 
more balance as the mayor needs a greater degree of support from council members 
to get budgets and favored legislation passed. This difference influ nces the way that 
the mayors in the respective cities interact with council members and partially 
dictates the strategies for organizers to engage local government. In addition, the 
large public sector employment base in Washington provides a certain degree of 
economic vitality and avenues for a burgeoning black middle class. This is in stark 
contrast to the economic chasm left by the decline of the manufacturing industry in 
Baltimore which translates to a smaller black middle class and large black underclass. 
Other important differences between Baltimore and Washington derive from their 
unique social and political histories. 
From my perspective, the story begins in 1968, because I contend that the 
riots of that year are central to understanding the conditions in each city. These urban 
uprisings are undoubtedly demonstrative of the rage, disinvestment, and racial 
animosity that imperil urban areas and are directly related to the issues that organizers 
seek to address. Baltimore and Washington are two of the cities worst impacted by 




assassination, the hope for political inclusion embodied in the civil rights movement 
went up in flames along with the many shops and businesses that served the black 
community. For those who remained in these primarily black and poor sections of 
their respective cities, the burned out reminders of past gone economic vitality along 
with exodus of whites and the black middle class emblazoned the belief that the civil 
rights movement had indeed passed them by.  
This is quite true when it comes to certain neighborhoods in both cities, where 
many residents seemingly have little to no prospects for upward mobility or 
meaningful political inclusion. The ‘best of times, worst of times’ Dickensian 
dichotomy fairly accurately describes the economic fortunes of Baltimore City and 
the District of Columbia. In each locale there are peaks of wealth and valleys of 
poverty; and in both cities this economic disparity is further compounded by race. 
While having majority black populations for decades, wealth in Baltimore and 
Washington is disproportionately held by a white minority (ever increasing in DC), 
while poverty is concentrated in black communities.  Although separated by 
approximately 50 miles, the similarities between the two are quite striking. Aside 
from Baltimore’s Inner Harbor and Washington’s Capitol Hill, notoriously 
impoverished communities languish within a stone’s throw of these 
nationally/internationally revered areas. 
In addition to inter-city disparities, intra-city disparities are quite glaring in both 
locales. Undoubtedly, many of those employed in Baltimore and Washington live in 
suburban jurisdictions outside the city. However, gentrification has substantially 




Washington may be shedding its longstanding black majority, Baltimore remains a 
solidly majority black city. The Baltimore-Washington region encompasses a 
significant geographical area and claims many inhabitants, however the region is 
often perceived as those suburban locations between the two cities as opposed the 
cities themselves (in particular, the most economically depressed ections of these 
cities). The federal government in Washington and the biotech industry in Baltimore 
attract highly paid individuals whose concerns are often addressed to the neglect of 
the most vulnerable individuals, who in most cases have been long-term residents.  
So, why did organizing occur at different times in the two cities? In order to 
answer this question, it is important to have an understanding of the social climate 
and political actors in each city. Organizing is not a haphazard occurrence, but results 
from the confluence of events and the tangible motivations of individuals and 
communities. Organizing requires manpower and motivation, and the direction that it 
takes depends heavily on what is happening at the ground level. To this end, th  
approach of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) is to first go in to see lay of the 
land – this means understanding political histories/culture, as well as prior and current 
divisions. Baltimore and Washington are complicated in their own ways, including 
different histories and governing structures. As such, some time must be dedicated to 
historical political developments in both cities that led to the emergence of IAF 
affiliates in Baltimore and Washington.  
The available avenues for neighborhood participation and the outlets for 
expressing community interests determine the appropriate strategies of organizing 




affiliate has only recently taken root in Washington, while there has been one in 
Baltimore for three decades. My expectation is that systems hat integrate grassroots 
community leadership/activism with the local policy/political process, though not 
entirely seamless, are better suited to respond to community interests. I assert that the 
differences in community engagement and organizing between Baltimore and 
Washington D.C. are largely shaped by contextual features – chief among these being 
empowerment a la descriptive representation and the presence or lack f an advisory 
commission structure. 
Causes and Effects of the Riots 
Although the riots of 1968 predate the onset of IAF organizing in Baltimore 
and Washington, these urban uprisings are more than a footnote in history– the  are 
integral to understanding the political/economic environments that organized groups 
encounter and attempt to address. Martin Luther King saw voting rights and 
desegregation legislation as necessary, but simply the initial phase in improving the 
prospects of the disenfranchised. The achievements of the civil rights movement were 
remarkable, but, he conceded, they did little for lower class blacks, in the South and 
elsewhere. In this regard, real transformation was a matter of effecting changes at the 
root of American society to bring about true social and economic justice (Jackson 
2007). During his sermon in Washington at the National Cathedral on March 31, 
1968, King remarked, “There is nothing new about poverty. What is new is that we 
now have the techniques and the resources to get rid of poverty. The real question is 




particularly changes targeted at a particular region (i.e., the South), was only the first 
step in a long march toward full equality in America.  
Accordingly, the next step would call for massive government programs in 
education, health, job training, and housing, which would have a profound impact in 
the lives of the urban poor. Martin Luther King had always seen eco omic and social 
justice as necessary counterparts to racial justice, but between 1955 and 1965 his 
activism had focused on the last of the three. The Watts riots and a summer spent 
organizing in Chicago provided an altered perspective. In May 1967, he told workers 
in New York City that “the movement needed a second phase, an effort to change not 
just racial laws, but the unjust allocation of national resources that upheld poverty and 
economic division” (Risen 2009: 13). If anything, he said in January 1968, “The 
plight of the Negro poor, the masses of Negroes, has worsened over the last f w 
years” (Honey 2007: 174). Days before he was killed, King told the congregation at 
National Cathedral, “We are not coming to Washington to engage in any histrionic 
action, nor are coming to tear up Washington. I don’t like to predict violence, but if 
nothing is done between now and June to raise ghetto hope, I feel this summer will 
not only be as bad, but worse than last year” (Gilbert 1968: 11). 
This was all in the midst of Martin Luther King’s recently end d campaign in 
Chicago which had become stymied in Northern racial resentment and the disinterest 
of a massive urban bureaucracy. Through a Poor People’s Campaign, Kin  intended 
to seek a more encompassing justice than the civil rights movement would have been 
able to achieve. The new campaign was to bring a broad array of America’s poor to 




parts of the American dream that had been denied them only because they were poor 
(Wilkins 2008).  Conditions were so dire that King, known for advocating 
nonviolence, warned of a repeat of the rioting that had erupted the previous summer; 
unlike those who merely condemned the perceived criminality, King understood 
rioting to be the language of the unheard. His assessment was that it did not cost the 
country anything to integrate lunch counters and protect voting rights, bu  that there 
was now a need for a massive redistribution of wealth. 
After King was murdered in Memphis, word of his death ignited civil 
disturbances in more than 100 cities across the United States. Lyndon Johnson 
reflected, ‘God knows how little we’ve really moved on this issue, despite all the 
fanfare. As I see it, I’ve moved the Negro from D+ to C-. He’s still nowhere. He 
knows it. And that’s why he’s out in the streets. Hell, I’d be there, too” (Goodwin 
1976: 305). The ghetto frustrations that led to civil disorder were a product of long-
standing, deep-seated divisions – between blacks and employers, shopkeepers and 
customers, police and civilians, landlords and tenants. “Systematic research 
conducted by the Kerner Commission, which was charged by President Johnson with 
studying the events of the summer of 1967, demonstrated that there was reason to 
think riots at least in part were engaged in by people acting purposefully to protest 
their circumstances…And in many cities, stores operated by whites were targeted by 
arsonists and vandals, while shops operated by black proprietors were passed over” 






Decline of Civil Rights and the Need for Organizing 
To a large extent, the black-led groups responsible for placing many bl ck 
leaders into office experienced a decline throughout the 1970s. “Civil rights 
organizations lost much of their membership and support, at both the national and city 
levels. As organized groups became less influential, black candidates turned their 
appeal to broader electoral constituencies, including whites and mid le-class blacks, 
who were less visibly united with poor blacks than a few years earlier” (Williams 
1987: 130). At the same time, the influence of the black clergy was diminishing with 
the rise of black politicians who were not church-based, as were th  majority of civil 
rights leaders, and did not necessarily rely on the church for electoral support. Thus, 
as former movement members were transitioning toward formal politics and away 
from church congregations, the clergy was in a position where they were not able to 
produce the change they desired or were once able to effect. 
Even after the civil rights advancements of the 1960s, Baltimore continued to 
be racially polarized, albeit it a more subtle fashion. The subsequent years were a 
period of drought for a number of reasons. In addition to white flight and the backlash 
of the corporate sector, there was no federal bailout for struggling cities and their 
most depressed neighborhoods. Also, the fact that it was a machine city (at that time 
under Schaefer) made it difficult for independent voices (not affiliated with the 
machine) advocating for change to be heard. With plenty of patronage – opportunities 
to dole out rewards or punishment – political incumbents had the ability to pacify 
individuals and small groups, thereby preventing broad systemic issues from coming 




was challenged by civil rights figures seeking more comprehensive attention to 
problems in the city; but such challenges were limited and not particularly effective.  
In Baltimore during the 1970s, there was a lack of organized political action 
since the civil rights battles of the 1960s. Recognizing the inability of he church to 
address the myriad issues affecting Baltimore, civil rights veteran Rev. Vernon 
Dobson asked the IAF to come. He and others saw the need to bring a new sense of 
organization and further the civil rights movement. Baltimore was the first 
predominately black city that the IAF worked in since the 1960s. Previous affiliates in 
other cities moved out with the onset of the Black Power Movement and he War on 
Poverty.  In the late 1960s, Alinsky felt that the IAF needed to be in white middle 
class neighborhoods because he feared that they would drift further to the right, whic 
arguably did occur. However, the 1970s proved that without this brand of local 
organizing, prospects for residents in increasingly poor and black cities like Batimore 
would be severely constrained. 
Alternatively, Washington was always a target for the IAF, however, for some 
time there was a lack of time and staff to dedicate to the effort, as well as 
characteristics of the District that presented a unique challenge. There was some local 
perception that an additional organizing approach was not needed for several r asons: 
churches connected with the black mayor (Barry) felt that theycould get what they 
wanted, the existence of a number of community organizations, and the ANC system. 
Furthermore, DC’s relationship with Congress posed some initial concerns about the 
suitability of an IAF affiliate. In later years, “Congress granted the Control Board 




and financial planning, above and beyond that held by the Mayor and the Council; 
approval of District borrowing; responsibility for reviewing all acts by the City 
Council that affect finance and revenue; approval for all labor contracts and leases” 
(Fauntroy 2003: 15).  In the face of the Congressional takeover, there were questions 
as to whether such an IAF organizing effort could be effective.  
Race has always been central to politics in Washington, but there also was/is 
greater class segmentation of the black community. At one end of the spectrum are 
the poor and downtrodden and at the other end are black insiders – the middle an  
upper middle-class who function as the political and social elites. In Washington 
during the 1990s, there was a void in vocal religious leadership in the city. Although 
there were older ministers who were veterans of the civil rights era, they seemed to be 
fighting the battles of a previous generation. There was also a vacuum of political 
leadership as political characters and policies remained stagnant. I  this regard, a 
weakness of black leadership is duplication; one critical observation is that by now, 
older figures ought to be mentors as opposed to central actors. Also, as in other cities, 
the ascension of post-civil rights politicians who were not connected with the church 
is a relevant factor. For instance, some politicians, seeing that many of the license 
plates in the District on Sundays were from Maryland and Virginia, surmised that 
these congregants were not local voters. This may have caused them to see the pastors 
as weak and therefore not partners in political collaboration.  
Timing is of the utmost importance, and it appears that the 1990s was the right 
time for a merging of energies in Washington. Younger ministers wre looking for 




limitations of descriptive representation being acutely felt, there was a growing 
movement for congregational and community inclusion in local decision making. The 
1996 founding rally was attended by 2000 people, representing a wide rang  of 
organizations; at that time, WIN focused on affordable housing, after school 
programs, jobs, and community policing. The organization began with 30 churches 
(with almost equal black and white presence) throughout the District; his is 
significant as some of the white churches have wealthy and powerfully connected 
congregants (i.e. Congressional staffers, Board of Trade members, etc.) who are able 
to exercise some level of influence as well as contribute financially. 
Economic Constraints and Resistance to Redistribution 
Aside from episodic demonstrations, the federal government has been an 
ineffective actor in alleviating urban poverty. In the late 1960s, Johnson’s urban 
agenda was typified by the Community Action Agencies which allowed for some 
degree of community participation in initiatives to solve local problems. This 
program provided politicized blacks, especially those with connections t local 
community-organizing campaigns and community development organizations, acce s 
to public money and influence over its expenditure (Greenstone and Peterson 1976). 
An additional feature was the Model Cities program which directed federal funds 
toward cities, albeit in a fashion that was too widely dispersed to be effective. During 
the 1970s under the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, New Federalism 
translated into a relative decline in the importance of categorical grants for the urban 
poor, and the rise of block grants such as the Community Development Block Grant 




service projects” (Howard et al. 1994: 175). Instead of “maximum feasibl ” or even 
“widespread” participation, each CDBG applicant merely had to guarantee that it had 
provided the public with “adequate” information about the program and an 
“opportunity to participate” in the application process (Dommel 1980; Lovell 1983; 
Nathan 1977). 
In the 1980s, Reagan’s domestic policies, emphasizing retrenchment and 
devolution, represented a major shift away from redistribution and toward the 
promotion of economic growth, a reduction in federal domestic expenditures, and 
increased in the responsibilities of state governments. As a result, the state and local 
political economy became more important in shaping urban affairs and citizen 
participation (Kirlin and Marshall 1988; Marshall and Kirlin 1985; Palmer and 
Sawhill 1982). These trends persisted under the Bush administration as part of a 
larger Republican attack on traditional Democratic programs and co stituencies 
(Ginsberg and Shefter 1990).  “Redistributive benefits which affected primarily the 
poor (e.g., larger grants for poverty programs and expanded services) depended, to a 
degree that seems to have been unappreciated at the time, on support from a p -
spending national elite. As the national economy became less buoyant and many local 
economies fell into serious decline, political resources and public poies also 
shifted” (Clark and Ferguson 1983: 177). It follows that perceived constrai ts on 
local economies are connected to government resistance to redistributive polici s. 
Public officials in urban regimes must balance responsiveness to the citizenry 
(popular control) with the promotion of their economies (market control). Peterson 




public interest requires that local officials create a positive business climate to attract 
jobs and revenue to their communities. In contrast, redistributive politics is seen as 
exacerbating the community problems by raising the cost of doing business. The 
contention is that cities should focus on being better off economically (development 
policy) and not worse off (redistributive policy). In this regard, “business 
involvement in development policy is not a matter of dominance, not a matter of 
prevailing over other interests; it is a matter of contributing to the capacity of the city 
to realize its general well-being” (Stone and Sanders 1987: 165).Replacing the poor 
(drains on city coffers) with the more affluent (tax payers) is a strategy that some 
cities may see as beneficial to the local economy. However, critics of this argument 
charge that cities should not be agents of corporations, and officials need not neglect 
neighborhoods and the poor to promote investment.  
But given the perceived – and somewhat accepted – inability of cities to address 
the needs of the most vulnerable citizens, local governments are often able to avoid 
serious critiques of their economic development strategies. It is true that cities must 
function within the parameters of a larger macroeconomic economic system and 
respond to its attendant trends and shocks. Yet, in the face of neighborhood neglect, 
community organizing necessarily arises to give political voice to the unheard; it is 
one of the few endeavors to bridge the gap between communities and government. 
However, despite such efforts, “it is absurd to present neighborhood and church 
initiatives as appropriate responses to the effects of government-supported 
disinvestment, labor market segmentation, widespread and well-documented pat erns 




local governments are tasked with both staying afloat and being responsive to its 
residents; this requires partnerships at several levels. “Today as population decline, 
revenue shortfalls, white flight, political isolation, and other negative consequences of 
deindustrialization and suburbanization continue, black leaders have to work with 
white corporate leaders and white suburban voters to assemble financial resources” 
(Orr 1999: 192). 
In the 1950’s, Baltimore was a city in the midst of a post-war economic boom. 
Fueled by plentiful jobs and a climate of opportunity, the city’s population swelled to 
nearly 950,000. The population declined over the next half century to 651,154 in 
2000 – a loss of approximately 30 percent from the peak population in 1950 (U.S. 
Census). Driven by a huge demand for durable goods during World War II and 
immediately thereafter, Baltimore’s economy prospered in the 1950s. Aboutone-third 
of all employees in the city worked in manufacturing. In the next half century, blue 
collar manufacturing jobs were replaced by white collar servic jobs (Baltimore City 
Department of Planning, 2006). With the decline of manufacturing, the service sector 
came to be the dominant base of employment for Baltimore City residents. According 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, service-providing jobs account for over 90% of all 
jobs in Baltimore City.  
The forces that have contributed to the overwhelming concentration of poverty 
within the city have been at work for decades. Service jobs have a heavily minority 
workforce; one study found that in 1990, 71% of low-wage service workers in 
Baltimore were African-American, though African-Americans represented only 59% 




region’s population, but 70 percent of its poor (Rusk, 1996). The loss of its residential 
base further exacerbates Baltimore’s economic transformation. As population has 
moved to the suburbs, so has retail activity. Today, the city’s portion of retail sales is 
significantly smaller than its proportion of the region’s population. Suburban office 
space is another decentralizing trend, tilting jobs and the regional tax base even more 
heavily into outlying areas surrounding the city. 
In the 1950’s, Washington’s population was over 800,000. The population 
declined over the next half century to 572,059 in 2000 – a loss of approximately 30 
percent from the peak population in 1950 (U.S. Census). In 1950, the District 
accounted for nearly 75 percent of the metropolitan area’s employment. By 2000, it 
accounted for less than 25 percent. In recent decades, the District has faced chronic 
negative trends that have limited its ability to meet the needs of many residents. 
These trends include population loss, job decline, high unemployment and poverty 
rates, fiscal insolvency, and the loss of spending power to the suburbs. Economic 
indicators also point to growing geographic disparities, with areas in the northwest 
portion of the city particularly advantaged and areas east of the Anacostia River 
particularly disadvantaged. While there have been positive signs on many fronts since 
2000, the historic east-west divide in the city has only deepened. Since the late 1990s, 
the District has seen significant private-sector employment growth, particularly in 
white-collar industries such as legal services, technology consulting, and similar 
sectors (District of Columbia Office of Planning, 2006).  
However, the economic paradoxes of the District of Columbia are quitapparent 




increase in property values has increased personal wealth for manyDistrict 
homeowners and substantially enhanced city revenues. Simultaneously, the city as 
more jobs than residents but an unemployment rate that is twice the r gional average. 
Jobs in the District provide some of the highest wages in the country, but over 20 
percent of the city’s residents live below the poverty line. Theregion has the fastest 
annual job growth rate in the country (2.3 percent), yet unemployment in the city is 
rising (District of Columbia Office of Planning, 2006). Billions of dollars of income 
are generated in the District, the majority of which the city is unable to tax because its 
earners live in other states. In addition, the city is barred by Congress from taxing the 
U.S. government, which occupies more than 40 percent of D.C. land. 
Undoubtedly, local governments are quite limited in what they can 
accomplish unilaterally, and because of such limitations and fragmentation, regime 
theorists emphasize that informal systems of cooperation are indispe s ble. “The 
study of urban regimes is thus a study of who cooperates and how their cooperation is 
achieved across institutional sectors of community life” (Stone 1989: 3). 
Appropriately, it is understood that business interests are an integral aspect of urban 
governance; this type of arrangement is clearly at play in both Baltimore and 
Washington. In the face of black population growth and political empowerment, there 
are varying levels of resistance employed by the previously entrenched white power 
structure. The most common strategy is withdrawal; although it is more often 
understood as a physical phenomenon (white flight), disengagement from he black 
poor can even occur while remaining within the city. According to Eisinger (1980), 




subversive method is the attempt to consolidate significant control, especially over 
the city’s economic fortunes. 
In 1955, the Greater Baltimore Committee was created to deal with the city’s 
growing poverty and its continuing loss of taxpayers to the suburbs; the GBC began 
to engage in efforts to become competitive with suburban shopping centers.  The 
GBC’s first urban renewal committee chairman was developer James Rouse, who put 
forward a concept for convincing private investors and government to work together 
on downtown revitalization. The philosophy was that to revive the city, its most 
precious resource – land – had to be developed with bold planning at a much faster 
pace, and specifically focused on downtown. Although its projects primarily affect 
the central city, the Greater Baltimore Committee draws many of its more than 500 
members from across the region, including Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, 
Harford, and Howard counties, in addition to Baltimore City. In many wa s, the GBC 
functions almost as an arm of local government and has significant input on many 
economic development projects in the city. 
Founded in 1889, the Greater Washington Board of Trade represents the 
business community and has a significant impact on the economic undertakings of the 
city and region. The Board of Trade has about 1,100 members and an $8 million
annual budget; it also has four political action committees (PACs) – DC, Federal, 
Maryland and Virginia – that endorse and financially support political candidates and 
policymakers who advocate the Board of Trade's priorities. PACs use the Board of 
Trade’s overall priorities and legislative agendas to evaluate candidates. With such an 




substantially affects economic development policies in the city. It could be argued 
that business interests – controlled largely by whites – are often times at odds with the 
social, economic, and political well being of poor blacks in the District of Columbia. 
Though economic and development need not be detrimental to city residents, such 
policies have historically had created that exact outcome. 
Demographic Change 
Even before the riots, the affected corridors had begun a steady decline as 
desegregation propelled middle-class black families to leave those neighborhoods and 
whites moved to suburbs where new shopping plazas were drawing patrons from 
downtown Baltimore. The unemployment rate was nearly 30 percent in the i ner city 
before the riots, and nearly half of the homes in inner city neighborhoods were rated 
as “very poor” by the federal government. Thousands of black families were forced 
from their homes for urban renewal projects or highway construction (Kiehl 2008). 
Baltimore had begun losing residents in the 1950s, as the promise of bigger homes, 
greener lawns and safer streets drew thousands to the suburbs. But after the riots, the 
flight became a stampede with the city losing 13 percent of its population – 120,000 
residents – in the decade between 1970 and 1980. Those who left took with them their 
tax money out of the city and, in some cases, their jobs; increasingly, they shopped 
and worked in the suburbs. From 1969 to 1980, the number of jobs in the city fell 
sharply, from 540,000 to 505,000. For the first time, Baltimore made the list of the 
nation’s 10 poorest cities (Kiehl 2008). 
Similarly, by April 1968, many Washington neighborhoods were inhabited by 




housing and low-paying jobs. Their children attended dysfunctional, decaying public 
schools, where three of every four students read below the national aver ge. In 
Washington alone, the riot resulted in $57.6 million in property damage. A survey of 
business owners found that 97 percent of those affected were white, resulting in the 
shuttering of 510 businesses. “The destruction of local businesses resulted in nearly 
5,000 lost jobs, 57 percent of which were held by blacks; many more were lost as the 
riots’ impact coursed through the local economy. A year after the iots, of the three 
hundred commercial buildings completely destroyed in the District, only two had 
been replaced, both by liquor stores” (91st Congress 1969: 3162).  
“By 1969 the riots were already having a clear effect on racial integration 
within the District – or lack thereof. The city demographically dominated by blacks, 
was being permanently abandoned by whites. Shop owners and shoppers alik  
retreated to their suburbs and stayed there, shriveling the District’s ax base (91st 
Congress 1969: 3231). Whites were not alone in fleeing the city as middle-class 
blacks were also part of this shift. Over the next two decades, many of the inner-ring 
suburbs of Maryland, particularly Prince George’s County, would essentially flip 
racially; what had been one of the wealthiest white counties in the country became the 
wealthiest black county. Between 1970 and 1995, 1 percent of the city’sblack 
population left each year. Over time, the District’s responsibilities as a city, county 
and state, along with a severely constrained tax base lead to revenue shortfalls and in 
1995, the city’s $335 million budget deficit led Congress to impose a federal 




District’s obligations translate into a “structural deficit” of $1 billion annually 
(Labbe-Debose and Harris 2008). 
The population loss and racial transition in both cities is remarkable; the 
period immediately following the riots saw dramatic demographic changes. From 
1960 to 1970, Baltimore’s white population decreased 20.0 % while the black 
population increased 25.0%. Similarly, from 1960 to 1970, Washington’s white 
population decreased 39.4% while the black population increased 30.6%. Also, from 
1980 to 2000, Baltimore’s population decreased 17.2% and Washington’s population 
decreased 10.4% (U.S. Census). The following tables detail the racial t nsformation 
over time. 
Table 3.1 Demographic Change in Baltimore 
U.S. Census 
Year Black Population White Population 
1960 35.0% 62.0% 
1970 47.0% 50.0% 
1980 54.4% 43.4% 
1990 59.0% 38.7% 
2000 64.0% 31.0% 
 
Table 3.2 Demographic Change in Washington 
U.S. Census 
Year Black Population White Population 
1960 53.9% 45.2% 
1970 71.1% 27.7% 
1980 70.3% 26.9% 
1990 65.8% 29.6% 







Local Political Culture: Machine Politics, Home Rule and Black Leadership  
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze a potentially transformative 
approach to reversing the political impotence of marginalized urban communities – 
community organizing. Once again, it is necessary to recognize that the ground level 
conditions and specific challenges in a particular city provide the impetus for 
organizing efforts. Therefore before delving into community organizing and policy 
debates, it is important to understand the economic and political constructs existing in 
a given city. This initial step is necessary as “political ulture variables have been 
underemphasized or ignored altogether by most urban scholars” (Orr 1999: 190). One 
example is Ferman’s comparative analysis of Chicago and Pittsburgh which shows 
that political culture helps shape the direction of a city’s politics and local policy. 
According to Walton (1972: 11), “black politics springs from the particular 
brand of segregation practices found in different environments in which bla k people 
find themselves. In other words, the nature of segregation and the manner in which it 
differs not only in different localities but within a locality have caused black people t  
employ political activities, methods, devices, and techniques that would advance their 
policy preferences.” Therefore, I argue that in order to place Baltimore and 
Washington in their proper perspectives, it is appropriate to view both of em as 
“Black Cities.” The fact that both have been majority black for deca s – and the 
perceptions associated with this – is a distinction that must be acknowledged, 
especially in light of the political significance. That the demography of both cities 
shifted as a result of white flight to surrounding jurisdictions is not inconsequential. 




affairs of their communities, adopted the term “white power structu e” (Carmichael 
and Hamilton 1967). One could argue that this structure is at play in the form of a 
hostile Maryland General Assembly or Congressional Control Board.  
Given that local governments do not exist within a vacuum, it is necessary to 
examine the larger political systems in which they are embedded. D spite their 
similarities, Baltimore and Washington have faced unique challenges to black 
political empowerment. Baltimore often has to fight against surrounding suburban 
jurisdictions and a state legislature insensitive to the issues plaguing Maryland’s 
largest urban center. Similarly, Washington, D.C.’s push for statehood is at odds with 
the neighboring jurisdictions (Maryland and Virginia) and the federal government 
which seeks to maintain control over the city, thereby denying autonomy and the 
economic benefits that would come with it (i.e., the ability to assess a commuter tax, 
spending on social services, and upholding its established handgun ban). 
Furthermore, there is a racial element to this frequently adversarial relationship – 
although Baltimore and Washington have been majority black for over thre decades, 
there has remained a strong undercurrent of white resistance to black governance of 
both cities. 
In Baltimore, relations between African American and white leaders c ntered 
around patronage politics. However, one of the problems with machine and patronage 
politics is that it undercut discussions of broad issues, such as housing, employment, 
and public education. “Black machine politicians’ preconceptions with the control 
and distribution of material and personal benefits encouraged them to accept the 




a relatively low price, thus forsaking any real inroads on communitywide concerns” 
(Orr 1999: 62). In Baltimore, a machine system with limited opportunities for 
significant black input made it apparent that an organizing approach w s needed. 
“Where urban machines have dominated, competing views have been ignored and 
new actors discouraged from participating. Perhaps most important, city officials, 
regardless of race or ethnic background, have come under increasing pressure to 
make economic development their overriding policy objective” (Howard et al. 1994: 
181). 
Additionally, the struggle between Baltimore and the General Assembly 
illustrates the racial animosity directed toward black Baltimore from largely white 
suburban jurisdictions. Often the city’s demands for additional state funds have led to 
clashes between city and suburb. Local politicians and activists in Montgomery 
County and in Baltimore have learned to use race to promote solidarity for heir 
positions. “By their own admission, elected officials in Montgomery County 
understand that “Baltimore bashing” plays on white anxieties and helps solidify 
support among suburban voters” (Orr 1999: 183). Suburban representatives are not 
swayed by arguments that concentrated poverty is a deep and intractable problem for 
the city, resulting from a series of trends to which the state h s contributed. In other 
words, as long as a problem is seen as isolated in the city, a legislature dominated by 
representatives from suburban areas has little inclination to address it. Also, as 
economic change has given Baltimore City a shrinking tax base, and demographic 
shifts have left the city with a diminishing electoral base, its influence in the General 




As for the District, issues of race and class take on a special significance. 
Despite its large black population, there had been a significant white (and wealthy) 
portion of the population that questioned black governance. From the outset, the 
largely black district has been subject to primarily white Congressional overseers. 
The Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade, with three appointed commissioners 
running the city, had immense power and control; this white-run business 
organization had fought home rule for decades. In 1965, as the home-rule bill n ared 
a vote in Congress, the Board of Trade gave its version of the debate in  mass 
mailing to newspapers across the country. “The fact is that a gre t many 
Washingtonians – including an overwhelming majority of local professionals and 
business leaders – are opposed to pending home rule legislation,” the letter said (Jaffe 
and Sherwood 1994: 45). Local leadership in Washington, D.C. had been denied by 
the federal government until home rule was achieved in 1974. However, some may 
argue that pandering to home constituencies is still a major factor in the decision-
making process of members of the House and Senate committees who have oversight 
responsibilities for the District of Columbia. “For most members, being tough and 
aggressive on the District is a no lose proposition, as it helps them in their districts 
with the racially conservative elements of their constituency” (Fauntroy 2003: 7).  
Furthermore, paternalistic members of Congress face no repercussions in the 
District, because Washingtonians lack the representation that would allow them to 
have a voice in such matters. Thus, the issue of black leadership is im ortant because 
the majority of the leadership in the home rule movement was African American. 




clear cut, as the District has a substantial middle and upper income African American 
population. Such distinctions make it difficult to make sweeping assessment  
regarding the black community in Washington; the reality is that there were several 
black communities. Regardless, many of the District’s black leaders had roots in the 
civil rights movement. “The home rule movement had considerable black le dership 
that viewed a change in the status quo as positive for the community that it 
represented. The change black leaders sought, however, would potentially u dermine 
the racial status quo and its efforts to use the city and its government as a personal 
financial windfall for big, white-owned businesses in D.C.” (Fauntroy 2003: 6). 
Neighborhood Inclusion 
I contend that in Washington, descriptive representation (black mayor) and the 
semblance of neighborhood inclusion (ANC system) lessened the perceived need for 
organizing. Baltimore and Washington are both cities with a history of legalized 
segregation and which are now majority black. Although demographically similar in 
many ways, blacks in Baltimore and Washington have had quite divergent lev ls of 
black political empowerment; while black mayors have been the standard in 
Washington since the early 1970s, Baltimore did not elect a black mayor until the mid 
1980s. One the one hand, although there are many community groups in Baltimore 
City, they tend not to be organized in a collective manner. This largely unorganized 
duplication of efforts and expression of interests severely limits their effectiveness in 
procuring desired public goods and policies through the political process. One the 
other hand, community groups in Washington have a built-in mechanism providing 




The argument for ANCs is that since there are elections, regular publicized meetings 
and minutes, community interests are able to be expressed in an organized d 
politically legitimized fashion. 
But in some respects, the ANC system may be the neighborhood equival nt of 
American democracy – elected officials (albeit unpaid) that may or may not speak for 
the constituents they purport to represent. Although somewhat of a conduit between 
the community and the city council, the purpose tends to be more procedural than 
advocacy-based.  Examples of this procedural focus are business regulations and 
renewals of various licenses, which is not necessarily the same as advocating for 
community benefits.  ANCs provide input to government agencies on behalf of 
neighborhoods, but they do not seek to change existing dynamics. Power analysis is 
central to IAF organizing – the purpose is to determine who the players are, their 
levels of resources, and how they interact / demonstrate influence. In this regard, the 
question for ANCs is – do they have a following or strategic agenda? It appears that 
many commissioners do not, so for the most part, WIN infrequently collaborates with 
ANCs. One could argue that the ANC system is demonstrative of DC’s highly 
politicized environment. Aside from the federal presence, Washington has a very 
active political scene with competitive elections from mayor down to single member 
ANC districts.  
However, as ANC elections receive less attention, commissioners tend not to 
draw support from a very large base. There are 37 ANCs across the di trict, with each 
ward having four to six separate bodies; within these bodies there ar  a half dozen to 




collaboration between WIN and the ANC, but in others the ANCs can frustrate the 
efforts of local organizers (e.g., commissioner who sees him/herself as a 
neighborhood representative vs. commissioner is closely aligned with the 
councilmember). In DC, many ANC members simply go through the required 
motions (elections, fees), and hold a titular position; however, they can make a lot of 
noise around neighborhood issues (alcohol sales, development plans) that directly
involve District government regulations. The focus of ANCs depends o  where you 
are talking about – some are pro-gentrification, while some ANCs collaborated with 
WIN in its initial efforts around afterschool/recreation.WIN is more citywide – 
affecting the District as whole, as opposed to ANC’s parochial interes s; but as 
individual churches have relationships with ANCs and commissioners – and church 
congregations constitute WIN’s membership, their role should not be ignored. So 
although the ANC system may provide some level of community voice, there is still a 
need for the advocacy of an IAF affiliate such as WIN. 
The Emergence of IAF Affiliates in Baltimore and Washington 
Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD) was founded in 
1977 but floundered for three years. Organizer Arnie Graf came to Baltimore in 1980 
to try to salvage the organization which was $30,000 in debt. BUILD began as an 
integrated organization, but a number of churches fell off after the initial failure. The 
affiliate was saved by turning it into a movement – however, this type of organizing 
largely had no interest to whites in Baltimore. BUILD has a black church culture, a 
focus upon the issues of the lower-income, and a relatively small white minority. 




for many whites to be the minority in a coalition (or even a neighborhood) given their 
longstanding majority status. The next organizer, Jonathan Lange understoo /viewed 
BUILD as a black power organization – there are a few progressive white churches 
who are involved, but it is predominately black. This is consistent with Saul 
Alinsky’s shifting of IAF resources to the black community because he concluded 
that black people were in motion for their own liberation, and that this kind of motion 
was an opportunity to build black power. 
Many of BUILD’s early campaigns were aimed at the corporate community. 
During BUILD’s infancy, business leaders tried to ignore its demands and often 
refused to meet with its leaders. “In its formative years, BUILD emphasized protest, 
confronting the defenders of the status quo and harassing established pow r holders 
into concessions. Over the years, however, BUILD leaders recognized that 
developing relationships with other power forces – mayors, governors, state
legislators, business leaders – is critical to addressing the needs of the thousands of 
families they represent” (Orr 2001: 86). More recently, BUILD created th  Child First 
Authority; it was organized in 1996 and authorized by city and statelegislation at the 
urging of BUILD leaders. While presented as an after-school program designed to 
improve school performance, Child First is also an effort to “empower parents by 
making them agents of change in their communities” (Fashola, 1999: 25). 
The Washington Interfaith Network (WIN) was founded in 1996 and 
benefitted from the IAF’s experience in Baltimore. Arnie Graf, the lead organizer 
who got BUILD off the ground in the 1980s, had the time to build the organization 




affiliated with Howard University Divinity School) met Arnie Graf in 1992 and the 
organizing effort began with house meetings. WIN was intentionally begun as an 
integrated organization (35-40% white). In the District, WIN has a visibility and 
racial/economic diversity which provides strength; there is also  depth of clergy and 
a more dues paying base, somewhat in contrast to BUILD which has fewer clergy 
members and dues paying institutions. WIN churches are led by ministers with 
traditional theological/seminary training whose view of ministry has a social 
responsibility. As far as size, mega churches (10-15k members) ar  rare, since they 
tend to believe that they do not need IAF-style organizing and already have access to 
resources. 
Through interviews with organizers, it has been revealed that the direction that 
organizing takes is not only the result of social and economic conditions, but is also 
the result of individual decisions and judgment calls. Although certain factors must be 
in place, primarily the desire of local communities to begin organizing, there is no 
one-size-fits-all strategy. Although Baltimore and Washington are both majority 
black cities, BUILD is a primarily black organization, while WIN is more racially 
diverse. While the attempt at the outset was to create BUILD as an integrated 
organization, the issues that the group organized around (such as redlining) te ded to 
get more traction in poor black communities. Additionally, Baltimore’s t nse racial 
climate in the late 1970s and early 1980s severely weakened the prospcts for a truly 
integrated organization. The same might have been true in Washington during the 
same time period, which is one of the reasons that IAF organizers made a calculated 




accountability, the Control Board posed an obstacle to local governance and thus 
made it unclear who to target politically. If there was no one for the IAF affiliate to 
hold accountable, it could be a waste of time organizing in DC.  
 IAF affiliates like BUILD and WIN are comprised of institutional members, 
namely moderately-sized churches (not of the large and powerful megavariety). 
Also, the churches most likely to be members are lead by pastors who are open to 
collective leadership. These organizations necessarily address current issues that are 
the result of historical developments, specifically, the ignoring of persistent problems 
in marginalized black communities. Years of neglect have exacerb ted neighborhood 
poverty, demonstrated by lack of resources/amenities and made communities 
vulnerable economically (i.e. depressed housing markets) and socially (i.e. low 
capacity, influence). Thus, the lifeblood of BUILD and WIN are institutions 
motivated by social justice to address the issues that directly affect its members and 
their communities. 
Current Connections 
Population and economic trends are better understood within the context of 
the larger Baltimore–Washington region. The economic interdependence betw en 
Baltimore and Washington was officially recognized in 1992 when t  federal Office 
of Management and Budget combined both metro areas into the Washington-
Baltimore Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical area (CMSA). More recently, 
Baltimore’s income and population growth can be partially attributed to the migration 
of residents from Washington, DC to Baltimore. However, this same trend has 




least expensive benchmark region to 5th most expensive benchmark region b tween 
2003 and 2005. This shift reflects increasing home prices, a factor influenced by the 
discovery of Baltimore’s housing bargains by families previously living in 
Washington, DC, which has the second highest cost of living in the nation. Also, the 
Baltimore region continues to benefit from the buying power of the Washington 
region, which ranks 4th nationally (Baltimore City Department of Planning, 2006). 
While the lack of adequate housing has long been an issue in urban areas, 
gentrification is also responsible for the heavy focus on quality affordable housing by 
the respective IAF affiliates. As cities have recently seen a reemergence during the 
housing boom, home prices in both cities have risen dramatically. This shift has seen 
previously neglected, largely black neighborhoods become pricey enclaves for white 
suburbanites attracted to life in the city. Gentrification which often confounds and 
masks the problem of entrenched poverty, changed the complexion of the Disrict 
over the course of a decade, and is now descending upon Baltimore, as individuals 
priced out of the former are finding refuge in the latter. In Baltimore, this has meant 
an influx of buyers looking for comparative bargains in a city with vast swaths of 
vacant houses. 
Over the past decade, as developers rediscovered cities across the country, the 
pace of construction exploded along Washington’s riot corridors. Boarded-up 
buildings and vacant lots were reborn as expensive loft apartments, luring white 
professionals to predominantly black neighborhoods. The symbols of Washington’s 
metamorphosis are the cranes that have become a constant presence over its skyline 




cities take for granted such as big-box retail, dozens of shops and cafes and 
restaurants, and a $600 million publicly funded, 42,000-seat baseball stadium. Since 
2001, along the riot corridors alone, developers and the government have poured 
more than $3 billion into new housing, offices, theaters and a new convention center. 
During the 1990s, Metro spent more than $500 million to open four stations in 
neighborhoods along two of the corridors, each station helping to catalyze further 
investment (Schwartzman and Pierre 2008). 
“It doesn’t look like the ghetto anymore,” said Council member Marion Barry, 
a community organizer in the District during the riots who also served four terms as 
mayor. Barry stressed that the redevelopment has not solved the city’s social 
problems. “We did a lot to move forward,” he said. “But the progress is not what it 
should have been in 40 years. Poverty has gotten worse. What happened in this city is 
we moved poverty…we didn’t solve it’ (Schwartzman and Pierre 2008). It is this 
poverty that IAF affiliates seek to address through organizing communities for 
change. Specifically, WIN has been instrumental in gaining concessions from the 
District government during this era of development. The group was very outspoken 
on the issue of a publicly financed stadium and was successful in pushing the city to 
allocate millions of dollars to support affordable housing.  
Moreover, the District of Columbia’s longtime status as a majority-black city 
appears to be diminishing. The 14 percent increase in non-Hispanic white District 
residents and 6 percent decrease in blacks from 2000 to 2006 have resulted from the 
gentrification of once-affordable city neighborhoods. The impact on the city’s racial 




by 2006, that figure was 55 percent. If the trends continue, the city will almost 
certainly cease to be majority black by 2020. From 2000 to 2006, the number of non-
Hispanic black residents in the District declined to 322,000, the number of non-
Hispanic whites rose to about 184,000 and the number of Asians increased to 18,000, 
a 20 percent gain (Aizenman 2007). The reality is that whites are moving into the city 
because they are able to afford the pricey housing in all these areas that are 
gentrifying and becoming much more middle- and upper-middle class. Meanwhile, 
the city is becoming more unaffordable to lower-income black families. 
Although Baltimore’s solid black majority remains in place, there is a glaring 
disparity between black and white residents – the median income for African 
Americans is $13,123 compared to the $25,139 for whites; African Americans make 
up 64% of Baltimore's population, but only 11% of Baltimore’s middle class are 
African Americans (Alexander 2008).  Recently, a coalition of organizations has 
launched an effort to urge black middle-class Baltimore residents to stay in the city, 
and is appealing to those who have left to return. Their contention is that a strong 
black middle class contingent is the key to revitalizing Baltimore.   Additionally, 
enticing Washington residents to relocate to Baltimore is what the people behind 
‘Live Baltimore’ had in mind when they began their campaign to at ract city dwellers 
10 years ago. Since Live Baltimore’s inception, home prices in the city have risen 205 
percent. And after losing population every decade since 1950, it increased by almost 
900 residents in 2006. The home center has conducted three advertising pushes to win 




as an affordable alternative. Since beginning the D.C. campaign, there has been a 
positive net migration from the D.C. metro area to Baltimore (Jones-Bonbrest 2007).  
This current relationship is further confirmation of the indelible and ongoing 
link between these two cities. As both cities have a history of segregation, 
disinvestment, rioting and disillusionment, now followed by urban renewal and 
gentrification, the impact of race and class upon political engagement in urban 
communities must be seriously addressed. In terms of community organizing, lessons 
can be learned from the challenges and successes of the past as BUILD predates WIN 
by two decades. And though Baltimore and Washington face similar issues, the 
strategies utilized by respective local IAF affiliates are considerably shaped by their 
specific economic and political contexts. It is also apparent that certain conditions – 
including the housing market – of one city can substantively affect th  fortunes of the 
other; this relationship may not necessarily be direct or consistent, but it does exist.  
Conclusion 
Political opportunities and racial group interests are shaped by the social, 
economic and political contexts within which they take place (Keiser 1997). As such, 
the appearance of community organizing collectives is shaped by the same 
aforementioned forces. Although local governments are tasked with serving 
neighborhoods, there are compelling economic interests which often lead mayors to 
make decisions focused on economic growth, while neglecting the most vulnerable 
city populations. Again, I propose that without pressure from local organizers, it is 
more than probable that the most pressing interests of marginalized communities 




necessary economic changes so critical to poor blacks in urban areas are likely not to 
occur through traditional political or economic models, but through creative social 






Chapter 4: Mayoral Typology 
 
Introduction 
Over the last 40 years, the presence of African Americans as mayors of major 
U.S. cities has gone from being an anomaly to a commonplace occurrence, 
particularly in cities with significant or majority black populations. For Washington 
during this period, home rule for the majority black population has resulted in the 
steady election of black mayors; however, Baltimore, which has also maintained a 
majority black population over time, has only twice elected a black mayor. The 
documented rise in black mayoralty resulted from the confluence of several historical 
factors, not the least of which being black migration to industrial centers and white 
flight from central cities. But as time goes on, the leadership of urban areas seems to 
be undergoing a perceptible shift. Seemingly gone is the first wave of mayors whose 
preparation for office came on the front lines of the civil rights movement, and whose 
energy was primarily directed toward minority inclusion in local government.  
To a large extent, it has been uncommon to see white mayors of majority 
black cities (Washington); but while white mayoral leadership of majority black cities 
was believed to be near impossible, some cities (Baltimore) havewitn ssed this 
development. This may speak to differing levels of black political empowerment in 
the two cities or simply be an epiphenomenal aberration.  However, as acial 
inclusion and descriptive representation have ostensibly been achieved over the past 




toward more pragmatic policies for managing the complex issues of large cities. This 
phenomenon is demonstrated by the willingness of some majority black cities to elect 
white mayors, while others have chosen to elect more moderate black mayors.  
There appears to be both a generational and ideological shift in urban politics, 
particularly in regard to black mayors. In cities where the symbolic novelty of having 
a black mayor has diminished over time, more and more attention is being paid to 
persistent problems. As such, efficient service delivery and innovative economic 
development plans are the calling cards of successful mayoral candidates and office 
holders. In addition, as gentrification is bringing whites back into these older large 
cities, the political lines continue to be drawn and redrawn with respect race. Explicit 
appeals for racial solidarity seem to have diminishing returns and often become 
political liabilities rather than strengths, except in extreme and highly racialized 
contexts. Consequently, the pragmatically focused, racially moderate c ndidate 
represents the newest wave of urban leadership. Before introducing a new typology of 
mayoral leadership it is necessary to discuss the evolution of urban leadership and 
what it has meant for neighborhood inclusion. In time, the promise of black political 
empowerment was met with the reality that benefits were not evenly spread across 
urban populations; it is this deep chasm that translates to the need for local 
community organizing. 
Empowerment 
 The majority of the first wave of black mayors elected in the lat  1960s and 
early 1970s were elected in highly racially polarized elections, garnering the lion’s 




vote – usually drawing liberal white or downtown business support (Thompson 
2006). This first wave consisted of “civil rights” mayors who were l cted in cities 
that had become majority black or were approaching a black majority. The black 
mayors were initially able to make significant strides such as the creation of police 
review boards, the appointment of more minorities to commissions, the increasing use 
of minority contractors, and a general increase in the number of programs oriented to 
minorities (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).  
However, when blacks entered city hall to take the spoils of victory, hey 
found that whites had carted away the wealth of the metropolis to suburban 
communities beyond central-city jurisdictions; hence the black-ruled fragments were 
little more than bankrupt relics of past greatness (Teaford 1993). Further exacerbating 
urban economic challenges were President Reagan’s fiscal policies of the 1980s 
which resulted in significant cutbacks in federal aid to cities. Thus the ability of black 
mayors to substantively improve the conditions of their cities was dr matically 
curtailed. As a result, black voters who had been initially excited by the election of 
blacks as mayors now became increasingly disenchanted. This created, in turn, 
incentives for black officials to demobilize the black poor or to allow demobilization 
to occur. The negative relationship between the swelling ranks of black officials and 
lower-status participation – along with worsening conditions of lower-status blacks 
across a range of indicators – prompts scholars to revisit the uneven class-benefits of 
black incorporation (Harris, Sinclair-Chapman, and McKenzie 2006). 
Moreover, incumbent public officials who are at least partially driven by the 




the possibilities for new or widespread mobilization. These electoral considerations 
translate into a preference for a brokered “politics as usual” th t limits the number 
and claims on the policy agenda (Reed 1999).  Therefore, as black public officials 
emerged, some of the limitations of descriptive representation became visible. 
Blacks’ ascension to prominence within the institutional apparatus of urban 
administration did not appreciably alter the mission or official practices of the 
institutions under their authority. Clearly, therefore, putting black in previously all-
white places was not a sufficient program for those who identifid with institutional 
transformation along populist lines or who otherwise rejected the status quo of race 
relations management (Reed 1999). By the mid-1980s, high levels of violent crime, 
drug abuse, homelessness, school failure, and job loss undermined black civil rights 
mayors.  
Black mayors were increasingly criticized for assuming a role of race leader 
rather than as city manager, and accused of antagonizing white businesse  and failing 
to entice them to their cities (Ross and Levine 2001). New, younger, black mayoral 
candidates replaced mayors of the civil rights era, promising to deemphasize race, 
promote efficient government, and offer strategies to lure investors to strengthen 
downtown businesses and create jobs (Thompson 2006). This second generation of 
black mayors like Kurt Schmoke of Baltimore, were seen as “more pragmatists than 
pioneers, professionals than preachers, coalition builders than confrontationis s, they 
came to power during a period of drastic cutbacks in federal money fr cities, and 
they are hawking economic progress and managerial expertise” (Moore 1988: 373). 




more racially motivated predecessors. They came into office promising change and 
significant improvements, and they were often blamed when they could nt stem the 
tide of urban decline; their primary success seemed to be providing gra der facilities 
for professional sports (Thompson 2006).  
One significant problem of governmental structure impeding the effectiveness 
of black mayors is the connection between their election and the broader 
empowerment of disempowered black civic organizations (Kilson 1996). Black “civil 
rights” mayors tended install small networks of government employees through 
patronage, as well as limited summer jobs programs, all of which generated a politic l 
base for their reelection campaigns. Thus the political and economic benefits that 
were expected to be community-wide were often exclusive and clustered among 
insiders. The more technocratic black mayors who followed them, faced with cuts in 
federal aid and limited by their aversion to the appearance of racial favoritism, have 
been even less effective in empowering black civic leadership (T ompson 2006). The 
lack of a strategy including grassroots black civic empowerment to augment black 
mayors has hindered black political participation and, as a consequence, has 
weakened black mayors in their struggles with white led state legislatures and 
suburbs, and federal officials. 
On the one hand, first wave “civil rights” mayors, like Maynard Jackson of 
Atlanta, Coleman Young of Detroit, and Marion Barry of Washington, D.C., had won 
in majority black cities in highly racially polarized elections and were fierce racial 
advocates known for their frequent denunciations of white racism. Also, becaus  of 




stay in office. On the other hand, technocratic mayors such as Bill Campbell of 
Atlanta, Dennis Archer of Detroit, and Anthony Williams of Washingto , D.C. came 
to office after running against other black candidates, other veterans of the civil rights 
struggle, and relied on white voters to edge out these competitors (Thompson 2006). 
The latter type utilized a “deracialized” strategy that tended to argue that race was a 
distraction from the more important fiscal and managerial issues facing cities; and 
this stance reassured and made inroads among moderate white voters and businesses 
that shared that perspective (McCormick and Jones 1993). 
In this light, another important distinction is the notion of authentic black 
leadership versus “deracialized” African American politicians. Walters (1992) argues 
that black elected officials whose base of support is within the wite community 
should not be considered authentic black leaders such as those that emanated from he 
civil rights/black politics movement. According to Guinier (1991), establishment 
endorsed blacks are unlikely to be authentic because they are not true representatives 
of the black community. Such estimation is particularly relevant in cities lacking a 
black majority (or where the majority may be fragile), which necessitate  appealing to 
whites. Such officials are often viewed as marginal community members whose only 
real connection is skin color, which is thus a convenient proxy for political authority 
(Guinier 1991). This differentiation has a significant impact on how black mayors are 
embraced or rejected by certain electoral constituencies. Although in the 
aforementioned cases, the rumblings of questionable authenticity were drowned out 
by both black and white voters who were more concerned with the policy direction in 




The “civil rights” model has reached its demographic limit and ol style 
candidates seem to have lost the enthusiastic support of the black poor (Gilliam and 
Kaufmann 1998). Cities with large black majorities have already elected black 
mayors, and in cities such as Washington, D.C. – black “civil” rights candidates have 
been replaced by technocratic black candidates who forged coalitions with disaffected 
black and white voters (Thompson 2006). A third kind of black mayoral politics does 
not fit either the “civil rights” or “technocratic” model. Such mayors attempt to 
“restructure government to strengthen the connection between holding office and 
grassroots black civic empowerment; they work to provide services for the poor 
rather than consolidating ties to downtown business elites at the exp nse of 
developing programs for poor neighborhoods, and confront white racism, at the s me 
time that they attempt to build ties with low-income whites and Latinos around 
substantive common issues” (Thompson 2006: 15). 
Voting Patterns and Electoral Strategies 
Just as previous ethnic groups rarely held a majority in the cities that they ran, 
African Americans have not necessarily dominated the local electorate. Therefore, 
success depended on intergroup support and alliances. Furthermore, until barriers to 
voting were removed and unless activists mobilized the community and registered 
voters, an African American popular majority did not necessarily translate into a 
voting majority. Many cities elected African American mayors when blacks 
constituted a majority of the population but a minority of the voters (Adler 2001). 
Candidates sought to mobilize as much support among black constituents as possible 




supporters, mainly liberals and business people (Colburn 2001). Thus with the racial 
makeup of electorate, black candidates could garner sufficient votes to secure a runoff 
in the Democratic primary, but typically black voters alone could not determine the 
outcome of the primary or general election.  
On the one hand, the rhetoric of campaigns in black neighborhoods was 
rooted initially in the civil rights movement and in an emerging black consciousness. 
On the other hand, at the city-wide level, there was at least the tacit understanding by 
some black mayoral candidates that it was also necessary to make inroads with the 
broader constituencies to ensure electoral victory and eliminate potential obstacles in 
governing. Also, in these cities small groups of whites began to recognize relatively 
early that a black voting majority was imminent and that a political ransition to black 
leadership with white cooperation would be beneficial to them and to community 
relations. Thus, support came frequently from business people who endorsed black 
candidates for pragmatic reasons; they concluded that black leadership was inevitable 
and that they could continue to influence city government and secure thei  business 
interests by being on the ground floor of this political change (Stone 1989). 
Consequently, the more frequently blacks served in prominent political positions and 
as mayor, the more acceptable they were to white voters at large and the business 
community in particular. 
This trend was especially evident in reelection campaigns and in elections in 
the 1980s and 1990s as black candidates became more commonplace and as black
mayors demonstrated they could govern these complex cities no less fairly and wisely 




campaigning began to shift away from race and toward the black candidate’s record 
and political agenda for the city. However, as black governance became more 
commonplace, white candidates turned increasingly to certain key issues to 
undermine the candidacy of their opponents; these “race-correlated agen a items” 
included crime, drugs, homelessness, and urban violence (Colburn 2001). Most black 
candidates found it necessary to defend themselves on these issues a  th ir opponents 
questioned their ability to address them satisfactorily. The implication was that these 
issues were endemic to the black community and that a black mayor was not 
equipped to resolve them (Colburn 2001). 
Conversely, by the 1990s some black candidates in tight races attempted to 
use race overtly to mobilize black voters against their opponents. Despite the fact that 
appeals to racial solidarity served as a key component in the campaigns of black 
candidates, they were not sufficient by themselves to maintain bl ck support (Colburn 
2001). Black voters did not automatically cast their ballots for a black c ndidate, nor 
did middle-class blacks and lower-class black voters always vote the same. As such, 
an ineffective mayor could not overcome such political problems by simply calling 
for black solidarity. In many campaigns, race played a crucial factor in the strategies 
of candidates and in influencing the outcome of the campaigns. Well into the 1980s 
and even into the 1990s, black candidates in these cities faced a huge hurdle in trying 
to attract white voters. 
Economic Development 
Elected on reform platforms that promised profound changes in the policy-




strategies that have virtually precluded the redistribution of major benefits to broad 
segments of the black community” (Nelson 1987: 174). Black regimes clearly 
generate racially redistributive benefits, such as general municipal employment and 
contractual services, but these benefits tended to cluster primarily among middle- and 
upper-strata blacks. From the mid-1970s onward, the racial advancement strategies 
most frequently advocated by black officials included increasing black owned 
businesses and increasing black involvement in white businesses. Those are strategies 
most compatible with the larger configuration of systemic power in which the black 
regime operates (Reed 1999). Accordingly, when private sector business interests are 
relatively powerful, they provide the city’s politicians with a strong incentive to reach 
an accord with the business community and to pursue fiscal policies that are 
acceptable to it.   
In response to the devastating effects of deindustrialization, city leaders 
advocated a downtown-centered redevelopment strategy, which was quite often to the 
disadvantage of the disintegrating neighborhoods outside of downtown. Peterson 
(1981) contends that cities have an overriding interest in avoiding redistributive 
policies that benefit poorer neighborhoods while pursing development policies a m d 
at the downtown business district. “Black regimes adhere to the pro-growth 
framework for the same reasons that other regimes do: It seems reasonable and proper 
ideologically; it conforms to a familiar sense of rationality; and it promises to deliver 
practical, empirical benefits” (Reed 1999). “In addition to the busines community, 
which is the principal beneficiary, middle- and upper-middle-class blacks receive set-




development activity, and improved access to professional and administrative 
employment in both public and private sectors” (Reed 1999). 
In studies of urban power, regime theory stakes out a middle-ground position 
between pluralists (Dahl 1961) and economic determinists (Harvey 1985; Peterson 
1981) by recognizing a division of labor between the state and market (Stone 1989; 
Stone and Sanders 1987). Leaders within both spheres possess resources of value t  
the other side; government officials have legitimacy and policy-making authority, 
while business elites are able to create jobs, generate tax revenues and provide 
financing (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Elkin 1987). Public officials and private 
elites, therefore have an incentive to cooperate with each other and nurture informal 
alliances – or regimes – to pursue common goals in an otherwise fragmented 
environment. Regime theory is concerned with the “internal dynamics of coalition 
building” as a vehicle for achieving a capacity to govern effectiv ly over periods of 
time (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Stone 1989). 
In theory, regimes can take multiple forms, but in practice, elected officials 
searching for coalition partners gravitate toward private interest groups with the 
resources necessary to move an agenda forward (McGovern 2009). By contrast, 
community-based organizations offer limited economic resources and their ability to 
mobilize may be inhibited by lack the institutional mechanisms linking citizens with 
their government (Stone 1989). In most cases, even city officials who are sympathetic 
to neighborhood interests wind up cooperating with the downtown business 
community because the latter offers the greatest potential for dvancing an agenda. In 




and regulatory measures and giving priority to the revitalization of downtown 
business districts over neighborhood redevelopment. The result is a pattern of uneven 
development and steadily increasing inequality within cities (Squires 1989). 
Regime theory offers a compelling explanation for the frequency and 
durability of downtown-oriented growth coalitions in many cities during the last half 
of the twentieth century, but it has been criticized for its difficulty in accounting for 
regime change (Orr and Stoker 1994), and the emergence of progressive r gimes that 
embrace redistributive and regulatory policies that benefit groups beyond the 
downtown core (Rosdil 1991). While regime theorists stress the possibility of 
alternative regimes, in contrast to market centrists such as Peterson, they are 
pessimistic about their likelihood (Stone 1989, Elkin 1987). I am also pessimistic 
about the likelihood of alternative regimes; this reality furthe  demonstrates the 
necessity for local community organizing. There is a lack of political will for 
redistributive policies and without a voice representing the interests of heretofore 
marginalized communities, the consequences would be even bleaker in an alre dy 
dire situation.  
Regime Change 
In normative theories of democracy, elections are acknowledged to be central 
to democratic politics at all levels of government. Presumably elections make some 
difference in the policy agendas that elected officials pursue and the resulting public 
policy outputs. Specifically, elections which change the occupants of public office 
have the potential of bringing into office individuals or groups with a policy agenda 




urban level, however, there has been relatively little interest in or research on the 
question of the impact of elections and leadership succession on public policy. This 
lack of interest undoubtedly reflects the prevailing wisdom in the political science 
literature that urban political leaders exert a relatively minor impact on public policy 
and that elections and leadership change are of minor importance. “Istead, urban 
public policy is frequently viewed as either: (1) determined by nonelected business 
elites whose public policy desires are able to prevail regardless of whom is mayor or 
(2) determined by social and economic forces in the environment (e.g., level of 
income, extent of urbanization, etc.) whose explanatory  power far outweighs that of 
political variables” (Wolman et al 1996). 
In contrast with the national and state levels, partisanship in mayoral elections 
is not particularly relevant. Baltimore and Washington are both examples that are 
consistent with Garand’s (1985) finding that the vast majority of urban governments 
with populations in excess of 100,000 are functionally nonpartisan in nature; both 
cities have been solidly Democratic for decades. And unlike the work at the national 
and state levels, there is little research that examines the impact of mayoral elections 
on public policy. Nonetheless, case studies, particularly those in the pluralist 
tradition, frequently identify the mayor to be an important actor with respect to public 
policy (see Dahl 1961). Traditional democratic theory suggests that elections, to some 
degree, are contests over alternative forms of public policy or at least referenda on the 
policies pursued by the incumbent.  
Although mayoral elections, like those at other levels of the American 




well as on policies and issues, it is likely that new mayors who attain office by 
defeating incumbents have indicated to the electorate some degree of policy 
difference from the incumbent (Wolman et al 1996).  While only a minority of newly 
elected mayors may disrupt existing arrangements, those who come to office by 
defeating incumbents do so with a presumption that they will undertake policy change 
that differentiates them from their predecessor whom the electorate has just rejected. 
This suggests that the degree of policy difference between a newly elected mayor and 
the previous mayor should be greater if the newly elected mayor defeated the 
incumbent than if he or she succeeded a mayor who voluntarily left office (Wolman 
et al 1996). However, it should be noted that in both Baltimore and Washington over 
the last 30 years, rarely has an incumbent mayor been defeated by a challenger; the 
end of most mayoral tenures was either the result of attaining higher office or not 
seeking reelection.  
Also, the new mayor’s links to the electorate may differ from the previous 
mayor. Newly elected mayors may reflect different electoral coalitions with different 
interests and policy preferences from those of their predecessors. Indeed, previous 
research emphasizes the critical importance at the urban level of constructing and 
reconstructing electoral coalitions (Shefter 1985; Elkin 1987). Changes in city 
population (racial composition, income, size, etc.) bring about changes i  the pattern 
of political demands. These are reflected during mayoral elections hrough shifts in 
electoral coalitions. Incumbents tend to hold on to the electoral coalition that 
originally brought them to office and continue to reflect, with modest change over 




in the nature of a city’s population may restructure electoral alli nces sufficiently to 
weaken an incumbent’s base.  
Moreover, if an incumbent mayor retires, the previously dominant electoral 
coalition may be difficult to put together again in cities with substantial population 
change; the new pattern of political demands will likely be reflected in a newly 
dominant electoral coalition. “In short, this argues that electoral co litions tend to be 
“sticky” and that changes in the pattern of political demands are not likely to be 
reflected in public policy until a new mayor, reflecting a new electoral coalition, takes 
office” (Wolman et al 1996). Electoral change thus acts as a threshold effect; election 
of a new mayor permits changes in the set of political demands that have been held 
back by the dominant electoral coalition responsible for the election of the previous 
mayor. New mayors, reflecting new electoral coalitions are thus likely to produce 
changes in public policy from that of their predecessors (Wolman et al 1996).  
As Stone (1989) has emphasized, mayors come to office not simply as 
representatives of electoral coalitions, but as key actors in governing coalitions or 
regimes. These regimes are put together to accomplish public purposes, i.e., to 
achieve a set of policy ends. Even if new mayors come to office by succeeding a 
retiring incumbent or with no change in electoral coalition, they ma desire to make 
some changes in the nature of the regime, to pursue new policies or an altered agenda.
“Where urban machines have dominated, competing views have been ignored and 
new actors discouraged from participating. Perhaps most important, city officials, 
regardless of race or ethnic background, have come under increasing pressure to 




181). By analyzing political actors, we can see that these cities have witnessed the 
progression of mayoral leadership through several waves of development. However, 
this progression has had its fits and starts, and in some instances the type of 
leadership has not changed much over the years.  
Community Organizing and Urban Governance 
What brought about the rise of the technocratic mayor was that significant 
portions of black voters came to reject the perceived empty symbolis  f some black 
mayors and instead gave their support to candidates with the most convincing plans 
for economic prosperity. But as mayors have increasingly positioned their leadership 
styles around such economic imperatives as tax abatements for downtown 
development and professional sports stadiums, the pendulum has swung in the 
opposite direction, but not all the way back to the civil rights types. City residents of 
all colors, who feel that they have been left out of the economic boon efalling many 
cities, are in search of leadership that will be both socially conscious while at the 
same time fiscally sound. Hence the dawn of a new generation of urban leaders who 
attempt to lead across racial and class lines by running on populist latforms while 
being careful not to alienate the business community. Thus urban leadership seems to 
have gone from one extreme to the other, and then to the middle – the next g ration 
of mayors. 
Three major factors appear to affect mayoral leadership: (1) substantive 
differences in major contextual variables from one locale to another; (2) the impact of 
different issues on major cleavages in a given political context which may have 




nature of patterns of conflict and alignment in a given political context which occur as 
a function of broad based socio-political change (Person 1985). As such, proposing 
distinct waves of urban mayors may be a convenient way to categoriz  local 
leadership however such categories may not capture certain nuances and are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. There are instances and contexts in which some 
mayors may fit more than one category or may change categories dep nding on the 
circumstances. For the most part, a discernable pattern is demonstrated, but it must be 
noted that it is difficult to place individual mayors in specific categories without 
taking into account local history and salient cleavages. 
Political activity encompasses efforts by individuals and groups to gain or 
preserve political power and a distribution of public goods and services favorable to 
themselves; this is particularly necessary for marginalized and neglected 
communities. However, even as citizens have been somewhat incorporated into the 
decision-making process of public agencies, this has primarily occurred in ways that 
produce small, incremental changes in public policy. In response, urban populism has 
cropped up as a potential antidote to this discrepancy at the local level. Urban 
populists are openly suspicious of concentrated power, whether in the form o  big 
business or big government; they stress local solutions to local problems and build 
upon the strength of community churches, ethnic associations, and similar 
organizations (Howard et al 1994). Urban populism is largely influenced by the 
protest movements of the 1960s (Boyte 1980; Piven and Cloward 1979).  
This dissertation does not look at community organizing in isolation, nor does 




relationship between the two. Although organizing strategies are of major importance, 
the ability to achieve desired ends is also related to the governing styles of mayoral 
administrations. All politics is local, and in local politics, the mayor is the executive 
and holds a significant degree of power. In order to understand decision making at the 
local level, it is imperative to understand urban executives. Although mayoral power 
is tempered by other factors, the philosophical orientation of the mayor has a 
significant impact on the opportunities for collaboration with community 
organizations. I contend that there are specific mayoral attributes that facilitate 
community engagement. I have identified the pertinent characteristics to be: Local 
Bond, Campaign Type, Platform, Development Focus, and Use of Power. 
Subsequently, I propose a theory regarding the characteristics/factors I anticipate will 
enable/frustrate relationships over time. 
Politics within a city has its own culture and success in this realm has much to 
do with local perceptions. Local Bond is relevant because one’s municipal experience 
before reaching the mayor’s office influences leadership style. At one extreme is the 
Insider – one who is from the community or is seen as speaking for it; such 
individuals may utilize patronage systems and pay attention to neighborhood 
concerns. The other is extreme is the Outsider – exemplified by weaker local ties and 
a rapid rise to executive leadership. Mayors from other cities tend to lack personal 
ties and/or affection and adopt a strictly technocratic stance. Campaign Type refers to 
statements of beliefs at the outset that help to frame the agend . An Incumbent 
campaign trades on the currency of experience and knowing city government; 




Insurgent campaigns are positioned outside of the current power structure and often 
focus on the underserved. Fixer campaigns promise a new direction and tend to take 
on a policy orientation. 
How one governs is related to the campaign that was run, but the two need not 
be identical. Platform represents the type and orientation of governing regime; these 
are: Patronage, Boosterism, Civil Rights, Populism, Technocracy. Patronage is 
largely connected with machine politics and the spoils that come with it. Boosterism 
focuses on development and selling the city as a destination. Civil Rights platforms 
are most closely linked with black political empowerment in response to white 
control. Populism refers to appeals for redistribution and serving the marginalized. 
Technocracy has a significant policy orientation and may be employed by an insider 
or outsider (but often an outsider).  Development Focus pertains to the degree of 
balance between downtown focus and neighborhood focus; each is necessary, but 
perception/reality is based on proportion of accomplishments.   This is critical as high 
level mayoral attention toward or concern for urban poverty/affordable housing, in 
proportion to development, helps facilitate collaboration in organizing efforts. Use of 
Power refers to executive decision making; this also affects levels of responsiveness 
to appeals and organizing strategies. At one end is a unilateral form which 
consolidates control, shuns input, and uses forceful gestures; at the other end is a 
more cooperative version which is open and engaging.  
Mayoral Categories/Typology 
There may in fact be a typological profile that explicates the types of mayors 




by assessing factors across several categories. Imperial mayors are described as local 
insiders, who run incumbent campaigns, promote patronage and boosterism as a 
platform, place a high focus on development, and demonstrate unilateral/forceful use 
of power. Changers tend to be outsiders, run insurgent campaigns, utilize civil rights 
or populism as platforms, place a low/moderate focus on development, and use power 
cooperatively. New Wave mayors may be either be insiders or outsiders, who run 
campaigns based on fixing, utilize a technocratic platform, place a moderate focus on 
development, and whose use of power varies between unilateral and cooperative. 
Hybrid mayors exhibit characteristics consistent with multiple categori s. In this 
regard, the hybrid – the latest generation of local black politicians – may be 
considered a legacy of the civil rights movement, governs technocratically, 
encourages development, and has flashes of populism. The table below presents these 
typologies and their defining characteristics.   
Table 4.1: Mayoral Typologies/Characteristics 
 Typology Imperial Changer New Wave Hybrid 
Characteristics      
Local Bond  Insider Outsider Either Either/Transition 
Campaign Type  Incumbent Insurgent Fixer Any 








 High Low/Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Use of Power  Unilateral/ 
Forceful 
Cooperative Varying Varying 
 
Mayoral typologies (Imperial, Changer, New Wave, Hybrid) are based on 




as there may be varying degrees of overlap. However, mere degres can account for 
significant differences in the relationships between mayors and organizers; it also 
affects the available avenues and corresponding strategies necessary for achieving 
desired ends. Therefore, these typologies have bearing on the types of relationships 
that mayors have with organizers. Every mayor is different, yet th re are 
characteristics that appear to be most conducive to their support for bottom-up, 
grassroots organizing efforts. These categories are not mutually exclusive or exact, 
but provide some very basic parameters. An attempt at strict classific tions across 
multiple cities will oversimplify quite complex local realities and individual 
personalities; in other words, this may be convenient but ultimately inaccurate. The 
best we can do is to highlight general similarities in light of contextual circumstances.  
In spite of these limitations, I am still able to present some hypotheses. It is 
my contention that mayors who emphasize populist priorities should be expect d to 
be the most willing to collaborate with community-based organizers around 
neighborhood focused agendas. A mayor’s philosophical orientation regarding 
neighborhoods is probably the factor that matters most and is the greatest determinant 
for whether a mayor will be responsive to community based organizing efforts. 
Although the degree to which executives are able to do so is also based on contextual 
constraints, I contend that mayoral characteristics exert an indepe nt influence on 
in this process. I also hypothesize that mayors are most likely to support the agendas 
of organizers when previous grassroots efforts are successful and there are 




the sake of classification, but categorization with an eye to what mayoral attributes 
mean for local community organizing and neighborhood inclusion. 
With respect to expenditure priorities, it is useful to consider Peterson’s 
(1981) three-fold division of city expenditures into developmental, redistributional, 
and allocational. Developmental expenditures, according to Peterson, ae policies that 
enhance the economic position of a community in its competition with other 
communities; redistributional policies benefit low-income residents at he expense of 
better-off members of the community; and allocational policies essentially consist of 
traditional housekeeping services. In making calculations about which expenditures 
receive priorities, mayors must weigh the requests for redistibution against local 
economic local realities. “Economic constraints, coupled with the growing diversity 
of disadvantaged groups, and at times their direct competition with each other, have 
extended the time lag between political empowerment and tangible ben fits in the 
lives of many urban blacks” (Howard et al 1994: 154). 
Undoubtedly, there are exogenous factors (local economy) that affect the level 
to which the goals of community groups can realistically be achieved. The 
combination of slower rates of economic growth, the exodus of more affluent 
residents to the suburbs – and, hence, declining tax bases of many cities, public 
resistance to tax increases, and the increasing mobility of capital has limited cities’ 
ability to engage in redistribution (Reed 1988; Stone 1989). The ability to solve 
longstanding neighborhood issues (including affordable housing) depends both on 
local circumstances and the commitment of urban executives. Thereare also elements 




conditions (poverty levels, property transfer taxes), and social composition (race 
relations, coalitions) that contribute to the extent to which administrations are 
receptive to community issues and bottom up movements. Specifically, mayors who 
at the outset prioritize neighborhood level problems/issues and project their missions 
as improving the lives and opportunities of underserved city residents are more likely 
to be substantively engaged with organizers. 
Regardless, some mayors are more attuned to community driven movements; 
this disposition is likely influenced by previous experiences and governing 
philosophies (open/collaborative vs. closed/unilateral). Organizing strategies must be 
tailored to mayoral characteristics. Organizing is based on relationships, and 
relationships change and evolve over time – over the course of a term or multiple 
terms. Because of this reality, one cannot paint the successes/chall nges of organized 
groups with a broad brush. Administrations matter, issues matter, prvious 
collaborations or disagreements matter, and of course economic resources matter; 
specific historical events also shape this process. Thus, there is somewhat of an ebb 
and flow which is dictated by local circumstances. It should be noted that IAF 
affiliates are nonpartisan and can therefore not endorse candidates or work on their 
behalf. However, I hypothesize that candidates who publicly agree with stated agenda 
items are more likely to be responsive to the organizations if they ar  elected. 
Although campaign promises are often broken, it is the role of community organizers 
to hold elected officials accountable. In this way, previous statements by 




My categorization of relationships is based on several indicators: Disposition, 
Level of Partnership, Attention to Appeals, Organizing Strategy, and Origin of 
Outcome. Disposition refers to feelings of closeness or lack thereof – amicable, tense, 
or estranged. Level of partnership describes the working relationship between mayors 
and organizers – collaborative (highly productive), reluctantly collab rative 
(productive), and non-collaborative (non-productive). Attention to appeals refers to 
the reaction from executives – responsive, moderately responsive, and non-
responsive. Organizing strategy describes how organizers go about approaching 
mayors – non-combative, moderately assertive, and confrontational. Origin of 
outcome captures how issues are resolved – willing partnership, negotiation, or 
agitation / forced hand. The combination of these indicators is used to distinguish 
between three primary types of relationships: partners, collaborators, and foils.  
Partners are just that – they work with organizers and share a vision. A 
relationship between a partner and organizers is typified by an amicable disposition 
along with a collaborative and highly productive level of partnership. Because 
partners are responsive to appeals, the strategy employed by organize s is non-
combative and outcomes result from willing partnerships. Collaborators also work 
with organizers, but the degree to which they do so varies depending on the situation. 
A relationship between a collaborator and organizers is typified by a sometimes tense 
disposition along with a reluctantly collaborative, but productive level of partnership. 
Because collaborators are moderately responsive to appeals, the stra egy employed by 
organizers is moderately assertive and outcomes result from negotiation. Foils serve 




relationship between a foil and organizers is typified by an estranged disposition 
along with a non-collaborative and non-productive level of partnership. Becaus  foils 
are unresponsive to appeals, the strategy employed by organizers is confrontational 
and outcomes result from agitation and force. The following table lays out the 
parameters of these relationships. 
Table 4.2: Type of Relationships between Mayors and Organizing Groups 
 Relationship Partner Collaborator Foil 































Given what we know about mayoral attributes and contextual circumstances, 
there are particular mayoral profiles that lend themselves to collaboration with 
organizers. Mayors who project populist stances may be most responsive to 
organizers’ agendas. Considering that their respectively stated goals are similar, it 
follows that there should be increased collaboration. Conversely, the foil is cr tical 
because the resistance of this actor provides an opportunity to personalize and 
polarize; high level resistance provides a focus for organizing and builds unity within 




the opposition; having a stated enemy to organize against. To polarize is to place 
political actors on side of an issue or the other – for or against the agenda.  Also, both 
organizers and politicians need success stories to demonstrate their effect veness; this 
provides further support for them to continue doing what they do. Collaboration and 
credit claiming are relevant as successful ventures may bolster the reputations of 
either or both parties. 
Additionally, the self-interest of mayors may extend further than immediate 
calculations of electoral strength and may very well include aspirations for higher 
elected office, which requires building a larger (statewide) constituency, which often 
includes suburban jurisdictions hostile to the interests or distressed, inner-city 
communities. In such a situation, it may be politically expedient down the road for a 
sitting mayor to demonstrate independence from unpopular constituencies (largely 
black, poor, marginalized communities). This applies to Baltimore, but not to the 
District; where there is no avenue or aspiration for higher elected office, the focus is 
on continuing to hold the position and maintaining power – lack of term limits allows 
for this. The District’s progress toward statehood, or at least substantive 
representation in Congress may change the political landscape for current and future 
DC mayors. Also, Washington’s mayor, though powerful, must interact with the 
council to a large degree in order to get budgets approved and favored legislation 
passed. The District’s home rule charter gives the council the ability to amend the 
mayor’s proposed budget by cutting certain items as well as moving funds from one 




  To the contrary, Baltimore has an especially strong form of mayoral 
leadership, while the city council is not particularly powerful. City spending is 
approved not by the council but by the Board of Estimates, a five-member panel that 
includes the mayor and two mayoral appointees. Baltimore City’s charter gives the 
mayor wide authority over the budget – the council cannot add spending or move 
funds from one item to another. The council only has the ability to cut from annual 
budgets; and a simple majority of votes provides the executive with favored 
legislation. Over time, majorities could easily be managed with funding pet projects 
in councilmanic districts. Historically, the mayor held the patronage reins as well, 
wielding control over the Board of Estimates, which handles the city’s day-to-day 
business (Smith 1999). In this body, the mayor can count on three votes – his/her own 
and those of two others whom are mayoral appointees. Hence, the relative strength of 
the mayor is critical as it affects the degree to which they fe l the need to collaborate 
with the legislative branch and the neighborhoods that they represent. 
I agree with the estimation by Howard et al (1994) that the difficulties of 
developing political coalitions that give priority to the challenge of poverty and the 
plight of American cities must not be underestimated. “It seems unlikely, but not 
impossible that the current generation of elected officials will genuinely attempt to 
address these problems. If so, these officials will undoubtedly make disadvantaged 
groups the targets of government action rather than providing them with the political 
resources needed to bargain as political equals” (Howard et al 1994: 190). In contrast, 
a more fruitful arrangement would involve an alliance between the latest cohort of 




substantive collaboration were to occur, this could possibly constitute a governing 
coalition in some cities. Nonetheless, it would obviously challenge current political 
dynamics and understandings of power at the local level.  
My typology builds upon previous conceptions of mayoral administrations, 
but goes further by explaining which types are most likely to be responsive to 
grassroots organizations. Based on this typology, there are specific expe tations of 
mayoral leadership and the subsequent relationships with community organizers. 
Imperial mayors are likely to be foils. Changer / New Wave mayors tend to be 
collaborators. Populist insiders are likely to be partners. Additionally, some outsiders 
may become collaborators; and at times, technocrats may act as foils. Moving 
forward, the profiles of individual mayors test the validity of these expectations. I 
contend that the emergence of hybrids reflects the current political realities in urban 
areas – each of the previous styles speaks to separate (electoral) constituencies (e.g., 
black poor and upwardly mobile professionals) and is a necessary component of 
effective campaigning and governance. This speaks to the natural, yet calculated 
















As urban executives, mayors are responsible for setting local priorities 
through their leadership. Mayoral types and governing regimes vary, and this 
variation has an impact on the form and level of community inclusion. In this regard, 
there are specific characteristics that indicate which mayors are likely to collaborate 
with grassroots organizers. The following profiles are based on consistent themes 
expressed in books, newspaper articles and interviews with organizers. One of my 
primary goals is to capture the nuances associated with each locality; broad categories 
may capture a lot, but by doing so they are inherently less accurate. The focus on 
specific actors in two cities allows me to drill down on specific characteristics and 
contexts without making sweeping generalizations; admittedly, there is some tradeoff 
between breadth and depth. As the mayoral typologies have already been laid out, this
chapter will test their predictive power. This analysis covers mayors in Baltimore and 
Washington over the last three decades. The following chart presents profiles of 
mayors based on their individual characteristics and relationships with grassroots 








Table 5.1: Mayoral Profile 
 
Mayors Typology Relationships 
Schaefer Imperial Foil 








Williams New Wave, 
(outsider) 
Collaborator 




Fenty Hybrid: began as 
Changer, then New 
Wave, unilateral use 
of force 
Partner 






Baltimore’s Clarence Burns and Washington’s Sharon Pratt Kelly r ceive 
limited attention in this work for substantive reasons. Burns was Baltimore’s first 
black mayor, but was not elected to the post, having finished the remainder of 
William Donald Schaefer’s term. Clarence Burns was, for the most part, a brief 
continuation of the former mayor’s machine that would ultimately come to an end at 
the next election. Kelly, the District’s first black female mayor, served only one term 
and was elected in the midst of Barry’s temporary political exile stemming from legal 
troubles. For Sharon Pratt Kelly, her efforts at reelection were futile as she finished a 
distant third in the primary, losing to the former mayor who had not sought reelection 
in the previous contest. These mayors are both outliers that fit no previous or later 
model, and whose mere occurrences were due to temporary circumstances more than 




neither had much time to foster a relationship with the organizations. In Baltimore, 
Burns came into office at the tail end of an administration that had a strained 
relationship and virtually no contact with the organizing affiliate; h  was mayor for a 
very short period of time – serving only 11 months – before being defeated in the next 
primary election. Kelly’s mayoral term in Washington ended two years prior to the 




William Donald Schaefer is an example of an Imperial mayor. Growing up in 
Baltimore and rising through the ranks of local government, Schaefer’s local bond 
was strong. He was the consummate insider; as city council pres dent he was next in 
line for the mayorality and ran an incumbent campaign. At a time of machine 
dominated politics, he was able to take advantage of the patronage system and use it 
as a base of support. As an Imperial mayor, Schaefer would not be expect d to 
engage in much collaboration with local organizers.  This is borne out by the accounts 
of his administration. His forceful and unilateral use of power did not provide much 
of an avenue for community inclusion. Also, his focus on boosting downtown 
development was largely at odds with the goals of organizers representing neglected 
neighborhoods. 
Before becoming mayor, William Donald Schaefer had been around city hall 
for sixteen years, twelve as a councilmember and four of them as council president, 




community – neighborhood groups, block associations; he used the patronage system,
provided walk around money for working the polls on election-day. While council 
president, Schaefer, was struck immediately by the enveloping sense in Chicago of 
government at work and by the constant reminders to citizens that one man was 
government in their city. As mayor, Schaefer, who admired Richard D ley, adopted a 
similar political approach. He could point to projects and say ‘I deliver…when people 
want something they come to me.’ Another similarity was that he was not going to be 
nice about confrontations and “actions” aimed at him, and if people were coming to 
him with demands, he would “set them back on their heels” (Smith 1999: 154). 
Schaefer’s dedication and political energy helped transform Baltimore from 
the blighted, depressed town of the 1960s into a national symbol of urban 
renaissance. Schaefer could often be found sitting in the back row of neighborhood 
improvement association meetings scribbling notes on his ubiquitous “action 
memos”(Weisskopf 1979). To his detractors, the same zeal that sent Schaefer into the 
forgotten corners of Baltimore turned him into the “imperial mayor” who sputtered at 
opposing views, browbeats aides, placed reporters on “suspension” for unflatteri g 
stories and ignored the city’s poor in favor of glamorous building projects. When the 
council rebuffed him, he would lash out, often punishing his opponents (Weisskopf 
1979). Schaefer would insist that he had always been a proponent of Baltimore’s 
neighborhoods although he had no hesitation about pushing ahead with controversial 
projects, whatever the pain to individuals, if he thought the greater good would be 
served. In his second term, Schaefer reaffirmed his devotion to making government 




enthused and voting “yes” on multi-million-dollar borrowing questions posed on 
election ballots, he had to make them confident that he would never abandon them, or 
forget their needs (Smith 1999).  
Schaefer’s aides found opportunities for making deals using a constellation of 
quasi-public bodies – obscure city agencies that could be public or private as financial 
circumstances and the law dictated. The city could do things that private entities 
could not and vice versa; such an arrangement provided money, speed and flexibility 
beyond that of the city’s charter. He had grown more comfortable with operating in 
secret, avoiding formation of committees that would give citizens a say in public 
policy making. One of his former neighborhood-based mentors commented that 
“Schaefer believes that he does not particularly need advisory commissions because 
he has been a member of city council and in government for many years…I think he 
feels he doesn’t want to be bothered with citizens’ committees becaus  he has 
listened to all that in the past. He is in power now and he wants to accomplish what 
has wanted to accomplish all these years” (quoted in Smith 1999: 198). 
Schaefer always considered downtown to be the pivot upon which Baltimore’s 
recovery would turn. His theory was that the revenue and employment benefits of 
downtown development and the tourist economy would filter through the entire fabric
of his city, enabling it to rebound from the decline of the manufactring sector and 
become more self-sufficient. Schaefer transformed downtown Baltimore through 
attractions such as Harborplace and the National Aquarium that spurred a downtown 
building boom that by 1988 had nearly doubled existing hotel space in a five-year 




district increased in value since 1980 (Kenworthy 1986). Schaefer acted as 
Baltimore’s chief salesman and his frenetic personality becam  synonymous with the 
city.  During his 15 years as mayor, he led the city through unprecedented growth that 
became known as “the renaissance.” Schafer believed that you had to sell your city, 
run it like a corporation and rule it like a regiment (Shields 2004). 
Schaefer knew the neighborhoods, but seemingly cared more about the Inner 
Harbor. Although he received support from the majority of the black community he 
was disliked by civil rights types. Schaefer found himself the target of angry and 
bitter recrimination. He was, the critics declared, a “bricks and mortar man,” a caterer 
to capitalists who sacrificed the concerns of the needy and the neighborhoods. 
“Harborplace was diminished as an avenue of excess, an ego-driven, busi ess-
favoring indulgence” (Smith 1999: 221).The argument was made that the Baltimore 
of Mayor Schaefer was the Baltimore of the wealthy, that he simply created “two 
Baltimores” – one for the well-heeled and one for the poor people who remain 
crammed into dilapidated houses. It seemed that his priority was structures and 
buildings for the middle classes. Schaefer bristled at such criticism, insisting that the 
city spent $8 of every $10 on social services (Weisskopf 1979).  
Previous mayors had faced the demands of poor people and black militants, 
who had made legitimate claims for power and a share of government’s favor. 
Schaefer and time had all-but neutralized protest. By the 1980s, Baltimore had a 
majority black population whose dream of political control had been deferred – 
denied – by the machine and Schaefer (Smith 1999). He achieved something f w big 




neutralized all meaningful political opposition. “During his city council days, 
Schaefer had a record of voting “right” on civil rights issues; this was particularly 
important to running a city with a growing black electorate” (Smith 1999: 59). Even 
in the large and poor black community of Baltimore – where blacks made up 56 
percent of the city’s population – the mayor appeared unbeatable. The polls showed 
he was nearly as popular among blacks as he was among whites. However, with an 
ever increasing black electorate and the potential for serious black contenders, 
Schaefer was widely considered to be Baltimore’s last white mayor (Weisskopf 
1979). 
Just as Baltimore’s building boom did not cure the city’s chronic fiscal woes, 
it brought only limited relief to the city’s large population of impoverished and poorly 
educated residents, most of whom are black. Baltimore’s building boom primarily 
benefited suburban commuters who made up an increasing share of the city’s work 
force. Three-fourths of all city neighborhoods and 90 percent of black neighborhoods 
experienced increases in poverty during Schaefer’s tenure (Kenworthy 1986). Hence 
Baltimore’s renewal was a double-edged sword for Schaefer, as critic  perceive his 
mayoral priorities as bricks and mortar over education and social programs. Schaefer 
was living the trickle-down theory long before Reagan popularized the term, 
however, there was no significant trickle down from the Inner Harbor boom. 
Schaefer’s policies, by essentially turning city government into an instrument of the 
business community and developers, ignored the genuine distress that occurred in a 




  Consequently, Schaefer’s relationship with BUILD leaders was strained. 
“Many of BUILD’s earlier demands, such as improved police protection, arson 
control, decent and affordable public housing, and rat eradication, had been dircted 
at Schaefer and his administration. BUILD leaders were also vocal critics of his 
administration’s emphasis on downtown redevelopment” (Orr 1999: 131). “Several of 
BUILD’s activist ministers were considered to be political opponents of Mayor 
Schaefer. Some of them, like Douglas Miles and Vernon Dobson, had openly and 
aggressively campaigned for city council candidates and mayoral h pefuls critical of 
the Schaefer regime” (Orr 1999: 131). Given Schaefer’s dominant poli ical 
personality, this created an adversarial and contentious environment in which to 
attempt organizing. 
“Schaefer was especially irritated when asked tough questions in public and 
was particularly uncomfortable attending BUILD’s issue forums. These were usually 
held in a large black church and attended by hundreds of volunteers” (Orr 1999: 131). 
During the 1983 campaign, BUILD sponsored a mayoral debate in which Schaefer 
stormed out, saying he was “set up” and “embarrassed” (Leff 1986). Afterward, 
Schaefer did not meet with BUILD leaders or attend any of their forums until after his 
election as governor in 1986. Governor Schaefer was reported to have said to one 
BUILD organizer: “I don’t like you, but I know I have to work with you.” Organizers 
contend that Schaefer may have been difficult to get along with and would fight you, 
but his word was his word; for example, he later came through on BUILD’s requests 




not talk about BUILD’s Nehemiah housing program until the organization went to the 
black church and raised $100,000; Schaefer would later praise BUILD for its effort . 
Schmoke 
Kurt Schmoke is an example of a New Wave mayor. Growing up in Baltimore 
and representing the first opportunity for a black mayor, Schmoke’s local bond was 
strong. Though an insider, he was able to run an insurgent campaign as he was 
outside of the machine previously in power. As a New Wave mayor, Schmoke would 
be expected to employ a technocratic approach; but in combination with populist 
tendencies, this would lead to collaboration with local organizers.  Thisis borne out 
by the accounts of his administration. His cooperative use of power provided more of 
an avenue for community inclusion than under the previous mayor. However, 
economic realities meant that his focus on neglected neighborhoods had to be 
balanced by a moderate focus on downtown development. 
By 1983, Baltimore remained the only majority black city without a blck 
mayor. In 1987, blacks made up 60 percent of the city’s population but held only six 
of the city council’s 18 seats. As Baltimore’s first elected black mayor, Schmoke was, 
for the most part, able to keep race from becoming a significant issue in city 
government – a challenging task in a city where whites only recently slipped into the 
minority. Schmoke, who was once the city’s prosecutor, seemed to have broken with 
the past Baltimore style of governance by powerful persona and eve more powerful 
machine politics and perquisites. When William Donald Schaefer was m yor, it 
sometimes seemed that his name was emblazoned on every city park bench, garbage 




In a departure, Kurt Schmoke began talking about a human agenda that concentrated 
on education and poverty and put less emphasis on physical things like seaport 
revival (Ayres 1988).  
Schmoke was different, his style was that of a modern technocrat, yet his 
disdain for traditional politics might have been an obstacle to realizing his vision. The 
mayor did not seem to operate well in the back rooms of politics and had no taste for 
the quid pro quos of dealmaking (Warner 1988). Schmoke wanted to continue 
revitalizing the city which enjoyed a downtown renaissance around its harbor and 
became a magnet for moneymaking conventions. But simultaneously, his election 
altered the composition of the city’s governing regime, opening city hall to black 
leaders long ignored during former mayor William Donald Schaefer’s t nure. BUILD 
leaders, for example, became major players” (Orr 1999: 141). By the time Schmoke 
took office in December 1987, he and BUILD had developed a solid working 
relationship. BUILD was considered part of Baltimore’s governing re ime. (Orr 
1999). “When it comes to the things we (BUILD) want, such as better ducation, 
housing, employment opportunities and health care, he’s been extremely accountable, 
making contact at least every three weeks” (Ayres 1988). Many observer  attributed 
Kurt Schmoke’s close victory over Burns to his quick endorsement of BUILD’s 
agenda (Orr 1999). A few days after he won the election, Schmoke told an audience 
of about 2,000 BUILD volunteers that “the real winner was BUILD’s agenda. And 
BUILD’s agenda is Baltimore’s agenda” (Crocket 1987). 
BUILD says the Schmoke administration was more amenable to 




disinvestment in neighborhoods. Schmoke himself was interested in developing a 
neighborhood-oriented development strategy and creating a self-sustained community 
development effort in the city and channeling more public resources to 
neighborhoods. Schmoke was regarded for his personal attention to housing issues.
Early in his tenure, he worked with Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development 
(BUILD) to create one of the country’s first Nehemiah developments for low-income 
homebuyers. During his administration almost 1,000 Nehemiah homes were built 
(Rath 1999). “He engaged us at a level most mayors wouldn’t engage a community 
organization at.” Graf says Schmoke met with BUILD representatives every six to 
eight weeks during his first six years in office (Rath 1999). 
Schmoke, Baltimore’s first black elected mayor was considered one of a 
generation of pragmatic black mayors who built a base of support acrss racial lines. 
“Kurt Schmoke was considered to be a black leader who could really bui d biracial 
coalitions, but he really wasn’t able to pull it off,” Orr says (Rath 1999).  Facing a 
white challenger, his reelection campaign colors – red, black and green, the 
traditional colors of the symbolic African liberation flag – were seen as a direct 
appeal to African-Americans in a city where 55% of Democrati voters are black. 
Schmoke was one that the black community could relate to, identify with, and be 
proud of; but this had its drawbacks. Being a product of the black church – which
fostered a “we raised you” type of relationship – made it difficult to apply tension. 





At times, Schmoke’s administration was disappointing to organizers; h  was 
willing in some instances and had to be forced into a corner in others. According to 
organizer accounts, Schmoke would sometimes claim credit for initiatives after 
battling them – championing after the fact. To some his vision was not big enough as 
there seemed to be little new thinking, continuing the usual position with the 
corporate community. Schmoke seemed cautious and his staff protective, so h  had to 
be cajoled on some things. However, he would reach out to organizers by calling and 
saying they needed to meet. After a challenger supported an agend  which included 
Child First, BUILD’s afterschool initiative, Schmoke eventually got on board and 
raised the necessary money from the sale of the city’s golf course. Schmoke was an 
ally with Child First and pushed for dedicated funding – he did not get i , but BUILD 
continued to push for it; he also delivered on the living wage and BUILD’s signature 
campaigns. BUILD concedes that if it was not for him, there would be no living 
wage, Child First, or Nehemiah homes; Schmoke also gave credit to BUILD. These 
victories came out of created tension between his mayoral power and BUILD’s 
power. 
Acknowledging at the outset that his objectives were sweeping, Schmoke said 
he would be satisfied with incremental change. Baltimore was/is socially and 
economically depressed and Schmoke was working with diminishing federal and state 
resources. “Those were different times,” Schmoke said. “Schaefer had a good 
economy and $23 million a year in (federal) revenue-sharing. I got the recession and 
no revenue-sharing” (Minzesheimer 1995). “Even Schmoke acknowledged that he 




expectations.” (Shields 2004: 2). One of his legacies was his ability to attract more 
federal and state aid while subsidies diminished elsewhere. Schmoke held up the 
$100 million federal Empowerment Zone Baltimore received to lure new jobs and 
businesses as one of his proudest accomplishments” (Shields 2004: 5). “Although 
Baltimore was known nationally as a “Renaissance City” for the redevelopment of its 
glitzy harbor and $19 million a year in hotel bed taxes from tourists, Schmoke 
continued to describe it as the “Tale of Two Cities.” Some of the most abject poverty 
in the nation existed 10 blocks from the shining harbor in any direction” (Shields 
2004: 7). 
O’Malley 
Martin O’Malley is an example of a New Wave mayor. Growing up in 
Montgomery County, MD, his local bond was not very strong. O’Malley was an 
outsider, and after two terms on the city council, he positioned himself to run a fixer 
campaign. As a New Wave mayor, O’Malley would be expected to ad pt a 
technocratic approach; this would not automatically lend itself to much collaboration 
with local organizers.  This is borne out by the accounts of his administration. His 
often forceful use of executive power provided limited avenues for community 
inclusion. Also, his high focus on downtown development was largely at odds with 
the goals of organizers representing neglected neighborhoods. 
After eight years on the Baltimore City Council, Bethesda, MD native, Martin 
O'Malley entered the 1999 mayor’s race late and used a divided electorate and tough 
talk on crime to prevail against two other candidates. O’Malley won a racially 




majority-black city (Mosk 2001). However, some saw O’Malley as an opportunist. 
“There was no talk of an O’Malley candidacy until you had …two to three other 
African-Americans in the race,” says the Rev. Douglas Miles, president of the 
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance (Rath 1999). Miles was widely quoted (or 
misquoted) as saying an O’Malley victory would be a “stunning setback in race 
relations”. “Had he declared himself before three or four black candidates were 
already in the running, then he would have some credibility. He has no credibility” 
(Shields 2004: 103). Nevertheless, O’Malley had properly read the mood of 
Baltimore and ran on a law and order platform; the implication was that the previous 
mayor and police commissioner had stood idle, while the murder rate climbed. 
O’Malley stumbled into an early misunderstanding, when he scheduled his 
first campaign press conference at a Head Start center run by an African-American 
church in West Baltimore—without getting approval from the church’s pa tor. The 
event was scuttled, and O’Malley found himself facing black ministers’ accusations 
that he was treading on their turf for political gain. “It was not his intent to do that, 
but it was his lack of understanding of the black church. Nothing flies in the black 
church without first being flown by the pastor,” Miles said (Rath 1999). Also, at a 
BUILD candidate forum in August 1999, O’Malley used the phrase “you people” 
while addressing the mostly African American audience; O’Malley’s words provoked 
a roll of grumbles through the church. Though O’Malley uttered the phrase perhaps 
innocently, it demonstrated a lack of awareness. O’Malley took it personally that 




To organizers, O’Malley appeared to be thin skinned and sensitive to 
criticism; he tended not to see a difference between individual ministers who were 
critical and BUILD. O’Malley also tended to believe that all politics is personal and 
took his disagreement with Miles as being synonymous with BUILD being against 
him. O’Malley also had verbal clashes with perceived opponents (alleged y cursing 
out an organizer over the phone). Because of their previous misunderstaning Miles 
somewhat disassociated himself from BUILD, functioning as clergy member, but not 
taking a visible leadership role.  In an interview, Miles was quoted as saying 
O’Malley’s election would be the worst thing for race relations i  Baltimore. 
However he contends that the full statement was that it would be the worst thing for 
race relations if he were elected by a white minority.  This was a potential fear 
because of the number of black candidates in the race.  
To the organizers, O’Malley seemed to be fighting a large portion of the black 
clergy community – seemingly saying “I have my own clergy”. O’Malley was 
endorsed by Rev. Frank Reid, pastor of Bethel AME Church, the largest black church 
in the city with 14,000 congregation members; Reid is also Kurt Schmoke’s half 
brother. O’Malley won the Democratic primary with 53 percent of the vote; the two 
leading black candidates received 28 percent and 17 percent respectively. According 
to election officials, 42 percent of the voters cast ballots. O’Malley became the first 
white mayor of this predominantly black city since 1986. Baltimore j ined other 
predominantly black cities such as Oakland, California, and Gary, Indiana that have 




Voters also decided to postpone the next mayoral election a year to make it 
coincide with the presidential election in 2004. The change, promoted as a money-
saver, gave O’Malley a five-year term (Dominguez 1999). One of O’Malley’s 
immediate priorities was finding a police commissioner; the former commissioner 
supported community policing over the zero-tolerance strategy. Zero-tol rance 
policing, in which all crimes no matter how small are aggressively enforced, had been 
advocated for years by O’Malley, who credited it with lowering crime in New York 
and other cities (Dominguez 1999). CitiStat is a program O’Malley introduced in 
Baltimore just months into office, a repackaging of New York City’s much-heralded 
crime-fighting strategy, which used computers to monitor and map every offense, 
then reposition officers where crime rates were highest.  CitiStat also proved to be a 
perfect match for O’Malley’s detail-oriented style – an pproach to governing 
borrowed from one of his best-known predecessors, William Donald Schaefer, who 
was famous for telling city workers to “do it now” (Mosk 2001).  
At the beginning, O’Malley appeared to be a single issue mayor – law and 
order – and had difficulty engaging in other issues. His focus was on crime and safety 
and did not make an immediate connection to youth/afterschool. His administrat on 
looked at dedicated funding for Child First, BUILD’s afterschool component; to this 
end, BUILD attended morning meetings, proposals were soon enacted, but themoney 
was held by the city. Child First was/is Baltimore’s most successful afterschool 
partner, but O’Malley wanted funds cut, supposedly because of auditing.  In 2001, 
O’Malley claimed that Child First books were not audited and would not meet with 




programming, a Child First staff member submitted an accounting form that had 
errors. O’Malley characterized the error in a way that made it appear that Child First 
was unaudited/misappropriating money. In response, BUILD presented the last 4 
years of its audits at the Board of Estimates which was a bit of an embarrassment for 
the mayor, further straining the relationship. 
Moreover, there was widespread speculation that he was contemplating a run 
for Maryland governor, after just two years into a five-year term. To many, it was 
apparent that he was attempting to build a name and broader reputation. “There’s no 
question he’s building a national profile – and fast,” said Al From, f under and chief 
executive of the Democratic Leadership Council, the incubator for moderate 
Democrats that helped propel Bill Clinton onto the national stage (Mosk 2001).  
BUILD questioned the mayor’s record on social issues. The group wondered if he had 
as much interest in problems such as poverty and housing. They noted tha  mayor 
O’Malley had failed earlier to keep promised dates with the group (Rath 1999). The 
mayor’s chief deputy wrote BUILD to defend O’Malley’s decision to cut funding for 
a child care program the group runs – a decision he believed was behind the group’s 
criticism (Mosk 2001). But organizers with BUILD said the group’s fears ran deeper. 
“We need to know if this mayor is committed to Baltimore, or if he’s just using it as a 
steppingstone to higher office”.  It was not just O’Malley’s streak of appearances in 
the national news. More than anything, the group’s concern stemmed from persistent 
speculation that O’Malley was considering a run for governor in 2002 (Mosk 2001). 
But there were local issues that needed urgent attention. About 400 people




protest what they called the city’s neglect of the east side’s Oliver neighborhood. The 
ministers accused Mayor O’Malley of refusing to respond to requests for meetings to 
devise a strategy to fight drug-related violence. They said the mayor’s administration 
had also ignored pleas to increase police patrols and take other steps to revitalize the 
neighborhood, where boarded-up houses pockmark most blocks and violent drug 
dealers take over corners at night. A spokesman for O’Malley, accused BUILD’s 
leaders of politicizing the deaths to get back at the mayor for not providing more 
money for the organization’s after-school programs. Top aides to Mayor O’Malley 
said “that neighborhood is going to be a key for the mayor for the next year or so 
because of this tragedy… It opened our eyes as to what was going on over there” 
(Marks 2002). Activists who were organizing there for over four years s id they were 
appalled that it took the deaths of a whole family to get city hall’s attention. But once 
they’ve had it, they were determined to use it (Marks 2002).  
After the Dawson family tragedy in 2002, O’Malley and BUILD began to 
talk; it was a turning point in the relationship. BUILD spent 5 years deeply embedded 
in the community and two of the children were in Child First. The group’s philosophy 
was that in a crisis you meet; in their view, BUILD had valuable information, but 
O’Malley seemed unresponsive. BUILD knew the neighborhood and its issues and 
requested a meeting with the mayor (via fax and kept a copy of the transmission), 
however there was no response. The message they were attempting to communicate 
was “can’t the mayor be bigger than our differences”. Later, O’Malley was on local 
talk radio and BUILD organizers contacted the producer about trying to meet with the 




meet with BUILD” and responded “I’ll meet with any organizat on acting for the 
good of the city…BUILD doesn’t reach out”. BUILD sent copies of 4 faxes sent to 
O’Malley requesting a meeting, which he denied ever seeing. At this point the mayor 
said “I’ll meet with them any time” and BUILD replied “how about today?”  
The first meeting with O’Malley was tense, however, there wasrecognition 
that he needed BUILD’s deep relationships in the Oliver community – 5 churches, 
250 children in the afterschool program. O’Malley helped the organizers rebuild 
BUILD; as they see it, his overreaction allowed for an opportunity to personalize and 
polarize. The governor at the time and BUILD’s partners in the corporate community 
urged O’Malley to meet and negotiate with them. Needing state aid and private sector 
support for the city he did so; the result was a contentiously fruitful relationship. The 
relationship would eventually be mended – much of it having to do with credit 
claiming for successful projects. In September 2003, O’Malley won his second 
Democratic primary, amidst limited competition, gaining 67 percent of the vote. He 
left in 2006, when he ran successfully for governor. 
Dixon  
Sheila Dixon is an example of a Hybrid, as she exhibits Imperial and New 
Wave qualities. Growing up in Baltimore and rising through the ranks of local 
government, Dixon’s local bond is strong. She was the consummate insider; as city 
council president she was next in line for the mayorality and ran an incumbent 
campaign. With traits of a New Wave mayor, Dixon would be expected to mploy a 
technocratic approach; this would not automatically lend itself to much collaboration 




her administration. Dixon’s varying use of executive power has provided av nues for 
community inclusion, albeit limited at times. She also has been accused of 
unilaterally using power, consistent with Imperial mayors. Also, her focus on 
downtown development has been at odds with the goals of organizers repre enting 
neglected neighborhoods. 
Sheila Dixon, the first black woman to serve as mayor of Baltimore, secured a 
full term in office with a resounding victory in the 2007 Democrati primary; Dixon 
took over as mayor from Martin O’Malley who was elected governor. Dixon, who 
once waved her shoe in the air during a racially charged City Council debate over 
redistricting, has mellowed considerably and broadened her appeal. Dixon seemed to 
undergo an extreme makeover while running for mayor – tough city council member 
becomes progressive, forward thinking, and compromising. Dixon, a Baltimore nativ  
was elected to the City Council in 1987 and won two citywide races for City Council 
president (Nuckols 2007). After a 1991 redistricting that raised the number of black-
majority City Council districts from one out of six to five out of six, council member 
Sheila Dixon  took off a shoe and waved it at her white colleagues, saying, “Now the 
shoe is on the other foot. See how you like it.” In return, Dixon’s white colleagues 
chided African-American council members for continuing to hold separate Black 
Coalition meetings despite their new majority (Rath 1999). 
The relationship between Dixon and BUILD began with the controversy over 
the convention center hotel in 2005. Ministers protested, accusing the City Council 
president, Sheila Dixon, of reneging on a promise to provide $50 million for the 




million hotel just west of the harbor. The hotel proposal was supported by Mayor 
Martin O’Malley and the city’s tourism and economic development agencies as a way 
to stem the loss of convention business to competing cities (Gately 2005).  The 
proposal called for the city to develop and own the 752-room Hilton, which would be 
built next to the downtown convention center; it would be Baltimore’s most 
expensive public project ever. When BUILD members marched into a meeting of the 
Board of Estimates to accuse Dixon of breaking her promise and to deman  a 
meeting, she agreed to talk later with the group.  
Bishop Douglas Miles, former head of Baltimore’s Interdenominational 
Ministerial Alliance, said City Council President Sheila Dixon had “selective 
amnesia” about the campaign promise. “We’re not gonna get into a debate about your 
perception of my commitment,” Dixon retorted. BUILD says that Dixon publicly 
promised twice during her 2003 campaign that she would deliver $50 million in city-
revenue bonds that would help groups like BUILD develop and construct affordable 
housing units in Baltimore; the group accused her of abandoning her pledge to inv st 
in needy neighborhoods in favor of the ritzy hotel (Janis 2005). Miles said the final 
straw came when a “stonewalling” Dixon e-mailed him a 32-page application for aid 
(Rosen 2005). 
But Dixon denied she broke a promise and said the city had pumped mor 
than $100 million into neighborhoods in the previous five years. She said BUILD had 
yet to provide a specific plan for redevelopment. “We can’t write a $50 million check 
when they don’t have a plan, and they don’t have a plan,” she said. BUILD countered 




plans, but was asking the city to commit the money to demolish, acquire and rebuild 
blighted and vacant properties. The council president said that she had been working 
with BUILD and that the city was making progress to wipe out blight, stimulate the 
economy and improve housing (Gately 2005). 
“It’s a tale of two cities and two visions – one uptown, one downtown, one 
doing extremely well, one struggling to survive,” said the Rev. Douglas Miles, also a 
co-chairman of BUILD (Gately 2005). “Since the hotel bill, she’s stopped returning 
our calls,” a BUILD organizer said. In her weekly constituent e-mail, Dixon called 
BUILD’s assertions “absolutely untrue,” stating that she was a strong supporter of 
affordable-housing construction. “Certainly the appearance of Harborplace is a stark 
contrast to some of our challenged residential neighborhoods . . . [but] the great 
majority of the development that you see in the downtown area is private 
investment,” she wrote in that e-mail. “It’s very misleading . . . to continue this fiction 
that the city spends all of its money on the downtown area. In fact, quite the opposite 
is true” (Janis 2005). 
The 2005 Hilton hotel and convention center development project was 
handled in controversy: nine council members voted against it at first, th ee of whom 
voted for it later after being promised development in their district . Dixon says 
getting a fund for affordable-housing out of that deal was a huge victory – though 
most observers credited the activist group BUILD with pressuring Mayor O’Malley 
to fund the affordable-housing trust fund along with the hotel. Still, Dixon nsists that 
the complaint by her opponents and others that she is too much of a downtown mayor 




we wouldn’t have the $59 million [from the hotel deal] now going to the Oliver 
community, which in some places looks like a war zone” (Ericson 2007). Dixon ran 
on a pledge to continue the progress the city enjoyed under O’Malley including a 
decline in violent crime and a downtown development boom. But at the same time, 
she was not afraid to distance herself from the former mayor particul ly on crime. 
She ended his zero-tolerance policing strategy, in part out of concern that too many 
questionable arrests had badly damaged the relationship between police officers and 
the communities they serve. O’Malley pledged to reduce homicides to 175 a year, but 
never came close. Dixon, meanwhile, set no statistical goals and did not expect her 
strategies to pay immediate dividends (Nuckols 2007). 
Contrary to her portrayal by her opponents, Dixon suggests she has been a
champion for the city’s have-nots, both in government and in the neighborhoods. 
(Ericson 2007). But BUILD contended that the city needs to commit more of its 
resources to rebuilding neighborhoods (Janis 2005). It appears that Dixon believes – 
like a lot of businesspeople and economists – that the engine of any city’s growth is 
the central business district. She believes that feeding that central business district – 
awarding tax breaks to favored developers, assembling land for them, changing 
zoning for them, financing their hotels – allows wealth to trickle down to the 
neighborhoods (Ericson 2007). After the fight around the convention center hotel, 
Dixon and BUILD later reconciled, but the question of whether or not she could 
totally trust BUILD continued to linger. Dixon is still working through the initial 
distrust. Dixon seems willing to be creative as mayor, and currently has a working 




mayors have in this area, but not what she promised. To some it appears that Dixon 
has calculated that she does not need BUILD. At this point, BUILD is not necessarily 
at the table, but there is some relationship. 
Washington 
Barry 
Marion Barry is an example of a mayor who transitioned from a Changer to an 
Imperial style. Although initially an outsider, his local civil rights organizing work 
allowed him to eventually be seen as an insider who spoke for the disadvantaged. As 
a result of rising through the ranks of local government, Barry’s local bond was 
strong. After being elected mayor, Barry became more of a supporter of downtown 
development – which was seemingly at odds with his previous populist stance . This 
is borne out by the accounts of his administration. He was also able to dominate local 
politics by constructing a machine based on a patronage system and using it as a base 
of support. As an Imperial mayor, Barry would not be expected to engage in much 
collaboration with local organizers; also, by appearing to a Changer representing the 
downtrodden, he was able to neutralize appeals from this segment.  
Barry initially came to Washington as a leader of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC); but he quickly sensed that SNCC was losing its 
clout and that the civil rights movement itself was moving into a new phase that could 
find its form in the nation’s capital. In his estimation, the tradiional civil rights 
groups with middle-class emphasis could not or would not reach the poorest blacks. 
At that time, Washington’s black elite looked on Barry as an inarticulate rabble-




the movement saw the city’s unique black majority community as fertile soil to carry 
on a civil rights movement as it changed into a struggle for economic power. (Jaffe 
and Sherwood 1994).  
In the 1978 mayoral primary, Barry stood out from his opponents in his 
commitment to social welfare goals by advocating tangible improvements in such 
areas as better schools, more low-income housing units and an increase in black 
power. But in a race where his two opponents had virtually locked up the support of 
the black middle class, Barry had to broaden his electoral base by appealing to white 
voters, a decision that proved crucial to his victory. While Barry carried only 27 
percent of the black vote, he outdistanced his rivals among whites with 53 percent of 
their support (Henig 1993). “Barry’s core support lay among liberal whites and 
younger blacks. It was essentially the same coalition that had propelled the student 
civil rights movement in the early 1960s. Fifteen years after SNCC had peaked, here 
was the SNCC support system ready to be molded into a political constituency” (Jaffe 
and Sherwood 1994: 113). In the 1978 mayoral election, “solid majorities in the 
affluent white precincts and the city’s gay community, a cohesive and politically 
growing minority, and a respectable share of black poor and middle-class voters 
punched Barry’s ticket” (Jaffe and Sherwood 1994: 122). 
The fact that whites made up a significant portion of Barry’s political base 
worried some blacks; home rule had created a black-led government, but there was 
always the specter of white reclamation of leadership in the city (Coleman 1979). 
People questioned whether Barry changed; was he betraying his image as a street-




Suddenly he had to deal with the same white business community that had objected to 
his demands for money for the home rule movement (Stone 1986). In return for 
financing his campaigns, for withholding most criticism of his government, and for 
including Barry’s friends in their deals, Barry would give the busine smen almost a 
free hand in developing Washington’s downtown business district” (Jaffe nd 
Sherwood 1994: 123). Also, shying away from him at first, the rising black 
professional class embraced the mayor because he positioned himself as a champion 
of black economic empowerment. He set a goal to increase business with minority 
contractors from 10 to 35 percent. “Barry worked adroitly to transform the District 
from the sinecure it had once been for whites appointed by friends n Congress into 
an opportunity structure for local blacks” (Gillette 1993: 194).  
The mayor deftly used the Minority Business Opportunity Commission to 
spread hundreds of millions of dollars in city contracts to firms controlled by blacks, 
Latinos, and women. Barry’s aides also made sure that they reciprocated with 
community support and campaign contributions. There were three legs to Barry’s 
political machine: “campaign money from the business community, power and votes 
from the churches, and the loyalty that derives from political patronage.” (Jaffe and 
Sherwood 1994: 140). He began by courting the city’s powerful black ministers. 
Barry wooed them with special clergy license plates, invited them to high-profile 
meetings at the District Building, and showcased them at an annual citywide prayer 
breakfast. Most important, Barry put millions of dollars at the disposal of the 
ministers to fund church-based day-care centers, senior-citizen meals programs, and 




To shore up his standing in the poorer neighborhoods, he worked with local 
clergy who had been cool to his election on such social concerns as housing and aid 
to the elderly. In a symbolic and highly publicized move, he shifted his residence 
from a racially mixed neighborhood on Capitol Hill to the politically strategic black 
middle-class Hillcrest section of Southeast Washington. In the 1982 election, Barry 
won nearly 60 percent of the vote. His opponent only won the predominantly whi e 
Ward Three, receiving 54 percent to Barry’s 34 percent. Every predominantly black 
precinct went for Barry by more than two to one. “The results marked the total shift 
of Barry’s electoral support from an integrated base in 1978 to one that relied on the 
black middle class and poor. In 1978 the white vote put him over the top; in 1982 it 
alone couldn’t defeat him.” (Jaffe and Sherwood 1994: 143). 
Achieving economic power was supposed to be the second phase of the civil 
rights movement. Nonetheless, what began as an attempt to broaden the economic 
base of the city, proved to be a rich source of political favors. The city would sell and 
at bottom-basement prices to development teams that included minority partners, and 
frequently were people with strong social and political connections to Marion Barry. 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development said that the city was 
giving away its assets (Jaffe and Sherwood 1994).The problem with Barry’s version 
of the spoils system was that he always seemed to spread them to the same people.  
After 1987, when problems in the Barry administration became public 
knowledge, Congress and the Reagan White House signaled disapproval by holding 
down the federal payment, the annual amount that the city receives to compensate for 




financial and management failings that prompted Congress to install a financial 
control board in 1995. Subsequently, Congress and President Clinton suspended 
home rule in August 1997 as part of the $928 million federal bailout of the city. Nine 
critical city agencies were stripped from Mayor Marion Barry’s control and placed 
under the control board as part of the bailout (Hansen 1998).  
The Barry administration was least effective with the city’s poorest citizens – 
those who helped him rise to power but remained trapped in decrepit public housing. 
Regardless, the poor and middle-class African American communities credited Barry 
with improving basic city services that most people take for granted: accurate water 
billing, street repair, garbage collection. These services were not completely efficient, 
but worked much better than before. Barry derived power because he gave the 
impression that he could contain the disenfranchised by giving them a voice, or 
unleash them by inciting their anger (Sherwood and Jaffe 1994). WIN was founded at 
the tail end of Barry’s last mayoral term; by then accountabili y was an issue as the 
control board wielded an inordinate amount of power.  Nonetheless, Marion Barry
demonstrated respect for WIN because of their ability to mobilize large numbers of 
people from all parts of the District. But, Barry’s initial disposition was “why should I 
meet with you?” He also attended a church with 7,000 members, while WIN’s 
churches tend to have no more than 300 families.   
Williams 
Anthony Williams is an example of a New Wave mayor. Not being from 
Washington, and only recently arriving, he was the consummate outsider. As the 




widespread mismanagement, he was able to run a fixer campaign. As a New Wave 
mayor, Williams would be expected to adopt a technocratic approach; this would not 
automatically lend itself to much collaboration with local organizers, specially as an 
outsider.  This is borne out by the accounts of his administration. His varying use of 
executive power provided avenues for community inclusion, albeit limited at times. 
Also, his focus on boosting downtown development was largely at odds with the 
goals of organizers representing neglected neighborhoods. 
Williams, a Los Angeles native, arrived in Washington as chief financial 
officer for the Department of Agriculture, after stints at economic development 
agencies in Boston and St. Louis.  In 1995, Congress had taken most of Barry’s 
power away amid a deep and paralyzing fiscal crisis and placed it in the hands of a 
federally appointed control board. One of the few things the four-term mayor could 
do was hire a semi-independent chief financial officer for the city, but only the 
control board could fire him. Barry named Williams as CFO in 1995 at the behest of 
the control board. As chief financial officer, Williams said the management problem 
was rooted in a mind-set that hobbles reform. “D.C. government has retrenched by 
focusing on its core, loyal base: its employees and a few favored contractors,” 
Williams said. “The public doesn’t fit in that picture. Machines and good 
management are not antithetical,” he said. “When a political machine works, it 
delivers to its customer base. In Washington, we’ve got the machine, but things don’t 
work” (Powell 1997). 
As the 1998 election year approached, a draft movement of city activists 




Ward 7 ‘drafted’ Anthony Williams to replace Barry in the belief that he could do for 
the city what he did as chief financial officer (Hansen 1999). He won the election by 
a wide margin, but the results showed a deep split in his support during the 
Democratic primary. The predominantly white neighborhoods in Washington voted 
overwhelmingly for Williams. After his inaugural address, Williams signed in private 
an agreement with the presidentially appointed control board that gave him virtually 
all the powers it stripped from Barry in August 1997 (Hansen 1999). Nine critical city 
agencies were stripped from Marion Barry’s control and placed under the control 
board as part of the bailout. 
Williams was granted the authority to set policy and run the District 
government day to day without interference from the presidentially appointed control 
board, which scaled back its role to providing vigorous oversight and focusing on the 
city’s budget. Also, the agreement formally gave Williams the ability to fire agency 
directors and other city workers. The control board’s decision to hand the reins of 
power to Williams – while retaining the authority to review appointments of agency 
heads – had bipartisan support in Congress (Vise 1998). Williams, was credited on 
Capitol Hill with cleaning up the financial mess that pushed the city to the edge of 
insolvency in 1995. Unlike Mayor Marion Barry, who had a rocky relationship with 
Congress, Williams is widely respected for his accomplishments, officials said. Rep. 
James P. Moran Jr. (D-Va.), the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations 
subcommittee on the District, lauded the transfer of power (Vise 1998).  
The control board was seen to have served a vital function; its presence helped 




powers was regarded as an appropriate step once the city was fisc lly secure under 
Williams’ management. The changes in the city’s governance structure were put into 
place in the summer of 1997 by then-Sen. Lauch Faircloth, the North Carolina 
Republican whose legislative amendment transferred operational control ve  most of 
the government from the mayor to the control board. Until that time, the control 
board, which was created in 1995, had focused mostly on the city’s finances (Vise 
1999). This reinstatement of power, in part, demonstrated that Williams rolled into 
office with a mandate to revamp the troubled D.C. government.  
Williams, the accountant, was cleaning up the mess; he was seen a  non-
political, the opposite of Barry and the beginning of post-civil rights politicians in 
DC. But politicking was not easy for him. While making efforts at public outreach, 
Williams had trouble figuring out how to build coalitions and work with ot er 
politicians in the city, particularly the council (Cottman 2000). Williams said in late 
1999: “I strenuously object to any notion that I don’t reach out to the council.…I go 
to enormous lengths to reach out to them, consult with them, make sure they’re on 
board. I’ve made announcements with them and supported them…even when they 
haven’t done a damn thing for me” (DeBonnis 2009). In addition, some community 
activists soon began to complain that some Williams aides were talking down to them 
– a problem made worse because most of the aides were white and most of those 
complaining were black (Cottman 2000). 
  As a candidate, Williams agreed to things on the Washington Interfaith 
Network’s accountability night. Williams was awkward in the first meeting with 




Williams was less responsive; they met more often during first te m, but over time 
WIN surmised that he was not delivering. But after the debacle overpetition 
signatures which kept Williams off of the Democratic ballot in 2002, he came to a 
meeting. Williams, who often seemed to prefer working in the office to meeting and 
greeting, began to increase his appearances at community gatherings. He also 
emphasized his commitment to creating economic opportunities in the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods. But critics cast the mayor as an elitist bureaucrat, with little feel for 
the concerns of working-class and low-income blacks. Williams’ Neighborhood 
Action program sponsored several forums with the goal of incorporating residents’ 
suggestions into policy. Williams attempted to promote understanding by bringing 
everyone to the table, through the citizens’ summits (Cottman 2000). 
But the mayor remained perplexing – even downright infuriating – to many of 
those he claimed to be most devoted to helping, particularly African Americans 
(Timberg 2002).  Williams remained something of an enigma to many black 
community leaders east of the Anacostia River who were increasingly worried that 
their part of town might be left behind as Williams’ vision of an economic rebirth in 
the District continued to unfold, drawing whites back into the city (Cottman 2000). 
There had been previous plans to remake Ward 8 which includes some of 
Washington’s poorest, most crime-ridden neighborhoods. Marion Barry, got nowhere 
but is widely beloved, hailed on the street as a champion of the needy. But, Anthony 
Williams made some progress yet was viewed as an arrogant utsider throughout his 




That racial rift in Williams’ support never closed and, by many measures, 
actually widened. This was not new to Williams after decades of having people 
question whether he is “black enough” (Timberg 2002). Williams’ ease in connecting 
with whites came through when interacting with them; he seemed somewhat 
comfortable and relaxed. This was not the case when he was among blacks; Williams 
seemed to be a poor mixer, even standoffish. His body language tended to convey a 
remoteness that said to those around him: ‘I'm here because I have to be here’ (King 
2006).With Williams, there was no flamboyant, in-your-face leadership. And he 
never resorted to the racially charged rhetoric for which Barry was known. A 
challenger in one election – an Anacostia minister – charged that Williams was 
“arrogant and insolent,” a callous leader who catered to the mostly white business 
community at the expense of the city’s mostly black neighborhoods. Polls also found 
a persistent coolness to the mayor among African Americans, who in many cases said 
he did not understand their community (Timberg 2002).  
Williams’ relationship with voters in Wards 7 and 8, largely east of the 
Anacostia, remained tenuous. The mayor had been reminded that residents are being 
pushed out of the city by gentrification and that there is more workto be done before 
everyone shares equally in the economic gains. “It’s not economic revitalization when 
just one group benefits and others suffer,” one minister said.  Others, however, called 
Williams an ally who made good on his promises. The Rev. Lionel Edmonds, a 
member of the Washington Interfaith Network, agreed. He said Williams kept 
promises to the group that he would work to provide more affordable housing n ts 




good degree of public cajoling by WIN – Mayor Anthony Williams pledg d to start 
putting money into a $450 million community investment fund, which would be tied 
to the proposed new baseball stadium. Also, Williams helped WIN build 150 
townhouses for first-time buyers, prevented foreclosure on 1,000 units of subsidized 
Section 8 housing and pressed the city to require contractors for city projects to train 
and hire D.C. residents. 
Supporters of Williams liked the fiscal savvy he brought to city government 
and his restrained, almost nerdy style – his persona as Barry’s opposite. Williams left 
in his wake a city with a good bond rating, sizable cash reserves, a more accessible 
health-care system for the underserved, several promising neighborhood projects, a 
major league baseball team, a new stadium under construction and a town that was no 
longer a glaring example of poor management (King 2006). But on his watch, the 
District underwent its most profound transformation in generations – gentrification. 
Anthony Williams wanted to attract 100,000 new residents to the city, mostly single 
and childless. Williams promoted an investment climate that led to city development 
but longtime residents also witnessed the conversion of old neighborhoods int  
enclaves for a growing and politically active new middle class, some of whom have 
little tolerance for the history they are replacing. The commn perception is that 
under Anthony Williams, the District of Columbia became more wealthy, and more 
white. Williams left office perplexed and angered by the fact that he was much more 







Adrian Fenty is an example of a Hybrid; he began as a Changer ad later 
transitioned toward a New Wave mayor. Growing up in Washington and serving on 
the city council, Fenty’s local bond was strong. Though an insider, he was able to run 
an insurgent campaign as he was outside of the previous power system. A  a New 
Wave mayor, Fenty would be expected to employ a technocratic approach; but in 
combination with populist tendencies, this would lead to collaboration with local 
organizers.  This is borne out by the accounts of his administration. His cooperative 
use of power provided more of an avenue for community inclusion; but he also h s 
been accused of unilaterally using power, consistent with Imperial mayors. After 
being elected mayor, Fenty has become more of a supporter of downtown 
development – which is seemingly at odds with his previous populist stances. 
At the outset, Fenty was criticized as being a relentless pre s hound with 
spotty interest in the day-to-day work of the D.C. Council, where  served for six 
years, nor any aptitude for putting together the coalition necessary to get legislation 
passed. Fenty’s focus on the council was constituent services – getting curbs cut and 
trees pruned, showing up at PTA meetings, sending and answering e-mails. He 
introduced bills that helped launch the District’s school modernization prgram and 
indoor smoking ban. He cast the only vote against a hastily assembled crim  bill and 
advocated for low-income families left behind during the boom of the past decade 
(Grunwald 2006).  To the skeptics, Fenty is an opportunistic showboat wh is good at 
highlighting problems but unwilling to work with others to solve them. Critics say, on 




(Grunwald 2006). In light of previous positions, Fenty might have been figured to be 
anti-business and a reliable ally of labor unions and tenant-rights activists. He 
opposed the stadium project and favored requiring developers to include mid l - and 
lower-income units in all future housing developments (Pearlstein 2006).  
But if Williams was a remote technocrat, Fenty is the master of the personal 
touch. An  activist in Fenty’s ward, said Fenty the councilman was great at attending 
meetings, moderating meetings and proposing more meetings, but not so great at 
making things happen: “Adrian takes care of the low-hanging fruit – trees, trash and 
traffic – but good government is more than making a call to get a pothole fixed” 
(Grunwald 2006). Fenty’s opponents deride him as an old-style machine politician. 
The Barry era gave charisma a bad name; the Williams era gave boredom a much 
better name. The Fenty machine is positioning itself to make the city to believe that a 
mayor can be charismatic and fiscally responsible (Grunwald 2006). Thus, Fenty 
appears to attempting to combine the most successful elements of the Barry and 
Williams administrations.  
Adrian Fenty made a point to consult other big-city mayors such as New 
York’s Michael Bloomberg and Chicago’s Richard Daley; he has modeled much of 
his early administration on measures practiced by Bloomberg. Fenty emulated 
Bloomberg in several areas (Emerling 2007). Fenty knocked down walls to create a 
bullpen-style office for himself and his staff on the third floor f the District’s Wilson 
Building – an open-air office structure ripped directly from Bloomberg’s similar style 
in New York. The bullpen layout allows staff members to conduct their business in 




2007). Fenty also has borrowed from Bloomberg a more managerial governing style. 
The new mayor planned to streamline the District’s sometimes-bloated government 
by running it like a business and gutting inefficient agencies. “He manages New York 
City like a corporation,” Fenty said of Bloomberg. “His managerial style of 
leadership encourages productivity and accountability, which yields results.” But 
Fenty’s biggest imitation of Bloomberg was his proposal to take over the District’s 
struggling public school system (Emerling 2007). One of Fenty’s top priorities is 
fixing the public schools. Thus, he has admitted, in effect, that he was wrong when he 
opposed Mayor Anthony Williams for wanting to take control of the public schools 
(Pearlstein 2006). 
Since taking office, Fenty replaced African Americans with non-black people 
in four of the city’s highest-profile jobs: city administrator, police chief, fire chief and 
schools chief. Among those who hold arguably the 10 most influential positions, five 
are white, three are of Asian descent and one is Latino. Only one – the deputy mayor 
for planning and economic development – is black (Nakamura et al 2007). In doze s 
of interviews, residents, particularly African Americans, said they were concerned 
that Fenty’s choices have created a cabinet that does not reflecthe ity it governs. 
They also said he has made many of his appointments in virtual isol tion, consulting 
few city leaders or residents (Nakamura et al 2007). 
During his campaign, Fenty cast himself as a part of a new generation of 
mayors who would focus less on politics and more on improving accountability and 
outcomes, lifting all parts of the city through hard work. He has m de a point to 




of the District address there (Nakamura et al 2007). Race has long bee  intertwined 
with District politics. Marion Barry, who served four terms as mayor, famously told 
white residents who did not support his reelection in the mid-1990s to “get over it.” 
Former mayor Anthony Williams was criticized for failing to bring development to 
largely black neighborhoods east of the Anacostia River, even as he oversaw a 
renaissance downtown in Northwest. Further, the Cabinet has been viewed as a 
reflection of which constituencies the administration is aiming to serve (Nakamura 
2007).  
Overall, Fenty, who swept into office by winning every voting precinct, 
remains popular, with more than seven in 10 residents saying they approve of his 
performance. But the poll also revealed that the mayor faces persi tently deep gulfs of 
perception between blacks and whites, and rich and poor residents when it comes to 
the city’s quality of life. While 74 percent of whites in the poll said D.C. is headed in 
the right direction, 45 percent of African Americans agree. And two-thirds of those 
living in more affluent Northwest Washington see the city on the right course, 
compared with less than half of those who live in Northeast and Southeast (Nakamura 
and Cohen 2008) . 
Fenty took over a city whose downtown core had undergone a remarkable 
economic revitalization during Williams’ eight-year tenure, but whose poorer 
neighborhoods were largely left behind and whose schools and social service  
remained broken. Upon taking office, Fenty vowed to attack those problems. He 
downgraded the school board and took direct control of the education system and 




departments. Fenty’s management style has been more visible and hands-on than the 
aloof Williams; Fenty held multiple news conferences and attended several 
community meetings nearly every week. Some council members and resi ents, 
however, have been frustrated by Fenty, saying he has charged ahead on some issues, 
such as schools, with little input from others. As Fenty has moved quickly, D.C. 
Council members have complained that he routinely ignores them, and six in 10 
residents characterized the relationship as less than good (Nakamur  nd Cohen 
2008).  
One telling development is that Adrian Fenty’s deputy chief of staf resigned 
after a year on the job, citing growing disenchantment with the mayor’s governing 
style. “I was disappointed that an administration that was built on strong populist 
tendencies has gotten to a place where the council and the public feel left out of 
decisions,” he said. “I believe this is the opposite of what people had expected and 
hoped for when our campaign won every precinct in the city” (Nakamura 2008a). 
Fenty embraces a private-sector management model, surrounding himself with 
capable deputies trusted to execute his administration’s vision. But it appears that the 
Fenty model is short on trust with those on the outside. “Adrian doesn’t believe in 
loyalty,” said one former Fenty supporter. “Loyalty with Adrian Fenty seems to be a 
one-way street” (DeBonnis 2009b). 
How much of Fenty’s governing style has been inspired by Williams’ early 
difficulties is debatable. As a council staffer and then a councilmember, Fenty 
watched firsthand as Williams took a beating from the legislative branch. Some 




send executive witnesses to council hearings, for instance—more than alittle bit of 
obsession avoiding the treatment Williams received from the council. Both Fenty and 
Williams have had their run-ins with the council, invariably over a lack of 
consultation—neither has spent much time personally consulting with legislators 
(DeBonis 2009a). But the differences between Fenty and Williams go much deeper 
than organizational discipline. It is true that Fenty likes the spotlight and the personal 
aspect of politicking much more than Williams ever did—shaking hands acro s the 
city and calling multiple press conferences every day, whether reporters show up or 
not. But his real distinction as a politician is in how he wields his power. Where 
Williams was content to let things work themselves out, Fenty makes  point to 
reward his friends and punish his enemies in ways Williams never would have 
imagined. A former aid of Williams said, “His first instinct wasn’t always to use the 
power of his office. Mayor Fenty clearly understands the power that comes with 
being mayor…the focus he can bring to any issue. He’s marshaled that very, very 
well” (DeBonis 2009). 
From 2004 through 2006, Williams was the stadium’s biggest champion, the 
mayor who put his political career on the line during a rough-and-tumble fight over 
public financing of the $611 million ballpark. Fenty, then a council member, was 
opposed to the project from the start and one of the fiercest critics of the plan. Fenty 
said he objected to the stadium deal because Major League Baseball had initially 
refused to contribute any money toward the project and only grudgingly agreed to 
chip in $20 million after the council balked (Nakamura 2008b). In large measure, 




powerhouse mayoral campaign, in which he swept every voting precinct. Williams 
suffered significant political wounds, as perception of him as sympathetic to deep-
pocketed developers was cemented in poorer neighborhoods whose residents felt lef  
out of the city’s sweeping gentrification (Nakamura 2008b). Now, though, Fenty 
sounds a lot like Williams did in 2004 when Williams promised that the stadium 
would be worth the money because it would speed up redevelopment in what had 
been a blighted industrial area. 
After the election, Fenty displayed respect for WIN’s agenda. According to 
Fenty, WIN is pushing the agenda of the people, therefore he will execute it. 
Organizers feel that Fenty has a staff that is in line with his vision and may be even 
more aggressive at pursuing it. WIN has met with nobody more than Fenty who 
details progress on promises. They started off with a good relationship and somewhat 
parallel agenda; Fenty was responsive to WIN as a council member. As a candidate, 
Fenty did well on accountability nights. One organizer said that “Fenty gets us more 
than other mayors.WIN (15-20 pastors and lay leaders) meets with Mayor Fenty 
every six weeks; they also meet with key staff – City Administrator and Deputy 
Mayor for Economic Development one week prior. The purpose of the meetings is to 
strategize on how to keep prior commitments. When an apartment building bur ed 
down, Fenty held four briefings in a week to reiterate his pledge to help displaced 
tenants. At one, he included the Washington Interfaith Network, who had been
planning a rally at the Wilson Building. After being invited, the group called off its 
demonstration. “There’s a real alliance here,” said one organizer. “H ’s committed to 




As city politicians have discovered, it is wise to make friends with WIN, 
whose members routinely show up at the Wilson Building (city hall) to support or 
oppose initiatives.  During the campaign, Fenty was among the handful of mayoral 
candidates who had pledged that, if elected, they would make good on a list of WIN 
initiatives. “I said I’d be back if I won,” Fenty said. “So I guess I’m glad I’m back 
because that means I won” (Nakamura and Labbe 2007). Adrian Fenty announced a 
wide-ranging plan to provide permanent housing for the city’s chronically homeless, 
to preserve affordable housing by making it harder for landlords to convert buildings 
into high-priced condos and to help fund 500 townhouses affordable to low- and 
moderate-income workers (Moreno 2007). The proposals were presented to more 
than 500 Washington Interfaith Network members, who elicited a promise from Fenty 
during his 2006 mayoral campaign to fund, build and preserve 14,000 affordable 
housing units over a four-year period. Included in that goal is the creation of 2,500 
units for the chronically homeless that would come with supportive social services 
(Moreno 2007).  “What we have tonight is the nuts and bolts of a vision that was cast 
when the mayor first got elected on how you bridge the gap between th  haves and 
the have-nots, and that’s affordable housing, quality education and living-wage jobs,” 
said Lionel Edmonds, WIN co-chairman (Moreno 2007).    
Profile Summary 
Schaefer is an example of an insider; Baltimore is his hometown, which 
corresponds to his early neighborhood focus and involvement in machine politics. 
With a downtown focus, Schaefer was credited with the city’s renaissance; but, the do 




also supported the perception that he was more concerned about development than 
community concerns. Schaefer eventually transitioned to higher office – governor and 
later state comptroller. Barry was initially an outsider, butecame an insider. He 
started with the civil rights movement and was an organizer for the downtrodden, but 
later was downtown oriented, though maintaining the appearance of neighborhood 
focus. In many ways, Barry represents the unrealized promise of black empowerment. 
Currently serving as a city council member, he could be described as a political 
hanger-on; even after his four terms as mayor and despite personal and professional 
shortcomings he is unwilling or unable to step down from local government. 
Washington is distinct in that it witnessed several stages of Marion Barry – from civil 
rights and populism, to machine governance and economic development. 
Baltimore is unique in that it never had its civil rights generation black mayor. 
Arguably, a missed stage in development; this possibly added to unrealistic 
expectations of Schmoke at the outset. Schmoke was an insider and was seen as 
community product; Baltimore is his hometown and he was the first elected black 
mayor in a city with a black majority. Schmoke was a consensus builder/collaborator, 
but his cerebral nature seemed to not be well suited for day to day governance. The 
hope or expectation for profound change did not materialize and his prospects for 
higher office seemed to end with his discussion of drug legalization; after three terms, 
he chose not to run for reelection, which marked the end of his political life. Williams 
is from Los Angeles and was always perceived as an outsider; socially and politically 
awkward, the former chief financial officer was drafted to run. He was technocrat 




renaissance. After two terms, Williams decided not to seek reelection which was the 
end of his political life. 
O’Malley was an outsider, originally from Bethesda, MD; he began as a white 
city council member in a majority black city. He employed a technocratic style and 
implemented best practices from other jurisdictions. O’Malley was criticized for 
looking past the mayorality, and made a relatively quick transition to the governor’s 
office. Fenty is an insider; Washington is his hometown and he began as  populist 
city council member, with a constituent services focus. He uses the media to his 
advantage and employs technocratic best practices. Fenty has been criticized for his 
secretive decision making process, consolidation of power, and us-versus-them 
disposition; he combines elements of predecessors and his future options remain 
unclear. Dixon is an insider; Baltimore is her hometown, where she gradually rose 
through the ranks of the city council. She also combines elements of her predecessors 
and her future options are unclear, especially in light of current legal challenges.  
In summary, the previous profiles support my hypotheses regarding mayoral 
interaction with grassroots organizations.  Mayors who emphasize populist priorities 
tend to be the most willing to collaborate with community organizers around 
neighborhood focused agendas. Thus, a mayor’s philosophical orientation regarding 
neighborhoods is one of the primary factors determining executive level 
responsiveness to community-based organizing efforts. However, mayoral 
characteristics do not provide the sole explanation for how and why such









“We recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get…The 
standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in facthe 
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept.” 
The quote above is from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, a 
reading that is central to IAF training. Its purpose is to get th  participants to 
understand dealing with the ‘world as it is’, rather than the ‘world as it should be.’ In 
other words, the IAF stresses pragmatism; while always pursuing a vision of what 
should be, affiliates must work within the confines of what is possible. From the IAF 
perspective, the most pragmatic course is to cultivate relationships with political 
actors over time in order to get the maximum possible from the interaction. In 
Thucydides’ story, the weaker Melians were decimated by the stronger Athenians 
because they did not understand both parties’ self interest and faile to accurately 
assess power relationships and potential allies.  
I contend that organizations such as BUILD and WIN fill a politica void by 
providing a mechanism for citizens to navigate the local political process. By doing 
so, they push for participation that goes beyond voting and pursues accountability in 
local governance. As affiliates of the Industrial Areas Foundation, hese organizations 
have the same underlying philosophy, but act autonomously. Although the mod l is 




According to Boyte (2004: 27), “it makes sense to focus in depth on one area because 
this provides a concrete setting to see how the IAF approaches the challenges posed 
by a particular political and economic environment.” The fact that both Baltimore and 
Washington have an IAF affiliate allows for a natural political experiment. How do 
organizations in different cities – and therefore different politica  contexts – execute 
the same IAF model? How are organizing strategies adapted to local conditions? This 
is a unique contribution as other scholars have not made direct comparisons between 
IAF affiliates. This analysis not only provides a contrast of the organizations, but 
does so with an eye toward the adaptation IAF principles to specific local contexts. 
Since the late 1950s, the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), under the 
direction of the late Saul Alinsky, has been practicing a pragmatic approach to 
community organizing that emphasizes tangible, short-term goals. He believed that 
achieving a series of small victories was more likely to achieve community power 
than championing abstract unwinnable causes. Therefore there was no preferred mode 
of organizing and whatever tactics worked were to be used. Alinsky further believed 
that the cultural resources of the community should be utilized rather than ignored, 
and that local institutions could be strengthened in the process. Conseque tly, 
preexisting, authentic community institutions like churches became the foundations 
for grass-roots organizing. “The modern IAF has taken Alinsky’s original vision, 
refined it and created a sophisticated national network of citizens’ organizations” 
(Perry 1990: 7). Unlike Alinsky, who prided himself on being confrontational a d 
fighting the power structure, modern IAF leaders emphasize the development of a 




school systems and corporations” (Perry 1990: 8). As Ed Chambers, Alinsky’s 
successor put it, “the only purpose of our organization is to amass power – but we are 
not interested in brute power…we are about relational power” (Rogers 1990: 48). 
Summary of IAF National Training 
IAF national training is a seven-day workshop designed for leaders and 
organizers of IAF affiliates from around the country. The series of sessions is 
conducted by experienced organizers who now serve on the IAF national staff and 
provide oversight and guidance to the local affiliates. These teachers of IAF-style 
organizing include Arnie Graf – former organizer with BUILD and WIN, Jonathan 
Lange – former organizer with BUILD, Ernesto Cortes – organizer with affiliates in 
the Southwest, and Ed Chambers – the current IAF executive director, who directly 
followed Saul Alinsky. One of the first points that the IAF examines is the tension 
between the world as it is, and the world as it should be. In order to move closer to 
the world as it should be, they stress that marginalized communities must change t eir 
view of power. Rather than accepting a position of perpetual powerlessness, 
communities must have confidence in their own efficacy and seek to exert people 
power in the face of political and economic dominance. 
To this end, broad-based organizations take existing mediating institutions and 
form a collective; by organizing around tangible issues, the affiliates also help to 
build and buttress these institutions. The IAF contends that the key to effectiv  broad-
based organizing is organized people and organized money; both of these must be 
able to be delivered consistently and with a focus in order to have an impact. By 




develop self and citizenry. Thus, the goal of IAF is to retrieve a r lational culture by 
forming organizations of institutions based within communities. It is imperative that 
broad-based citizen organizations are comprised of institutions like churches that pay 
dues because organized money that is controlled by the members provides the 
independence to determine the agenda. To this point, the budget for any orgaization 
is a statement of theology – a reflection of what they value – and funding speaks to 
who the controls the organizer (forces inside or outside the community). 
In keeping with the IAF perspective, a view that reduces political culture to 
sheer class warfare is oversimplified. In reality, the work of organizing communities 
is broader than just pitting the haves against the have-nots; it i  also about 
understanding mutual self-interest and power. As opposed to dominant power, 
relational power is the ability to act in communion with others. Relational organizing 
seeks to shift the tide away from a society in which people are atomized and isolated 
toward one where they interact based on collectivized interest and common gain. 
“Civil society in poorer neighborhoods and the public sector are interdependent so 
that what can be accomplished in alliance with one another is different from what 
each can accomplish separately” (Stone 1999: 851). Hence, the goal of the IAF is to 
reconstruct a relational culture – the opposite of a dominant culture. The following 









Table 6.1: Contrast of Dominant and Relational Cultures 
Dominant Relational 
European, male, wealthy Have-nots, racial minorities 
Homogenous, uniformity Mixed multitude 
Power is unilateral, hierarchical, top-
down 
Collegial, mutual, reciprocal power 
Self is disconnected, individualistic Self is encumbered, obligated 
No history, no obligation History, tradition 
Preferences (are manipulable) Interests (have permanence) 
Claims based on status as consumers, 
customers, clients 
Claims based birthright 
Forged electorate (passive – hibernates  
between elections); chooses lesser of two 
evils 
Political nature (constantly active – 
engaged citizenship) 
Premium on elite communication – 
directive, order 
Conversation – listening, curiosity; 
agitation, tension, conflict, compromise 
Priority on experts – disconnected, sterile Tacit knowledge – comes out of 
experience 
 
Typically, community-building efforts are conceptualized and promoted by 
extra-neighborhood institutions, including private foundations and government 
agencies, but with aspirations of having meaningful neighborhood impact (Chaskin 
and Garg 1997). By addressing multiple issues, the IAF teaches its members the craft 
of agenda building and compromise but also avoids being pigeon-holed as a special-
interest, single-purpose organization (Boyte 2004). Overall, the purpose of IAF 
organizing is to build local community power, as opposed to setting up local branches 
of an overarching organization. Though the IAF provides a general framework and 
technical support, the affiliates are autonomous and only exist through the will and 
action of local communities.   
By necessity, the IAF model remains strategically flexible as affiliates must 
work given local strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges. This 




this end, agenda setting is crucial as it determines what issues and potential solutions 
are up for discussion. Though usually considered as the purview elected officials, the 
goal of IAF affiliates is to turn the tables and have this functio  reside with 
community members. This is based on the understanding that whoever s ts the 
agenda has more power; without this power, communities remain subjects rather than 
active participants – being affected by policy, with no ability to shape it. Also, 
conducting a power analysis – assessing the strength of the organization in relation to 
other local political actors – is critical to understanding the politica  terrain. Because 
circumstances matter, organizations must know when and how to compromise – as 
illustrated by Melian story 
During one training session, Arnie Graf of the IAF distanced himself from the 
idea of empowerment. In his words, “how can I give people something they already 
have (power)? I can free up something within you, but I cannot give you power.” The 
point is that latent power resides in individuals and communities and the role of the 
organizer is to help manifest and channel it. This is consistent with the Iron Rule that 
IAF organizers constantly adhere to: never do for others what they can do for 
themselves. The determination of whom to work with is based on a simple estimation 
– communities must be ready for action. According to Graf – BUILD’s lead organizer 
in the early 1980s who also helped organize WIN in the 1990s – if one wants to effect 
long-term institutional change, “something has to happen to people. We can dream up 
all the programs we want, but we can’t dream up people.” 
As a central purpose of organizing is to build relationships of trust that lead to 




regard, self preservation (food, clothes, shelter, and safety) is balanced against the 
drive for meaning (fulfillment, recognition, and acknowledgement). In order to 
understand interests and build the legitimacy needed to speak for communities, 
organizers must conduct hundreds of one-on-one meetings with nascent leaders. A 
leader is described as someone who has a following that can be deliv red and from 
which money can be raised; a following refers to the people that an individual can 
influence and turn out for meetings, actions, etc. Hence, leadership is demonstrated 
by an exchange of money and people. Also, a multi-issue format is required because 
different people have different interests; on some issues, one set of m mbers may be 
more energized, on some issues others may be energized. The key is to get disparate 
groups and those representing different geographic areas to support one an ther in 
each other’s struggles. IAF staff stresses the point that “if we want power we join 
with people who are not like ourselves, those outside of our comfort zone.” 
Moreover, in public life, organizations need to have a persona, which means 
wearing an appropriate professional mask. While this may involve a calculated 
vulnerability – through presentation of needs and requests for assistance – 
organizations must choose between being liked and respected by elected officials. To 
this end, Cortez quotes a statement by Pope John XXIII – “that which is owed in 
justice should never be given in charity.” However, since being right is not enough, 
affiliates must be reasonable, and compromise requires judgment. Public relationships 
are held together by interest and such bonds are tentative as they are dependent on 
specific circumstances. The IAF understands the concept of quid pro quo – this for 




regimes and organizations thrive on this – so credit claiming is a valuable commodity. 
Additionally, agitation is a necessary component for change and is exercised to 
varying degrees within a relationship (both between organizers and le ders and 
between the organization and local officials). This type of agitation means to stir, to 
bring ideas to the surface by probing into one’s story beyond abstractions and 
stereotypes. It is through agitation that motivations and interests b come apparent and 
can be acted upon.  
Attending IAF National Training provides a critical insight: the same skills an 
organizer needs are the same skills that IAF trains leaders to have; organizers do it for 
pay on a full time basis, leaders do it for their community in their spare time. In order 
to function, affiliates need leaders, and leaders come attached with problems to 
address. For the purpose of organizing, the IAF focuses on the distinction between 
problems and issues. On the one hand, problems are generalized and vague (e.g. 
education). While people constantly talk about them, they seem insurmountable and 
garner no urgency; also, they are faceless which makes it difficult to assign 
responsibility. On the other hand, issues are specific/concrete (e.g. charter school) and 
may be acted upon. Because they are winnable, they garner tension ad immediate 
action; they are also opportunities to personalize – assigning a face and responsibility. 
There are three steps that the IAF teaches in terms of addressing issues – 
research, action, and evaluation. The method for transforming a problem into an issue 
is through research; this type of research involves intimately knowing the issue 
(details, pros/cons) and how it affects specific communities. This research educates 




challenging policies proposed by the governing regime. The IAF puts great emphasis 
on the concept of metis – local knowledge. In other words, there is knowledge h ld 
by the community because of their day to day experience living there.  Issues are 
central to building an organization because they attract new leaders and new 
institutions as well as foster depth within existing institutions. Is ues can also bring 
press coverage and additional funding. All of these enhance the overall power of the 
organization.  
Actions are designed to bring the membership base into contact with elected 
officials and policy makers. To be effective, preparation requirs distinction between 
problems and issues – this translates to having a solid position and lobbying for 
something specific. Actions may take the form of hosting accountability sessions and 
candidate forums, testifying at city council meetings, and holding emonstrations or 
rallies. In such efforts, organizations must be attentive to issues and what can be 
actionable since the purpose of an action is to get a reaction. Essentially, an action is a 
form of business conducted in the public sphere. In order to build and sustain 
momentum, the event should be made exciting, if possible; however leaders must be 
attentive to balance between business and drama.  
Designing the drama is integral to how IAF affiliates function. Elements of 
the drama include: protagonist / antagonist; story (description how bad the situation 
is); tension / climax; resolution (will you work with us?). There a  several steps for 
an action: (1) form strategy team (schedule pre-meeting), (2) pick a target 
(personalize – who is responsible?), (3) find allies, (4) determine goals (what you will 




number of attendees), (6) choose location / place and time (appropriate size for venue 
to look full) (7) contact media. Immediately following an action, there is an 
evaluation where the IAF affiliates typically spend thirty minutes discussing the event 
– what was successful, what needs to be improved, and planning next steps. 
By placing accountability at the center of its approach to politics, the IAF 
speaks to a deep need in American politics (Boyte 2004). One of th  central forms of 
an IAF action is the accountability session. In these sessions, politicians are brought 
in front of the local affiliate and asked quite specifically about their positions on 
agenda items. These events often dovetail into candidate forums during election 
years. The organization then follows up with these officials after they are elected and 
places continuous pressure on them to follow through on their commitments. The IAF 
stresses that the accountability session must be fair and non-partisan – not favoring 
one candidate; this is important given the non-profit tax status of the organizations, in 
addition to the need to work with whoever is eventually victorious. 
Role of the Church 
Being that IAF affiliates are membership organizations comprised largely of 
church congregations, it is important to dedicate attention to the role and contribution 
of this institution. The behavior and effects of activist African American churches 
that partner with government go unnoticed by most political scientists. The research, 
particularly the most influential and innovative studies, on the political engagement of 
African American churches in the post-civil rights era focuses almost exclusively on 




political engagement in policymaking processes (Reed 1986; Tate 1993; Harris 1999; 
Harris-Lacewell 2004; McClerking and McDaniel 2005; Smith and Harris 2005). 
In this vein, Calhoun-Brown (2003: 46) argues that electoral and protest 
myopia prevents social scientists from observing “other important p r s of the 
political process including agenda setting, interest articulation, p licy formation, 
policy implementation, policy impact, and policy assessment – areas in which an 
institutional presence [by churches] may be particularly significant.” Similarly, 
Lincoln and Mamiya comment that “politics” in relation to African American 
churches is properly understood only when it is “broadly defined beyond electoral 
politics and protest politics to include community organizing and community bu lding 
activities that are part of the ministry of many black clergy and churches” (1999: 
234). 
Therefore, “social scientists must define the political engagement of African 
American churches and black clergy as encompassing an assortment of ways they, 
alone or alongside other institutions, seek to influence public policy” (Owens 2007: 
7). This is particularly important for the study of churches in cities, given the new 
characteristics and forms of urban politics that have emerged over the last thirty years 
as a result of social movement activity, minority incorporation, and changes in 
government such as the devolution of public policy, privatization, and the 
replacement of political machines with urban regimes (Elkin 1987; Stone 1989; Orr 
1999; Hula and Jackson-Elmore 2000; Hula, Jackson, and Orr 1997). 
IAF affiliated clergy members like Rev. Lionel Edmonds (of WIN) see IAF 




the status quo) and the priestly (non-confrontational, top-down orientation). In his 
view, Christ’s ministry could be characterized as urban considering that He walked 
amongst the people; conversely, the priests were in the temple and somewhat 
removed from the people, but connected to the political powers at the time. In 
keeping with such a distinction, the civil rights movement was emblatic of 
prophetic ministry, whereas the burgeoning mega church phenomenon may be more 
akin to the priestly tradition (residing in the temple, on high). Thus, one factor that 
must be understood is the impact of the changing church culture, specifically, the type 
of minister that people aspire to be (mega-church, prosperity gospel v . activism, 
social justice). This is shift important considering the decreased volume of activists in 
the post-civil rights era. 
For Reverend Dobson (a founding member of BUILD), a key point that 
people often do not understand is that spiritual growth is not monastic: it does not 
involve a pulling away from people. It comes from struggle, from interac ion with 
others. “Our witness depends on this… The mega churches are leading us to 
anonymity. Five thousand parishioners, all strangers, sitting in an auditorium or 
watching television, waiting for some mesmerizing experience that they then have to 
take home and connect to their own lives. It’s an illusion. The reality of life can only 
be worked out in struggle and in concert with others.” (quoted in McDougall 1993: 
134). Therefore, interpersonal relationships based on mutual interest are critical to 
effective organizing and social change.    
It is through such relationships that IAF affiliates derive their power and 




“Collaboration, especially when it involves government and nongovernmental 
organizations, is a relationship of two or more actors working together to mutually 
achieve goals unlikely to be realized save for collective action” (Owens 2007: 8). 
Moreover, “collaboration involves collective action among organizations that one 
would normally not expect to act together, with groups often working across the 
boundaries of the public, commercial, and voluntary sectors” (Fosler 2002: 19). It 
implies that all of the actors involved recognize that an end is important and the 
likelihood of achieving it is greater if they act together than alone. Collaboration, 
nonetheless, is “more than simply sharing knowledge and information and more than 
a relationship that helps each party achieve its own goals (Chrislip and Larson 1994: 
5). The IAF focuses heavily on the concept of mutual self interest – it is the basis of 
their organizing strategy. 
Application of the IAF Model in Baltimore and Washington 
BUILD and WIN’s congregational structure follows the basic IAF structure. 
The leadership consists of four “co-chairs” two of who are clergy, while the others 
are lay persons. Optimally, co-chairs are only to serve for tw  consecutive years. A 
strategy team of lay and clergy leaders comprise what is essentially an executive 
committee. The strategy team is the key group of leaders who make day-to-day 
organizational decisions in BUILD and WIN. It meets monthly to set th  agenda for 
the organization and plot strategy. In Washington, WIN closely follows the IAF 
structure, rotating co chairs/leadership regularly. However, the dearth of potential 




BUILD has a full-time staff of four, and is comprised of about 40 
predominantly African American churches (with varying levels of membership and 
participation in actions and strategizing). BUILD raises at lest $500 from each 
member institution; the amount can be as much as $5000 for large churches. There 
are some churches that are financially insolvent and therefore contribute no dues. 
BUILD accepts no government money and takes foundation grants only for 
individual projects not essential to the organization’s survival. Child First Authority, 
BUILD’s school-based component which was launched in 1996 as a locally 
constituted authority, does receive such moneys. Creating an ‘authority’ requires city 
and state legislation and is essentially a public/private partnership; the board includes 
three people from BUILD and four appointees from the city.  
Carol Reckling is a long time leader with BUILD and currently serves as the 
Executive Director of the Child First Authority, which focuses on after school 
academic programming. A Baltimore native, she considers herself part of the 
generation that embodied the hope of the civil rights movement – attaining social 
advancement through education. Although education is so critical, to her and others it 
appeared that by the 1980s, the city was not paying enough attention to schools. In 
Reckling’s view, the city was gearing itself toward tourists/bu iness interests and not 
seeing the connection to vibrant residential life. While focusing on the expansion of 
downtown businesses, regardless of community conditions, neighborhoods have 
continued to deteriorate because they have remained out of sight – or off the agenda.  
While previously working for the Greater Baltimore Committee, Reckling was




way to somewhere else); as such, the goal was to move it toward a three-night town 
by creating developments that would attract and keep the attention of visit rs. The 
question in economic development circles was ‘what do we need?’ to lure tourists, 
and there was always more needed. In recent years, Reckling has been quoted as 
calling the Inner Harbor an “insatiable beast”, always demanding to be fed more 
money.  Despite the constant infusion of money, all the attention did not seem to 
reverse the city’s fortunes. Nonetheless, BUILD recognizes that growth is critical to 
the city’s survival and is not anti-development. As such, understanding interests, key 
players, and how deals are made allows BUILD to more effectively n gotiate with 
mayors while pursuing community benefits. 
Douglas Miles is pastor of Koininia Baptist Church and has been a BUILD 
co-chair for quite some time. In his view, BUILD is able to rely on relational power 
because it is an organized force in Baltimore and Maryland politics.  He and others 
relay the fact that Child First funding came from organizing and a promise of funding 
made by Governor Parris Glendenning. In the summer of 1998, leading to the fall 
gubernatorial election, Glendenning needed to build bridges in Baltimore and came to 
BUILD to ask for help. “Before election day, Governor Glendening appe red before a 
BUILD assembly and endorsed several specific BUILD issues, includi g a proposal 
for Maryland to provide $500,000 per year for the Child First Authority. BUILD 
could not formally endorse Glendening because of its nonprofit tax status, but BUILD 
leaders and volunteers aggressively spread the word that the governor supp ted their 




BUILD worked on voter turnout around their agenda, registering 
approximately 10,000 new city voters, and was listed as a winner in post-election 
coverage. According to organizer accounts, Governor Glendenning told people he 
owed the election to BUILD and introduced himself as BUILD’s humble servant; 
subsequently, he eventually kept every commitment he made to BUILD. This 
previously gained currency in Annapolis would prove to be fruitful over time as 
Governor Glendenning was able to influence Mayor O’Malley (who needed state aid 
for the city) to work with BUILD. This type of arrangement has proven to be a piece 
of their operating strategy – when blocked at the local level, BUILD lobbies at the 
state level to wield power. 
Again, the goal of organizing is not doing things for, but with the 
neighborhood. So, how do they choose schools, neighborhoods, etc? This is a 
calculated decision based on ability to make changes. In other words, the dedication 
of organizer time and energy is determined by who is leading and willing to be 
actively engaged. Child First is present at twelve city schools and for the program to 
thrive, it must deliver quality programming and parents and schools must be an active 
constituency. This means that there must be an organized body of peoplesaying that 
the issue is important, while doing something. Schools are also chosen on proximity 
to BUILD affiliated neighborhood churches, which allows the organization to build 
on existing relationships. Child First as a form of relational organizing leads to issues 
of self interest and things to organize around – in particular educational enrichment 
and school conditions. The work of Child First also provides legitimacy and a stable 




the midst of a protest, ‘do you live in the district?’, and all BUILD would have to do 
is point to the neighborhood schools with which they are in relationship. 
Nevertheless, the challenges inherent to organizing remain constant over time. 
While politicians tend to believe in “divide and conquer” (in reference to black 
church support), BUILD seeks to unite churches so that all – as opposed to a select 
few – benefit. As far as Reckling is concerned, mayors come and go, so her attitude is 
“see me now or see me later…you don’t have to like us, we don’t have to like you”. 
This is consistent with the statement by Arnie Graf that “BUILD is like an 
elephant…long memory…at some point the mayor will need us.” The overall point is 
that regardless of personal inclinations, it is in the mutual interes  of BUILD and city 
hall for the two to work together. BUILD has a track record of voter turnout and 
afterschool education which are useful to any regime; BUILD understands quid pro 
quo and shares credit, but requires acknowledgement. 
Additionally, changes in church membership – spatial and class distinctions – 
have an impact on the ability to organize around neighborhood-level concerns. 
Congregants may go to church in the city but live in the county; over time they 
become more connected to suburban neighborhoods. Therefore, BUILD seeks to go 
beyond the walls of the church. In order to garner depth in the community, the cost is 
primarily that of BUILD organizer time. For Child First to expand there is a financial 
cost (approximately $100,000 – $1000 per student – needed to run the program in 
each school) as well as maintaining funding to support what already xists. 




more challenges in connecting with lay people, which is why Child First is so critical 
to the organization’s survival.  
Lottie Sneed is a current BUILD organizer who has also worked with WIN in 
the past. A graduate of Duke Divinity School, Sneed believes in “provocati e 
preaching”; this requires having a mission outside of the church, which builds both 
the community and the church. One consistent challenge for organizers is that they 
must prove themselves – knowing they will be viewed with suspicion they must be 
unwavering to win people over. Sneed makes that point that the availability of more 
resources in Washington provides the ability to shift resources. Conversely, there is 
not the same level of wealth in Baltimore, where there is an abundance of legitimate 
needs. Since organizations cannot solve every existing problem, the most prudent 
approach is tackling pieces and trying to make difference where feasible. In 
Baltimore, the school piece is not separate from the central organizatio , as schools 
are used as a base to mobilize churches and train parent leaders. Baltimore is a city 
with a larger population, but fewer resources, so the question becomes “what can you 
get?” Over time, people have been disappointed so much in Baltimore that they are 
very disillusioned, which often translates to lower expectations.  
This view is also held by Coleman Milling, a current WIN organizer who has 
also worked BUILD in the past, and describes an “entrenched non-progressive 
attitude in Baltimore.” Milling contends that the city dropped the ball on recreation 
and schools in the 1980s and 90s and is now only beginning to address it; this is w at 
necessitated BUILD’s current, ‘save our kids/ save our city’ campaign. Also, in his 




that of Baltimore, which may provide a greater avenue for political m neuvering. 
Milling also mentions that WIN has a level of visibility and diversity which provides 
strength; the affiliate also has a depth of clergy and a more dues paying base which is 
somewhat in contrast to BUILD. WIN has a full-time staff of four and is comprised of 
about 45 churches whose membership dues are anywhere from $500 to $10,000, 
depending on the size and wealth of the church. For WIN, affordable housing is at the 
top of the agenda, followed by supportive housing and youth investment (libraries 
and recreation centers). 
In Washington, WIN co-chair Lionel Edmonds is a pastor of Mount Lebanon 
Baptist Church, one of the affiliate’s member churches. He is one of the Howard 
University Divinity School-affiliated pastors that Arnie Graf met with to get WIN off 
the ground and has been a co-chair essentially since the beginning. Edmonds has been 
active in the NAACP and Urban League, which to him have a significa t degree of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy, whereas he sees the need for a more immediate impact. 
Edmonds’ philosophy of ministry is that “spiritual formation leads to social 
transformation”; in other words, the message preached in the church should lead to 
action outside of its walls. In his view, the IAF is the best vehicl  to express this point 
of view and structure for the world. Above all, an individual cannot do what an 
institution can, which is why the IAF model works. However, Edmonds makes the 
point that dues from member churches are not enough, and affiliates must create 
revenue producing vehicles to stay viable. His belief is that in the long run, “WIN 




There are particular attributes of WIN churches that make the affiliate 
successful. The organization is comprised of ministers with traditional 
theological/seminary training whose view of ministry has a social responsibility; also 
these pastors are comfortable with collective leadership rather than an individualistic 
model seemingly more compatible to the mega church model. Timing is also very 
important as WIN’s origin corresponded with the fortuitous convergence of issues 
and opportunities. In reference to Washington D.C. bearing the title of he “Murder 
Capital” during the crack epidemic in the 1990s, Edmonds commented that an 
organization “can’t let a good crisis go to waste.” On the heels of well publicized 
conditions of crime and poverty, WIN’s 1996 founding rally was attended by 2000 
people, representing 20-30 organizations focusing on affordable housing, after school 
programs, jobs, and community policing.  
At the outset, WIN fought with the Control Board, who in Edmonds’ words, 
“thought they were on a slave plantation. This was a slap in the face to the dignity of 
the District and cracked your psyche.  It was an open sore that never healed – a daily 
reminder of the loss of freedom. If you vote for people, you want to see them be able 
to govern and wield power. Who do you hold accountable? With a Control Board 
with marching orders from Congress…WIN had to go to Congress folk with whom 
its sister organizations had relationships.” In IAF organizing, if politicians agree to 
the agenda, they must be held accountable. Edmonds added, “But how can you make 
them accountable, if you don’t sit across the table from them?” Thus, in order to hold 
elected officials accountable, it is critical for grassroots rganizations to be in 




understand money and votes. During 1998 mayoral election, WIN’s sign up and take 
charge campaign lined up politicians and mobilized 30 churches; 75,000 scorecards 
on agenda were handed out over the city. After a session where Councilman Kevin 
Chavous, an unsuccessful candidate for mayor took a negative position on a WIN
agenda item, Marion Barry was reported to have said to him, “I told you not to mess 
with those WIN people.”    
According to Edmonds, once WIN began functioning, “everybody got 
baptized” and they were “holding politicians’ feet to the fire.” This meant bringing 
people to the city council for actions and leaving when the mayor would show up late 
for meetings. WIN organizer Tim Tilghman also makes the point that in order to 
organize for power, communities must be able to speak to those in positions of 
power; in some neighborhoods this meant beginning by contacting District 
government regarding stoplights and crosswalks. This is consistent with the 
estimation that small things lead to bigger things. Similarly, as an organization, WIN 
began by focusing on improvements at schools and libraries before expanding its 
scope to affordable housing. It took four years before WIN began to see significant 
results.  
The organization “planted seeds years ago and nature took its course…seeds 
took root in the 1990s and are now bearing fruit now.” By the time of negotiations 
regarding the baseball stadium, WIN had some political capital and was able to 
procure benefits for District neighborhoods. It must be noted that there ar  stages in 
relationships and many steps before an action. WIN has never really had to “go there” 




affect turnout is a threat, because “such large numbers don’t just disappear and they 
vote.” For change to occur, organized citizens must create political will, then things 
such as affordable housing will be accomplished. In this realm the city holds many of 
the cards – for affordable housing it has to assemble land, financing, etc. “We’re not 
experts on finance, but we are experts on political will. If you have the political will, 
there will be affordable housing.” WIN also collaborates with socially conscious 
developers who may be willing to forgo some level of profit to make  project 
feasible. 
Though collaboration is desired, IAF affiliates specifically make  point to not 
become co-opted by the governing regime. As Edmonds commented, “You want to 
be in the room – at the table, but not in the bedroom – no pillow talk.” Through 
collaboration with DC government, WIN has negotiated $1 billion for neighborhood 
development; however to determine how and where to spend, it is necessary to have a 
presence in the community. Additionally, to be legitimate in the eyes of the regime, 
an affiliate “can’t be perceived as a black or white, poor or middle class organization, 
but must be a balance.” When Tilghman began in 2000, to him WIN seemed like a 
white middle class organization because of its initial strength in the wealthier 
northwest portion of the city. Over time, the organizers have carved out solid bases in 
each ward, including less affluent neighborhoods east of the river. This speaks to the 
importance of non-exclusionary (racially and economically diverse) organizing. 
Also, confrontational strategies are outdated. As recounted by Edmonds, on 
one occasion WIN was trying to schedule a meeting with Council President Vincent 




won’t you meet with us!” This approach was not effective and turned Gray off, but 
when two black male organizers approached him more respectfully and conversed, a 
relationship was formed. To this point, Edmonds contends that in order to be m re 
effective, the IAF must diversify national staff – this also means more black male 
organizers; an emphasis on recruiting, hiring, training, and redesigning the training 
model. 
Conclusion 
Through interviews with organizers and clergy leaders of BUILD and WIN, I 
have gained a nuanced understanding of the particularities of each IAF affiliate. 
Through this research, I am able to compare and contrast the structure and 
composition of both organizations. In this regard, one primary truth remains – local 
conditions dictate strategy. A smaller economic pie means that there are limited 
resources to be dedicated in all areas; in particular, this disproportionately affects 
expenditures on what is categorized as redistribution or social programming.  This 
speaks to different realties (local conditions and issues) which neessitate different 
approaches (strategies). One of the difficulties of organizing in a largely poor city 
such as Baltimore is that it is hard to address the myriad of basic needs. It is quite 
difficult to get individuals in communities to see the importance of collective action 
in the political realm when their own individual misery is so encompassing. In this 
regard, the prospect of going to city hall to protest or lobbying at the state capital can 
seem far removed from securing basic necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. 
Baltimore has a larger and lower income population, less municipal money, 




BUILD has a longer track record which has engendered both collaboration and 
animosity, without a large clergy pool to pull from, BUILD utilizes Child First to 
build membership. The fact that this poor population is trapped in a struggling school 
system provides a ready-made issue and mobilizable base. BUILD’s strongest 
constituency is Child First; and out of necessity, there is no real sep ration between 
the two entities. Child First has a larger staff and more organizers than BUILD itself; 
this works for the organization as the schools, parents, and youth provide a significant 
membership recruitment base. 
Washington has smaller and higher income population, more local revenue, 
and a greater diversity of pastors (larger leadership pool and more turn-over). WIN’s 
strength is its larger number of churches (institutions = organized people) and its 
larger dues paying membership (organized money).  Moreover, the more politicized 
environment of Washington places political action closer to the forefront. Although 
there is stark poverty in the District, the ability to organize is assisted by pastors who 
are more politically active and vocal. Additionally, the recent housing boom has been 
beneficial as proceeds from transfer (property) taxes may be used to fund agenda 
items. For WIN, neighborhood investment (i.e., affordable housing) to counterbalance 
downtown development has been the most salient agenda item and has contributed o 
the growth of the organization. 
Additionally, as these are both majority black cities with African Americans at 
the helm, it might be controversial to assert that black regimes are more responsive to 
white constituencies, but it becomes easier to posit in light of the tendency for white 




income are correlated with voter turnout and political efficacy; thus more affluent 
communities provide valuable resources to a regime (votes and taxes)and therefore 
their voices are more often heard, commanding attention and city services (see 
Massey and Denton 1993). My theory of Non-Exclusionary Organizing (NEO) holds 
that organizing efforts that include a broad base of constituents/supporters (diversity 
of race and wealth) are more likely to sustain challenges from urban regimes. This is 
because universal approaches embody greater political strength than programs 
targeted solely at low-income or minority populations. Further, integrat d 
organizations are able to make the case that benefits are spread ac oss a broad section 
of the population. In this way, NEO may insulate an organization from government 
opposition and potential white backlash – which is extremely important for 
distribution of resources.  
Non-exclusionary organizing is seen in the example of WIN – a truly 
multiracial, interdenominational organization. WIN has clearly mastered NEO, 
whereas demographic and political realities make this difficult for BUILD to do; 
Washington has gentrified, while Baltimore is still largely ghettoized (with pockets of 
white wealth). For the most part, BUILD is primarily black and Protestant (with some 
Catholic member churches). Furthermore, the lack of a sizable middle class in 
Baltimore makes it difficult to forge inter-class connections; middle class church 
goers (potential leaders) worship in poor neighborhoods, but may live in 
suburban/middle class neighborhoods and are therefore not as invested in con itions 




middle class population within the city, in addition to a significant population of the 
severely marginalized.  
Ultimately it is not only a matter of needing to connect isolated actors with 
more powerful and broadly networked ones; effective community-building work must 
also aim to enable impoverished neighborhood residents to change the processes that 
lead to a status of isolation. Some have argued that we are witnessing in cities new 
forms of representation and a broader incorporation of minority interests into policy 
making and policy implementation (Ferman 1996, Hula, Jackson, and Orr 1997, 
Fraser et al 2003, Burns 2006). The IAF is attempting to build a new politics and a 
new local economics; it is accomplishing this by organizing and mobilizing the very 
people who are left out of politics as practiced today (Boyte 2004).  
Although one of the goals of the IAF is to identify leaders and train members 
of marginalized communities how to function in the political realm, this process may 
be easier when a foundation has been previously established.  To this end, havi g a 
middle class contingent is valuable, as it is extremely difficult to organize the poorest 
of the poor. The extremely impoverished lack economic resources and have low 
political efficacy, whereas the middle class is able to rely on connections to 
institutions that are able to wield influence/power. Therefore a mix of the middle 











“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.”                                 
The quote above is attributed to Winston Churchill and can be applied to a 
variety of circumstances – in this case local politics. Normatively speaking, 
community organizing is valuable because it opens up the democratic process, 
making it accessible to the heretofore unengaged. While governments tend to be top 
down, organizers stress the bottom up; in order for the political system to be effective 
these two orientations must balance one another. There are specific roles for the 
government and for citizens – government is responsible for managing bureaucracy 
and implementing public policies, while communities are responsible for making sure 
that their issues are recognized by the government. For local democracy to thrive 
these elements of governance need not, and must not be seen as mutually exclusive; 
rather this relationship should form a natural feedback loop essential for 
responsiveness and accountability.  
In this way, outcomes can be achieved by putting public pressure on the 
governing regime to live up to promises made during or after an election season. 
Thus, high profile public fights between organizations and regimes can lead to 
significant city-wide benefits. Organizational successes (outcomes) are related to 
mayoral leadership, but not necessarily dependent upon it. Though some mayors  




do not completely account for the variance in outcomes. To assume that the success 
of community organizing is totally dependent on the mayor would be to accept a top-
down view; to claim that all power lies in the community would support a bottom-up 
view. In my estimation, an either/or formulation is incorrect; in reality, there are 
elements of both top-down and bottom-up processes at work in local governance. 
Hence, policy outcomes are based on this two-way relationship between urba
executives and grassroots organizations. Additionally, the potential success of 
organizing campaigns is also shaped by local economic constraints.  
Each organization has had numerous victories over the years and chro icling 
each of them in detail would be a project unto itself. Instead, this chapter will focus 
on the largest, most recent victories by each organization, particully in the realm of 
housing. The highlighted outcomes are the culmination of years of work – community 
organizing and government collaboration – and have come as result of pushing for 
affordable housing in exchange for downtown development. The ability to extract 
community benefits from local government speaks to how the relationship between 
these organizations and local regimes has evolved to the point where tangible results 
can be seen. Although these victories may be current, previous mayoral 
administrations have also played a part in more recent developments. Ultimately, the 
expected level of collaboration given the mayoral typology is supported by the 
available evidence.  
BUILD in Baltimore 
BUILD’s track record of housing advocacy began in the late 1980s with the 




in 1988, authorizes the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
make grants to nonprofit organizations to enable them to provide loans to low-inc me 
families for the purchase of newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated houses. 
The Nehemiah program, named for the Hebrew leader who organized the rebuilding 
of Jerusalem, was created to permit massive intervention in inner-city neighborhoods, 
and was made available only to cities proposing a project with a scale large enough to 
make a significant impact. The first Nehemiah Project was conceived by the East 
Brooklyn Congregations (EBC), an IAF affiliate in New York. 
In 1988, over eight hundred BUILD members, Mayor Schmoke, Governor 
Schaefer, Senators, Mikulski and Sarbanes, Representatives Mfume and Cardin, and 
scores of religious and lay leaders gathered to announce a collaboration among 
BUILD, the city, state, and federal governments, and the Enterpris Foundation. 
BUILD raised $2.2 million toward the development of 300 homes for low- and 
moderate-income families. Mayor Schmoke committed $11 million in land, site 
clearance, and municipal services; Governor Schaefer promised $11 million in low-
interest mortgage financing (McDougall 1993). In early 1989, more than 4.2 million 
was awarded to the Nehemiah partnership by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). With its partner Enterprise Homes, BUILD is the largest non-
profit developer of lower-income owner-occupied housing in Baltimore. As of today, 
BUILD and Enterprise have helped to develop more than 767 Nehemiah homes 
(Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development 2007). 
In addition to recognizing the need for neighborhood revitalization, BUILD 




According to BUILD’s documentation, during the 1995 mayoral campaign, Kurt
Schmoke endorsed BUILD’s proposal for Child First, and after the election led the 
charge to create the authority. Within six months after the election, the state passed 
legislation authorizing the Child First Authority. Since its inception, Child First has 
grown from seven to thirteen schools, providing academic, cultural and recreational 
enrichment to more than a thousand students each year. During its history, Child First 
has leveraged $10 million for after-school programs and has become the leading 
recipient of city afterschool funds. BUILD has organized parents to ecure nearly 
$500,000 in state funding every year since 1998 (Baltimoreans United in Leadership 
Development 2007). Child First’s growing constituency lends numerical and 
institutional strength for BUILD which has been critical in subsequent organizing 
campaigns. 
In 2005, BUILD decided to fight plans for a downtown convention center 
hotel unless the city funded the redevelopment of blighted neighborhoods. Mayor 
Martin O’Malley, along with city development and tourism officials, believed that 
Baltimore needed a convention center hotel to revive its sagging convention business. 
The plan was for the city to develop and own the 752-room Hilton, which would be 
paid for with $305 million in city revenue bonds. Ministers with BUILD contrasted 
the thriving Inner Harbor area with Baltimore’s struggling neighboro ds and 
demanded equity. “It looks like a tale of two cities,” said the Rev. Marshall Prentice 
of Zion Baptist Church. “The city they see and the city we see. ... In their city, they 
want one hotel after another after another. We say, stop seeing hotels and start seeing 




investment. ... We just want the same respect that is given downtown uptown” (Rosen 
2005). Subsequently, BUILD protested at city hall during a council hearing on the 
proposed hotel.  
In particular, BUILD scorned Council President Sheila Dixon who, according 
to the group, reneged on a campaign promise to dedicate $50 million for 
redevelopment efforts in struggling neighborhoods. BUILD says that Dixon made a 
campaign promise in 2003 that she would deliver the funds in city-revenue bonds for 
the construction of affordable-housing units in Baltimore. Two years later, the group 
accused her of abandoning her pledge to invest in needy neighborhoods in favor of 
the ritzy hotel. BUILD says she publicly promised twice during her 2003 campaign to 
sponsor a $50 million non-revenue bond that would help groups like BUILD develop 
and construct affordable housing in the city. But BUILD’s lead organizer Rob 
English said Dixon had not delivered, and he believed that with a $305 million hotel 
bond on the City Council agenda, Dixon had other priorities. Carol Reckling, director 
of Child First called the Inner Harbor “an insatiable beast,” always wanting more. 
“They say if we only had this one thing it would be better. Then w  build it and it’s 
the next thing and the next thing,” she said. “And look where we are, all these 
boarded-up homes” (Rosen 2005) 
Ultimately, BUILD’s efforts were successful and the Affordable Housing 
Trust Fund was created in 2005 to provide homes for the poor and the working class 
in Baltimore. The fund was created as part of a deal struck by then-Mayor Martin 
O’Malley and then-City Council President Sheila Dixon to win support for a city-




hotel, but organized 10 out of 15 votes on the city council to invest in neighborhoods 
beyond the hotel. When O’Malley and Dixon saw they did not have the votes on the 
council to support the project, they structured a $59 million bond bill to rebuild 
blighted neighborhoods. The final vote was 9-6 and several council members vot d 
for the hotel only after they were assured of the $59 million housing fund. Legislation 
that created the fund says it should be used for essentially three purposes: acquisition 
and demolition of property; planning, preservation, rehabilitation and developm nt of 
economically diverse housing in city neighborhoods; and rental payment and home 
purchase assistance for eligible households.  
Currently, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City is using a significant 
majority of the $59 million fund to tear down 15 public housing sites across the city. 
Housing Commissioner Paul Graziano defended using the money to demolish mre 
than 1,500 housing units, saying the sites are being prepared for redevelopment. But 
critics say that the new housing is years away, if it materializes at all, and that the loss 
of housing units is inexcusable when 20,000 households are on a city waiting list for 
housing and specific redevelopment plans are lacking. City Council President 
Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, who supported the convention center hotel deal, said 
demolition is an appropriate use of the affordable housing money. 
At six of the sites, plans are in place for the construction of 3,700 new mixed-
income housing units. Nearly half of the units would be affordable or low-income 
housing. According to newspaper accounts, Graziano could not say how much of the 
$59 million is going toward demolition, but he acknowledged that it will be a 




first task is to eliminate blighted, abandoned properties that are a drain on 
neighborhoods, and planning will come after that. “There’s no reason to leave 
blighted and largely, if not totally, vacant housing sitting there,” Graziano said. “So, 
if we can do demolition work in advance, we have eliminated blight and made a site 
ready for rapid redevelopment once we have adopted a plan and selected a 
developer.” Graziano called it “part of a citywide blight elimination effort” (Kiehl 
2007). 
As BUILD was the primary advocate for the creation of the fund, the 
organization’s lead organizer, Rob English, said the fund is being used as the group 
expected. He said developers are loath to spend money preparing sites for projects, so 
demolition is an acceptable use for the affordable housing fund. “That was he first 
piece of the puzzle,” English said. “The second piece is to create a plan to rebuild on 
that land. And we trust the city to do just that.” He said eliminating blight is a proper 
use of the money. “If that land sits for two years as the community develops a plan, 
that's better than this decaying mess that’s been there for years” (Kiehl 2007). 
To this end, BUILD is responsible for assembling the first new houses in the 
Oliver neighborhood in half a century. In July 2008, Governor Martin O’Malley, 
Senator Barbara Mikulski, Mayor Sheila Dixon, and State Housing Secretary 
Raymond Skinner joined representatives from BUILD and The Reinvestment Fund 
(TRF) at a housewarming celebration for new residents of Preston Place in the Oliver 
neighborhood. This East Baltimore neighborhood has been a blighted community, 
where one survey put the vacancy rate at 44 percent and where drugs and crime have 




have been abandoned, the landscape is undergoing a significant change as the first ten 
of 122 new and rehabbed homes were built in the summer of 2008. 
Preston Place is the product of a partnership between BUILD and TRF, with 
support from city and state government. The project began in 2001 when BUILD 
approached the city to help reclaim abandoned properties around Oliver, and secured 
$1.2 million to acquire 200 properties. Initially, Mayor O’Malley offered $400,000 to 
demolish old homes, but the group, hoping to bankroll a longer-term plan that 
includes other neighborhoods, insisted on millions. In 2007 the city, under Mayor 
Dixon, committed $1.2 million in HOME Funds to underwrite the cost of developing 
40 homeownership units. Additionally, the Department of Housing and Community 
Development acquired and delivered the properties in coordination with TRF. The 
Department of Housing and Community Development contributed $1.55 million to 
help acquire property and clear the land and $1.65 million to subsidize the 
construction of the homes to keep the costs down. “This is really the beginning of a 
major transformation and revitalization of the community,” said Baltimore City 
Housing Commissioner Paul Graziano (Kiehl 2008). 
Preston Place is the first redevelopment project in BUILD and TRF’s 
revitalization plan for the Oliver community and will feature 122 affordable 
homeownership units. To lead organizer Rob English, “it’s instant impact…a radical 
transformation for the Oliver community and the people living here.” All of the 
houses, to be sold to single-family homeowners, will be built in a six-square-block 
area just north of Johns Hopkins Hospital and the new east-side biopark. Oliver hopes 




the core of the neighborhood, the hope is that the renewal will spread outward 
through the entire area. 
Once a solidly middle-class community, Oliver – like so many city 
neighborhoods – saw its core residents flee for the suburbs as well as an influx of 
drug activity. Oliver hit bottom in 2002, when a firebombing killed seven mmbers of 
the Dawson family, who had battled the dealers on their block. The tragedy 
underscored the need for a comprehensive plan to rebuild the Oliver community and 
reclaim the neighborhood from violence and crime. BUILD partnered with TRF to 
form TRF Development Partners and crafted a revitalization srategy for the area to 
acquire and assemble underdeveloped real estate. Galvanized by the tragedy, 
churches and activists in the neighborhood drew up a plan to rebuild Oliver, w th 
BUILD raising money to acquire vacant houses and assemble land for new 
development.  
In discussing the partnership with BUILD and TRF, Mayor Dixon commented 
“We are celebrating the beginning of yet another project to create affordable 
homeownership on the East side…We know that expanded home-ownership in 
Baltimore is one of the keys to continuing the progress we’ve made in th  last several 
years” (City of Baltimore 2007). “Often we talk about partnerships ... but this is a true 
example of it,” Mayor Sheila Dixon said. “What we need to say to people in this 
community that are skeptical ... is be patient. Feel the spirit of all these organizations 
working together” (Cahall 2008). The state has invested more than $10 million in the 
project, federal contributions have exceeded $800,000 and the city has helped t 




The homes are being built and sold by Philadelphia-based TRF Development 
Partners, a nonprofit that specializes in reviving inner-city neighborhoods. The 
company raised the $10 million in capital needed to get the project started, promising 
investors a 2 percent return. The Oliver project will include 75 new homes, selling for 
about $139,000 each, and 47 rehabbed homes at about $99,000 each. The 
development has staggered price points, making affordable housing available to 
families ranging from 48 percent to 80 percent of Baltimore’s Area Median Income. 
The three-bedroom, energy-efficient homes are subsidized to keep mortgages at 
$140,000 for families with annual incomes of $35,000 to $60,000. “The State of 
Maryland has really understood what it takes to make affordable housing work and 
bring back vitality to Baltimore’s neighborhoods. The State joined with many private 
investors to provide TRFDP with the flexible capital needed to redevelop while at the 
same time making a mortgage commitment to homeowners during this uncertain 
credit market,” says Sean Closkey, President of TRF Development Partners (Office of 
the Governor of Maryland 2008). 
At the housewarming celebration in July, 2008, now Governor O’Malley said, 
“I am proud to stand with all of you and celebrate Preston Place, another important 
step towards the revitalization of this community. We are committed to helping the 
people of Oliver and the surrounding areas maximize their full potential as strong, 
sustainable communities” (Office of the Governor of Maryland 2008). Through the 
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), the State provided 
$750,000 to TRF Development Partners for strategic demolition in the neighborhood 




prospective Preston Place homebuyers through the Maryland Mortgage Pro ram 
(MMP). Preston Place’s MMP borrowers can also access down payment and closing 
cost assistance through DHCD’s Down payment and Settlement Expense Loan 
Program (DSELP). With the DSELP commitment, combined with MMP mortgages 
and fund provided for acquisition and demolition, the state has invested over $10 
million in Preston Place (Office of the Governor of Maryland 2008). 
Speakers at the ceremony commemorating the new housing recalled Ang la 
Dawson, an Oliver community activist who was killed along with her fiv  children in 
2002 when a drug dealer set fire to their home in retaliation for her efforts. O’Malley 
and BUILD Co-Chairman Bishop Douglas Miles said Oliver revitalization efforts 
were already under way at the time, but believed the tragedy ave the project a new 
urgency. “That tragedy was like our Alamo,” O’Malley said. “Rescuing good from 
evil ... is something that’s ingrained in the people of our city. There are very few 
cities and states that would have triumphed from that tragedy” (Cahall 2008). Preston 
Place and the revitalization of the Oliver community will be supported by additional 
redevelopment efforts in surrounding areas in Baltimore City. These efforts include: 
East Baltimore Development, Inc.’s activities, which will strengthen the Oliver 
community’s eastern border; and the East Baltimore Biotech Park, located adjacent to 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, featuring 22 acres of mixed use development and up to 
8,000 jobs. And with Hopkins employees being able to receive a $17,000 tax credit 
for purchasing a home, the potential for gentrification is within sight. But given its 
prime location near ongoing development and its history of activism and strong 




WIN in Washington 
In the spring and early summer of 1998, WIN leaders collected signatures of 
20,000 voters who supported WIN’s agenda of community policing, homeownership, 
universal after-school programs, and living wage jobs for District residents. In July 
and October of that year, WIN leaders conducted accountability sessions with all of 
the mayoral candidates, seeking public commitments to WIN’s agenda. With 
information from each candidate, WIN leaders distributed 40,000 voter informati n 
cards during the summer and 60,000 in the fall informing citizens of the mayoral 
candidates’ responses to the agenda. According to WIN, Anthony Williams, the 
eventual winner, was the only candidate to publicly commit to the group’s full 
agenda. 
In November 2000, WIN leaders gathered with Delegate Eleanor Holmes-
Norton, Mayor Williams and religious leaders from key denominations in the city to 
break ground for 147 Nehemiah affordable homes at the old Fort Dupont public
housing site, the first of 1,000 affordable homes pledged to be built by the Williams 
administration in partnership with WIN. Construction began in 2002, and leaders 
assembled in September 2003 for the ribbon-cutting at Dupont Commons Nehemiah. 
At this affordable housing development, WIN secured 147 contracts for first time 
homeowners with incomes between $15,000 and $60,000. In December 2003, the 
first owners moved in, and the last round of new owners came in February 2005. 
After being elected, Williams helped WIN build these townhouses for first-time 
buyers, in addition to preventing foreclosure on 1,000 units of subsidized housing and 




In December 2002, Mayor Williams pledged before 600 WIN leaders to create 
the $200 Million Neighborhood Investment Fund and to start immediately to address 
neighborhood blight, particularly east of the river in Wards 7 and 8. Atthe same time, 
there was much excitement when Major League Baseball returned to the Washington 
after 34 years. But its arrival ignited strong feelings in the city, particularly in 
communities east of the Anacostia River that have largely felt disconnected from the 
renaissance experienced in the rest of the District. The push for a baseball team 
prompted the group to seek a huge down payment on the promised investment in 
neighborhoods. In June 2003, 75 clergy and lay leaders from WIN attended the DC 
Council’s Finance and Revenue Committee hearing to demand that the council and 
mayor take action on Bill 15104 – “DC Neighborhood Economic Development and 
Investment Amendment Act of 2003” – before taking action on baseball financing 
legislation (Washington Interfaith Network 2003).  
The bill would raise at least $100 million to capitalize the $200 Million 
Neighborhood Revitalization Fund called for by WIN; the bill was also supported by 
9 council members. Supporters on the council included the two leading candidates for 
mayor in the next election – Linda Cropp and Adrian Fenty; this is significant as 
Williams decided not to seek reelection and his legacy in the District would be tied to 
the stadium deal. WIN’s position was that the mayor had taken no action in the 
targeted WIN neighborhoods because he was too busy promoting a public finan ing 
scheme to lure the Montreal Expos to Washington. At a press conference, WIN clergy 




the neighborhoods received equivalent resources for rebuilding (Washington 
Interfaith Network 2003). 
Mayor Anthony Williams’ proposed financing package for a $440 million 
baseball park in Southeast Washington included a bond issue, a sales tax on in-
stadium purchases and a new tax on city businesses that take in $3 m llion or more a 
year. The proposal was controversial to leaders of the faith community who know the 
city’s human needs firsthand. Many were happy to see baseball coming to the 
nation’s capital, but they did not want resources diverted from the city’s o her 
responsibilities, such as educating its young, caring for its sick and uplifting its eedy.  
Rev. Lionel Edmonds of WIN said the group had “conversations with [D.C. 
Council] people to ensure that there is an equal investment in neighborhood funding 
compared with the baseball stadium. If you’re going to put $500 million into baseball, 
you’re going to put $500 million into neighborhoods. . . . There ought to be a dollar-
for-dollar match,” said Edmonds (Murphy 2004). The Rev. Joseph Wayne Daniels, 
senior pastor at Emory United Methodist in Northwest, said that although “there is a 
lot of excitement” about baseball’s arrival, “we got schools falling apart . . . we got 
marching bands in high schools that can’t even afford new uniforms . . . and here we 
are investing $400 million in a baseball team. . . . There is great anger in churches 
that our values are misplaced, our priorities are misplaced” (Murphy 2004). 
The Rev. Roger Gench, pastor of New York Avenue Presbyterian Church in 
Northwest wanted equivalency. “If the mayor can propose a tax on busi ess to go for 
a stadium, why couldn’t he do the same thing for low-income housing?” he asked. 




great thing, but it’s got to benefit everyone, not just a few people” (Murphy 2004). 
The pastor of 19th Street Baptist Church in Northwest, the Rev. Derrick Harkins, said 
that the city must invest in human capital, by funding education, street saf ty and 
health care. “I’ve just never seen from the mayor’s office or, for that matter, the 
business community . . . the collective will to address those issues,” Harkins said. “If 
you had said you’re going to infuse the public school system with $400 million, just 
imagine what you could begin to talk about” (Murphy 2004). The most ambitious 
project in WIN’s history was the effort to mobilize its member congregations to urge 
the city to invest $1 billion in neighborhoods for such projects as parks, recreation 
centers, computer laboratories and sidewalks. 
The Neighborhood Investment Fund (NIF) is a pot of money set up to appease 
the Washington Interfaith Network and other activists during ballpark negotiations in 
2004. The NIF, which is funded with up to $10 million yearly from personal property 
tax revenue, was intended to fund revitalization projects in a dozen underserved 
neighborhoods through a rigorous planning process. In January 2004, the 
Neighborhood Investment Act created a $100 million fund secured by dedicating 
15% of the revenue from the personal property tax on businesses for 12 target 
neighborhoods where WIN member institutions organized. In March 2004, WIN 
secured the next $100 million for neighborhoods through tax increment financing and 
announced WIN’s new goal, $1 billion for Neighborhoods First, which would be 
achieved by capturing $500 million in tax increment financing revenue from the 
city’s projected $8 billion investment in the Anacostia Waterfront Development 




In December 2004, after two years of organizing in the community ad 
garnering leverage at the legislative level, WIN – through the DC Council – 
compelled Mayor Williams to include a $450 million Community Benefits Fund in a 
bill to fund the construction of a new baseball stadium on the Anacostia wa erfront – 
keeping the commitment to WIN to make an equivalent investment in the 
neighborhoods. The commitment to Neighborhoods First included in the bill was the 
creation of a $450 million fund capitalized by revenues from a tax increment 
financing district in the area surrounding the stadium. The revenue is supposed to be 
dedicated to affordable housing, neighborhood retail, libraries, other public faci ities, 
infrastructure repairs and upgrades in the city’s poorest neighborhoods. 
“We wanted baseball not just for the sake of baseball,” Anthony Williams told 
600 people at a WIN gathering. “Our challenge is to put our arms together and lift up 
all parts of our city” (Pierre 2005). Despite the initial grievances and skepticism 
regarding the stadium deal, some consider Williams an ally who made good on his 
promises. “We have to give credit where it's due,” said the Rev. Marcus Turner, the 
pastor at Beulah Baptist. “The mayor has been working hard” (Pierre 2005). Mayor 
Williams pledged to start putting money into a $450 million community i vestment 
fund, which was tied to the proposed new baseball stadium, three to five years earlier 
than planned. The fund was not expected to start producing benefits until 2011 at the 
earliest. But according to Williams, there was enough private inv stment in the 
proposed site to allow the city to free up money in its budget so it could start building 




season, when the new stadium opened. However, with construction delays and cost 
overruns, the price tag for the stadium eventually ballooned to $611 million.  
At a WIN candidate forum in 2006, the leading candidates for mayor pledged 
to make social justice for children and the poor their top priority in office, vowing to 
spend about $1 billion on neighborhood redevelopment, youth services and 14,000 
units of affordable housing. In front of more than 800 coalition members, the 
candidates promised to pay for those programs without raising taxes by managing 
existing city funds more efficiently and by generating cash from development 
projects. Council member Adrian Fenty pledged to find $350 million in “new 
dedicated revenue” for such youth services as libraries, recreation centers and 
extracurricular activities in public schools. “I commit to you that I’m going to raise 
the bar,” Fenty said, explaining that the city’s housing production trust fund and its 
new school modernization fund are both being bankrolled with existing tax revenue. 
“We’ll take that $7.4 billion budget we have and make sure the money goes to the 
priorities that you and the rest of my constituents want it to go to” (Montgomery and 
Woodlee 2006).  
Each candidate was asked to respond to three questions: would they dedicate 
an additional $500 million to neighborhoods, $350 million to youth services and at 
least $117 million a year for affordable housing? All of their answer  were yes and 
the candidates also promised to meet with leaders of WIN at a later date to lay out 
more detailed plans for accomplishing their goals. In the meantime, he organization, 
which did not endorse a candidate, put more than 400 election workers on the streets 




the Democratic primary. “Others have come before us, and they said they would put 
neighborhoods first, and it didn’t really happen,” the Rev. Christine Wiley of 
Covenant Baptist Church told the crowd. “Read my lips. We are aware of the 
promises in the past that were made and not kept. We’re going to hold you 
accountable” (Montgomery and Woodlee 2006). 
In 2009, Mayor Fenty proposed taking $11.6 million from the NIF and 
spreading it to various places around the government. Much of it, under the p oposal, 
is to stay under the control of the deputy mayor for planning and economic 
development. Up to $10 million annually from personal property taxes gointo the 
Neighborhood Investment Fund which was created to improve the city’s neglected 
neighborhoods. However, the fund is being divided among several agencies and 
funneled to big-budget nonprofits such as the Kennedy Center in Mayor Fenty’s new 
proposed spending plan. Ed Lazere of the D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute, informed of the 
mayor’s moves, expresses some concern: “It seems like they’re using the [NIF] in 
part just to plug holes in the mayor’s budget….In some ways, it’s no  a huge problem 
[that they’re not following the NIF process]…but it seems like some of these things 
aren’t in keeping with the spirit of the law, which is to fund neighborhood projects” 
(DeBonis 2009). 
By law, the office of the deputy mayor for planning and economic 
development is supposed to gather community input before deciding how to use the 
fund, which will have more than $17 million in 2010, according to the budget. In the 
past, community groups have jockeyed for the money after city officials have met 




newspaper accounts, some council members say that has not happened duri g the 
most recent budget cycle. “This particular budget, they’ve eliminated the whole 
process of coming to the community with a spending plan. They just want to give the 
money to who they want to give the money to,” said Council member Kwame Brown. 
“It’s just another way to do earmarks” (Stewart 2009).  
Under the proposed budget, only $5.4 million of the $17 million will be set 
aside for neighborhood groups. About $1.6 million will be transferred to the 
Commission on Arts and Humanities and distributed through grants of mostly 
$250,000 to the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, the Washington 
National Opera, the D.C. Jewish Community Center and other groups, all based in 
Northwest. Brown, chairman of the Committee on Economic Development, said that 
the groups may be “worthy” but that he is disappointed with the process and how 
some remaining funds could be used under the plan. A spokesman for the deputy
mayor’s office, said that there was an error in the budget book and that more money 
will be awarded to community-based projects than is currently refect d in the 
document. The spokesman said that the budget is actually less than $17 million and 
that the deputy mayor’s office will award $11.8 million to neighborhood groups 
(Stewart 2009). 
Assessment of Outcomes 
As a result of the work of BUILD and WIN, neglected portions of the city 
have received increased attention and funds have been dedicated toward 
neighborhood revitalization. In both cities, the major vehicle for achieving 




projects. In the midst of grand development plans sponsored by mayoral 
administrations, these organizations bring additional considerations to the table that 
would not ordinarily be considered. In essence they use such plans as opportunities to 
get community/neighborhood-based agendas on the table. In Baltimore, the $59 
million Housing Trust Fund (HTF) was secured as a result of BUILD’s activity 
concerning a new convention center hotel. In Washington, the $1 billion 
Neighborhood Investment Fund (NIF) was secured as a result of WIN’s position 
concerning a new baseball stadium.  
The two organizations engage in public political battles with mayors and city 
councils and have varying degrees of success in achieving stated agen a items. And 
while each mayor has defining characteristics and is the unique product of timing and 
local conditions, there is also a degree of overlap between mayoral regimes. 
Consequently, outcomes are not necessarily the result of one administration, but 
rather represent a point in a continuum of events. There is a long and storied history 
regarding how these things came to pass as past efforts and rel tionships contribute to 
present clout. While WIN was founded in 1996, BUILD was founded two decades 
earlier and naturally has longer history of negotiating with mayoral regimes.  
In Baltimore, BUILD had a confrontational relationship with Schaefer who 
exhibited an imperial style and acted as a foil; consequently, there was not much 
collaboration. BUILD was able to form a working relationship with Schmoke whose 
populist focus spurred him to act as partner. Under his administration, BUILD was 
able to secure some of its greatest victories including Nehemia Housing and Child 




outset, as exhibited by some high profile disagreements with BUILD. He later 
transitioned to a collaborator as demonstrated by his eventual support the 
organization’s work around housing in Oliver. While Dixon has been a long-time 
insider, she has been around long enough to go through several stages of relationship 
with BUILD. At times she has been a foil (fight over convention ceter hotel), 
sometimes Dixon has been a collaborator (housing in Oliver). Ultimately, BUILD’s 
public fight with then-Mayor O’Malley and then-Council President Dixon resulted in 
the affordable housing trust fund. 
In Washington, WIN did not have much of relationship with Barry whose 
final mayoral term was ending as the organization was getting off of the ground. WIN 
was able to form a collaborative relationship of necessity with Williams; while a 
technocratic outsider, the neighborhood investment fund was secured in exchange for 
the baseball stadium that he desired. Fenty who came in as changer with populist 
tendencies acted as a partner from the outset, further supporting and expanding the 
neighborhood investment fund. Because BUILD has been around longer than WIN, 
there is a longer track record of successes; this does not, however, mean that the 
magnitude of successes is necessarily greater. Grassroots organizations are critical, 
yet the local economic and social context contributes to the effectiveness of 
community organizing and the policy outcomes generated in response. To this point, 
the relative wealth of cities has an impact – in the District, a larger local economic pie 
corresponds to a larger slice for organized communities, while Baltimore is a cash 




Recently, scholars have embraced the notion that non-profits can play avit l 
role in the governing process in America’s cities (Ferris 1994). As Boyte (1989:17) 
notes, “IAF groups shifted from simply protest organizations to the assumption of 
some responsibility for policy initiation and what they call governance.”As Hula, 
Jackson, and Orr (1997: 478) note, governing nonprofits seek to “restructure local 
political agendas” by assuming “ a number of roles and responsibilities traditionally 
identified with formal governing authorities, including the identification of citizen 
preferences, program design, securing public resources, and marshalling public 
opinion.” It is through governance that an organization moves from protest and 
electoral mobilization to the delivery of public goods. This phase involves th  ability 
to affect the implementation of policy by elected and appointed officials. 
Both BUILD and WIN have been successful at negotiating concessions from 
local government, however, the usage of these hard-won funds (Baltimore’s HTF and 
Washington’s NIF) remains under the auspices of the respective mayoral 
administrations. And because of the fungibility of set-aside money ad the potential 
for misuse, community-based organizations must continue to stay on top ofelected 
officials to ensure that programs and funds are being implemented as designed; thus, 
they need to be ever vigilant in following the money from allocatin o expenditure. 
Additionally, the preceding chronicle of recent events does not yield end results – 
given the fact that efforts are currently ongoing – but one may make predictions give  
past campaigns and levels of success. In particular, the emphasis on br cks and mortar 
does not necessarily address the development of human resources which have lagged 




neighborhood’s stability, such as crime, drugs, lack of employment, and a poor 
education system.  
Even with improved housing, this does not improve schools and provide the 
amenities that neighborhoods need to thrive. Hence, some of the areas included in the 
Nehemiah project remain impoverished and isolated. BUILD has worked for years to 
build hundreds of new houses in some of the city’s roughest neighborhoods. Some of 
those houses in West Baltimore’s Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood stand in neat, 
red-bricked contrast with the boarded homes and graffiti-riddled former shops. This is 
a lesson that BUILD has learned well; consequently the organization’s more recent 
housing ventures have sought to play off of existing strengths by going into areas 
adjacent to other development. 
It is undoubtedly true that organizing gives voice to the marginalized and can 
be a catalyst for substantive change. However, community organizing does have its 
limitations, specifically when it comes to addressing larger systemic issues such as 
eradicating poverty or completely transforming public education. Traditional social 
welfare programs that appear redistributive and only benefit the poor tend to be a 
much harder sell than housing redevelopment programs which generate broad r 
support. The issues affecting cities such as Baltimore and Washington are long-
standing, complex and dependent on numerous factors. IAF affiliates like BUILD and 
WIN have been able to make strides in housing and education, but are unabl  to – nor 
are they designed to – do it all by themselves. Government has its role, the 
community has its role, and the two must be in relationship with eac one another. As 


















Deuteronomy 15:11 – “There will always be poor people in the land. Therefor I 
command you to be openhanded toward your brothers and toward the poor and 
needy in your land." 
According to the Christian tradition, the statement attributed to Jesus that “the 
poor will always be with us” appears in Matthew 26:11. Over time some have taken 
this passage to mean that since poverty is a constant issue, one can turn a blind eye to 
its existence. However, a more thoughtful reading of the verse and knowledge that it 
alludes to the Old Testament scripture above calls for a different type of response. It 
exhorts the people of God to both acknowledge the reality of inequality in the world 
and work on behalf of those who have not. Nevertheless, regardless of religious 
affiliation, the looking away from poverty and the multiple ills that befall urban 
communities has become quite accepted and pervasive in American society. As de 
from token gestures of concern during moments of crisis (see Hurricane Katrina), 
there is a serious lack of attention to the economically, socially, nd politically 
disadvantaged and the work required to change their collective fate. Rather than 
regarding the members of distressed communities as active and qual participants, it 
is quite commonplace to view them only as subjects or clients to be serv d. However, 
self-determination through community empowerment is a way to not only address the 
material needs of the marginalized but also to provide the social and political capital 




This dissertation looks at community organizing as a means to influence local 
policy, including distribution of resources and services at the local level. For critics, it 
is quite easy, and unfair to assert that community organizing has no significant imp ct 
because one can see that all of the problems that beset Baltimore and Washington 
have not been solved. Of course, there are still poor people (they will always be with 
us) and neighborhoods suffering from high unemployment and crumbling housing 
stock. However, I argue that such conditions would be even worse in the absence of 
organizing activities. A major facet of my argument is that many of the recent 
benefits, which some may consider mere table scraps, would never have trickled 
down to the masses without some ground-level push. Put differently, even though a 
local administration/government may have its heart in the right place, the distribution 
of economic resources and changes in policy will not occur unless there is p ssure 
emanating from community driven movements.  
Poverty has continued to be persistent, concentrated demographically and 
geographically, and relatively isolated from the mainstream social and economic 
forces in this country. Many of these challenges have been attributed to the lack of 
social capital, and community building through organizing has been developing as a 
way of addressing these challenges. Although a political orientatio  based on 
organizing may not cure all of the maladies associated with American capitalism, it is 
much more useful and relevant than pontificating about what might be ultimately 
desirable, but which will never be. If the racial/economic/social revolution were to 
have occurred, it would have done so decades ago when the climate was most open to 




production never have nor will be willing to part with that which sustain  their 
entrenched positions (power elite) without a degree of cajoling. 
This project began with several research questions and hypotheses. Through 
my research we are able to better understand how these elem nts fit together. My 
qualitative approach is rooted in experiences (academic, personal, professional) 
which have guided my thinking and provided the contextual background to make 
informed assertions. In my opinion, this undergirds my ability as a scholar to make 
practical and relevant contributions. Hence, one of the goals of my work is to appeal 
to both scholars and practitioners.  Through this research project I have come to the 
conclusion that above all, it is context that matters. By context I am referring to each 
city’s unique history, social structures, economic conditions and political a tors. 
Context influences when and how community organizing develops, the composition 
of organizations, the issues they seek to address, and the response from local regimes.  
The first question was what role does the leadership style of the mayor have 
upon the longevity and success of community organizing initiatives? It is my 
contention that leadership matters, and the degree to which community organizers are 
integrated into the governing structure depends somewhat on the orientation of the 
mayoral administration. Mayoral philosophies fit into a general typology, which is by 
no means discrete, but provides a shorthand mechanism for categorizing and 
critiquing mayoral administrations and governing regimes. Also related to context is 
the nature of relationships between organizing affiliates and mayoral regimes. While 
mayors are generally seen as the central political actors at the local level, they are not 




The truth is that there are both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms at play. 
As such, organizers cannot achieve their desired ends on a totally independent basis 
and must rely on the government to be partners since they hold the keys to local 
resources. Also politicians (mayors) work in four year cycles, however, organizers 
work regardless of who is office. Nonetheless, there are certain factors that are 
associated with successful organizing. Aside from the organizations hemselves, one 
significant factor is mayoral leadership. There are some types of mayors that are more 
amenable to grassroots participation and redistribution than others. In particular, 
populist mayors are most likely to partner with organizing affiliates, whereas 
development minded mayors are less likely to do so willingly. As relationships are 
constantly evolving, some mayors are going to be initially more rec ptive than others, 
while others can either be forced into cooperation or they can engage in a process of 
social learning the longer they work with community organizations.    
The second question was what impact does the political structure – presence 
or lack of structured community participation – have upon the existence of grassroots 
organizations? In Washington it appears that structured participation nd descriptive 
representation made organizing seem less necessary because of perceived inclusion in 
the local power structure. In Baltimore, the lack of meaningful neighborhood 
integration and empowerment in local government caused organizing to sprout as an 
antidote to this exclusion. However, government structured avenues for neighborhood 
participation can prove to be insufficient, resulting in the call for grassroots 
organizing efforts. Depending on the circumstances and the area of the city, ANCs 




commissioners with higher education, economic resources and political connections 
tend to see themselves as co-equal with the government and have a high deal of 
efficacy. In less affluent sections, commissioners with less education, few economic 
resources and no political connections see themselves more as advocates, but are 
often ineffective.    
At the outset, I hypothesized that there might be a synergistic effe t between 
organizing and structured forms of participation. However, my research in 
Washington revealed that the Advisory Neighborhood Commission system and WIN 
had relatively little overlap. The issues addressed and methods employ d are 
significantly varied as the former often acts as a procedural arm of the government 
while the latter is more advocacy-based. Nonetheless, I contend that structured forms 
of participation like the ANC are indeed useful to supporting local democracy. While 
they may not necessarily act as advocates, it is important for local democracy to have 
community representatives engaging with local government in the policy making 
process. The minimal collaboration between WIN and the ANCs may constitute 
untapped potential within the District. Perhaps if the two worked together they might 
be able to exercise greater political leverage.   
The third question was why did organizing (IAF affiliate) take root in 
Baltimore over thirty years ago, while this only occurred in Washington during the 
course of the last thirteen years? I hypothesized that community organizing and 
advisory councils are individually necessary, but more optimal when in tandem. Each 
has its own merits, however, if combined in a substantive fashion, inclusive 




and responsive system. In Baltimore, the long history of organizing has served as a 
link between neighborhoods and government in the absence of a structured 
mechanism. As a city such as Washington gentrifies, it becomes all too apparent that 
successive generations of black leadership and structured neighborhood 
representation are insufficient when it comes to meeting the needs of distressed 
communities. 
As the ANC is set up to be more procedurally focused, there is a need for 
organizers to help build political efficacy in resource poor communities. One WIN 
organizer relayed the story of how addressing seemingly minor issues can help to 
build efficacy and power in neglected communities. He used the example of one 
priest who tended to avoid confrontational politics, and contended that “nobody gets 
to talk to the mayor”. After becoming involved with the organization, he called on the 
Director of the Department of Transportation to fix a stoplight and crosswalk and is 
now one of the more engaged pastors. The point is that in marginalized communities, 
residents must often be convinced of their own power to push for change and that 
small steps can lead to big things.  
Clearly, it is an uphill battle, but this is the purpose of IAF affili tes like WIN 
– to teach communities how to speak truth to power through organizing. When money 
and status are lacking, communities must rely on their greatest str ngth – people 
power.  One of the beauties of WIN is that it has been able to form a constituency 
throughout the District – including sections that are as starkly disparate as the largely 
wealthy Ward 3 and poverty stricken Ward 8. It is this breadth that makes them such 




– the organization can legitimately contend that it “stands for the whole” in keeping 
with the IAF model. 
The last question was how effective are the organizing strategies mployed by 
IAF affiliates? Are they catalysts for significant policy hange, or only responsible 
for limited improvements at the fringes? In Baltimore and Washington, the respective 
IAF affiliates (BUILD and WIN) have managed to emerge as significant players in 
the policy arena, particularly when it comes to affordable housing. It appears that the 
strength of the mayor in relation to the city council and the types of projects for which 
the administration needs broad support has an impact on the degree to which the 
agendas of broad-based grassroots organizations are addressed. This is evidenced by 
deal-making regarding municipal projects; in Baltimore this meant securing 
affordable housing in exchange for the convention center hotel, and in Washington 
this meant securing affordable housing in exchange for the baseball stadium. 
The outcomes associated with organizing are based not only on ground-level 
activism, but are also based on local economic and political realities. In other words, 
political will is necessary but is insufficient on its own accord; there must also be 
money available to dedicate to agenda items. As we have seen, the key to exerting 
power and extracting resources is to link requests to support for development projects 
favored by city hall. IAF-style community organizing is valuable b cause it 
represents the interests of marginalized communities, while drawing strength from its 
broad-based model. Ultimately, the most optimal scenario is to have a sympathetic 




resources to dedicate to issue areas. Absent these conditions, it becomes increasingly 
difficult – but not impossible – to make progress on an organization’s stated agenda. 
As far as collaboration with local government, WIN currently has a more 
optimal situation characterized by regular meetings, an ambitious agenda, and hefty 
financial concessions. However, conditions such as a housing boom, populist mayor, 
etc. cannot be transported to other locales. At this time, BUILD’s relationship is more 
strained typified by infrequent meetings and battling over scarce local resources. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that WIN benefited from a unique situation in 
Washington with plenty of money and a cooperating mayor. On other hand, while 
BUILD has had both amiable and contentious relationships with mayoral 
administrations, their level of success over the years – in a chronically poor city – is a 
testament to their viability as local power.  
Regardless, the strategies and accomplishments of each of these organizations 
may prove to be instructive for organizers in other cities. The main take-away point: 
local governing regimes tend to push for downtown development – use this as an 
opportunity to lobby for neighborhood investment.  IAF affiliates like BUILD and 
WIN preach that they are financially independent and survive based on organized 
money – dues. While this is largely true, it would be disingenuous to claim that such 
large scale projects are funded by such meager resources. However, hil  the 
organizations may accept foundation grants and outside contributions for specific 





Also, as the Industrial Areas Foundation is divided into regions, BUILD and 
WIN fall under Metro IAF which is made up of 17 affiliates in the Northeast (Boston, 
New York, New Jersey), Southeast (DC, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina)  and 
Midwest (Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin). This body meets periodically for group 
trainings, actions, etc. and the affiliation is also being used to push for broader, more 
national issues. While IAF affiliates function as autonomous units, there has been 
some recent movement toward collective action at the state level. At a meeting in 
December 2008, Action in Montgomery (AIM), People Acting Together in Howard 
(PATH) and BUILD voted to come together as Maryland IAF in order to leverage 
their strength and lobby at the state legislature regarding the distribution of federal 
stimulus funds.  While Maryland IAF encompasses the three affiliates in the state of 
Maryland, it does not include WIN, which reflects the Washington DC’s unique non-
state status.  In any event, this unification of affiliates may be appropriate if it results 
in greater strength and recognition at the state level. However, on  drawback could be 
the perceived loss of local ties and an agenda that may be too broad to speak to 
specific circumstances at the local level. 
Nevertheless, one of the benefits of the IAF network is the sharing of 
ideas/concepts. As an example, BUILD leaders decided to take on the issue of work 
and wages in 1992. The result was that BUILD discovered that many of the people 
using social services offered by BUILD churches were low-wage workers in service 
jobs, and that many low-wage workers were employed by contractors doing business 
with the city. That led to BUILD’s demand that the city include “Living Wage” 




bring a family of four above the poverty line. After a series of large actions with 
Mayor Schmoke, terms of a bill were negotiated and passed in 1994. BUILD and 
Baltimore began what has become a national and international movement. Today, 
because of BUILD’s efforts, no politician can talk about jobs without using the term 
“living wage.” 
At this point, I will now return to the story at the beginning of this dissertation 
– BUILD’s exchange with Mayor Dixon at the Board of Estimates meeting in 
December 2008. Through the federal stimulus plan, the state of Maryland did receive 
an infusion of funds that were used to plug some of the holes in Baltimore City’s 
budget; however the money was not dedicated to youth as requested by the 
organization. While the effort to force the mayor’s hand on youth spending was 
unsuccessful, BUILD continues to be at the forefront of the fight for youth funding, 
particularly around the city’s recreation centers that have been slated to close during 
the summer of 2009. Meanwhile, talks of a new arena have stalled as have many 
other development projects during this time of economic uncertainty. A major 
challenge presented by economic downturns is that big ticket projects ften go by the 
wayside. Short-term outlooks could be bleak if agenda items can only be realistically 
be tied to seemingly once-in-a-generation development opportunities. The ability of 
local government to address long standing issues is contingent on the quantity and 
availability funding sources. It is increasingly difficult to direct adequate attention 
toward struggling neighborhoods in the face of limited financial capability and cities 




Nonetheless, there still remain opportunities for collaboration between 
organizing affiliates and local governments. Although this dissertation has focused 
primarily on accomplishments in the realm of affordable housing, BUILD and WIN 
cannot be reduced solely to this issue. As the IAF model prescribes, th e 
organizations have a broad scope and have the flexibility to shift priorities in light of 
local conditions. In addition to housing, the organizations have also focused on 
banking, community policing, drug treatment, education, employment, recreation, etc. 
Ultimately, the story is ongoing as both BUILD in Baltimore and WIN in Washington 
continue to push their respective local governments to be accountable to community 
determined agendas. It is this push – sometimes successful, sometime no  – which 
brings often marginalized and neglected citizens into the political process. Again, 
IAF-style community organizing does not operate on a utopian basis, but functions on 
a pragmatic foundation – dealing with the world as it is, while always pursuing a 
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